

HSSE
DOC

44.IN 8/16:K84/pt.1

ACTIVITIES OF THE KOREAN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE UNITED STATES

PURDUE UNIVERSITY
SEP 21 1976
LIBRARY

HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

PART I

MARCH 17 AND 25, 1976

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1976

73-271

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price \$1.30
Stock Number 052-070-03527-7

9148

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania, *Chairman*

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin	WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio	EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina	PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida	JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama
CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan	J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania	PIERRE S. DU PONT, Delaware
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota	CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr., Ohio
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York	EDWARD G. BIESTER, Jr., Pennsylvania
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana	LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York	BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York	TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania	ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina	
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts	
LEO J. RYAN, California	
DONALD W. RIEGLE, Jr., Michigan	
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois	
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York	
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey	
DON BONKER, Washington	
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts	

MARIAN A. CZARNECKI, *Chief of Staff*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota, *Chairman*

DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida	EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York	PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts	
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois	

ROBERT B. BOETTCHER, *Subcommittee Staff Consultant*
THOMAS R. SMEETON, *Minority Subcommittee Staff Consultant*
JEANNE M. SALVIA, *Staff Assistant*
RICHARD MAUZY, *Research Assistant*

CONTENTS

WITNESSES

Wednesday, March 17, 1976:	
Henderson, Gregory, professor, Tufts University, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.....	Page 2
Kim Hyung-il, president, Korean Community Federal Association of Southern California.....	33
Kim Woon-ha, Editor, The New Korea newspaper, Los Angeles, Calif.....	16
Ranard, Donald L., former Director, Office of Korean Affairs, Department of State.....	11
Thursday, March 25, 1976:	
Ranard, Donald L., former Director, Office of Korean Affairs, Department of State.....	66

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Personal Résumé of Yi Yong-un, translated by Key P. Yang, Korean Area Specialist, Chinese and Korean Section, Library of Congress.....	19
Copy of ad contract and letter to the New Korea newspaper.....	21
"New Korean Community Center—Consulate Office in Disguise," article from the New Korea, October 30, 1975, by Yung-gill Kook.....	24
"KCIA Gets On Tunney's Campaign Trail," article from the New Korea, September 11, 1975, by Yung-gill Kook.....	26
"Senator Tunney's Statesmanship," article from the New Korea, September 18, 1975, by Yung-gill Kook.....	27
"Korean Consulate General: Condemned," article from the New Korea, November 6, 1975, by Yung-gill Kook.....	29
"KCIA Agents All Out To Get New Korea," article from the New Korea, November 21, 1975.....	30
"An Appeal To Concerned Citizens," article from the New Korea, November 21, 1975.....	31

APPENDIX

1. Letter from Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman of the Committee on International Relations, authorizing Hon. Donald M. Fraser, Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, to administer oaths to witnesses pursuant to the subcommittee's inquiry.....	83
2. Newspaper articles and material submitted for the record:	
"Threat to Koreans in U.S. By Seoul Stirs Concern," David Binder, New York Times, August 17, 1973.....	84
"Seoul's Vast Intelligence Agency Stirs Wide Fear," Richard Halloran, New York Times, August 20, 1973.....	85
"Visiting Koreans Call Park Demonic Tyrant," Ken Wong, San Francisco Examiner, September 24, 1974.....	88
"Threatened by South Korea, Editor Says," Los Angeles Times, November 24, 1975.....	88
"United Press International Dispatch," December 24, 1975.....	88
"South Korean Abuses Tolerated," Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, May 17, 1976.....	89
"South Korean CIA: Power Grows, Fear Spreads," John Saar, May 23, 1976.....	90
"Seoul's U.S. Operatives," New York Post (editorial), March 19, 1976.....	94

1336823

3. Correspondence concerning the activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the United States:	
Letter from Congressman Donald M. Fraser to Attorney General Levi, June 12, 1975-----	95
Letter from Congressman Donald M. Fraser to FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley, August 25, 1975-----	95
Letter from Congressman Donald M. Fraser to Attorney General Levi, October 21, 1975-----	96
Letter from Congressman Donald M. Fraser to FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley, October 28, 1975-----	96
Letter from Congressman Donald M. Fraser to Attorney General Levi, November 18, 1975-----	97
Letter from Congressman Donald M. Fraser to FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley, December 17, 1975-----	97
Letter from Congressman Donald M. Fraser to Attorney General Levi, January 12, 1976-----	97
Letter from Congressman Donald M. Fraser to Assistant Secretary of State Philip C. Habib, January 30, 1976-----	98
Letter from Congressman Donald M. Fraser to Assistant Secretary of State Philip C. Habib, February 24, 1976-----	98
Letter from Assistant Secretary of State Robert McCloskey to Congressman Donald M. Fraser, March 11, 1976-----	99
Letter from Congressman Donald M. Fraser to Assistant Secretary of State Philip C. Habib, April 5, 1976-----	100
Letter from Assistant Secretary of State Robert McCloskey to Congressman Donald M. Fraser, April 28, 1976-----	101
Letter from Congressman Donald M. Fraser to Assistant Secretary of State Philip C. Habib, March 31, 1976-----	102
Letter from Assistant Secretary of State Robert McCloskey to Congressman Donald M. Fraser, April 22, 1976-----	102
4. Memoranda from Raymond J. Celada Senior Specialist in American Law, Library of Congress, concerning statutes affecting domestic activities of foreign agents:	
"Statutes Affecting Domestic Activities of Foreign Agents," March 12, 1976-----	103
"Statutes Affecting Domestic Activities of Certain Foreign Controlled Organizations," April 12, 1976-----	106
5. Korean newspaper articles submitted for the record by Prof. Gregory Henderson:	
"Korean Study At Harvard to Expand," Kim Young-hee, Chung-Anj Ilbo, March 12, 1976-----	108
"American Academic Circles' Self-Restraint on Interference With Foreign Countries," Kim Dae-joong, Chosun Ilbo, March 13, 1976-----	109

ACTIVITIES OF THE KOREAN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE UNITED STATES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 1:45 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Fraser (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee hearing is in session.

Today the subcommittee is conducting its first hearing as part of an inquiry into reports of improper or illegal activity by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the United States.

Since the summer of 1974, the subcommittee has maintained an active interest in United States policy toward the Republic of Korea in the face of continued violation of internationally recognized standards of human rights by the government of President Park Chung-hee. The determined efforts by that government to silence opposition are a matter justifying grave concern by the United States in view of our military supportive relationship with the Republic of Korea. The subcommittee has received numerous allegations that efforts to silence opposition to the Park government have extended to the United States, directed by the officials of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency against American citizens and Korean nationals living here.

Such activity is of interest to the Committee on International Relations—and this subcommittee—in exercising its jurisdiction over the relations between the United States and foreign governments. The subcommittee's inquiry will examine the allegations and all other evidence it obtains with the objective of establishing what the facts are. Allegations which prove groundless will be reported as much in the public record, and will be discarded. Likewise, if evidence of wrongdoing is substantiated, the public record will show it, and the evidence will be turned over to the appropriate Government agencies.

There are three Federal laws designed to identify and control the agents of a foreign power. All provide for penal sanctions:

First, section 951, title 18, United States Code, makes it a Federal crime for any person, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attaché, to act as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the Secretary of State;

Second, section 219, title 18, United States Code, makes it a criminal offense for any person who, being an officer or employee of the United States in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch

of the U.S. Government, acts as an agent of a foreign principal required to register; and

Third, the Foreign Agents Registration Act imposes severe criminal sanctions on any person who acts as an agent of a foreign principal within the United States unless he files a certified registration statement with the Attorney General.

We have decided to ask all witnesses during this inquiry to testify under oath. Today's witnesses have agreed to take the oath. Witnesses at these hearings will be appearing voluntarily; subpoenas have not been issued.

Our witnesses today are Prof. Gregory Henderson of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; Samuel B. Knight, Professor of the Humanities, Case Western Reserve University; Donald L. Ranard, former Director of the Office of Korean Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Kim Woon-ha, editor of New Korea, a Korean language newspaper in Los Angeles; and Dr. Kim Hyung-il, President of the Korean Community Federal Association of southern California.

In accordance with customary procedure in this subcommittee, questions will be addressed to the witnesses as a panel after all four have completed their opening statements.

In connection with the administration of the oath and testifying under oath, I call attention to the witnesses to the copy of the Rules of the House of Representatives, which have been provided to them, in extract, and also a copy of the committee rules which govern the business of the House Committee on International Relations.

In accordance with the provisions of those rules, the witnesses may decline to answer questions if they believe the questions might incriminate them. Also, if statements might tend to defame or incriminate persons, a provision is made for the taking of such testimony in executive session.

We will ask each of the witnesses to be sworn in the order of their appearance.

Our first witness this afternoon is Prof. Gregory Henderson, and, Professor, if you will stand and raise your right hand: You do solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give the committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Mr. HENDERSON. I do.

Mr. FRASER. We are delighted to have you here, Professor.

**STATEMENT OF GREGORY HENDERSON, TUFTS UNIVERSITY,
FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY**

Mr. HENDERSON. Let me express my appreciation, first, Mr. Chairman, for the courage and discretion shown by this committee in holding this hearing in the face of the many pressures brought to bear by the agencies and influences of the present Korean Republic.

First, as one who saw its birth and the context in which it came into being when I was cultural attaché and political officer of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, 1958-63; let me comment on the general nature of the organization which this committee now studies.

The Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the form we now know it was born with the violent coup which overthrew the democratic

government of Prime Minister Chang Myon and brought to Korean power a former lieutenant of Japan's repressive army, Park Chung-hee.

President Park was personally particularly well acquainted with the baser vocabulary of repression. As a Japanese officer whom Japanese sources allege to have been a "special action"—in other words, political assassination and repression—officer of the Japanese forces in Manchuria in World War II, he knew first-hand the instruments by which Japan repressed colonial Korea—the thought control police, the Kempeitai or ruthless military police, censorship, ubiquitous agents, secret subsidization of front organizations, torture, kidnaping, debauching, and defamation of character.

Several of his key younger associates, including his nephew, the recent Prime Minister, Kim Chong-pil, had been intelligence analysts and operatives specializing in the affairs of North Korea and as intimately acquainted as it is possible to be in South Korea with its methods of absolutism and control.

Park Chung-hee, Kim Chong-pil and the other key planners of the coup, including notably a Col. Suk Chong-sun, an intelligence expert now or recently resident of Lexington, Mass., founded their planning for the government they would violently midwife in 1961 on a vast, complex apparatus whose essential function was control and direction of nearly every kind.

Starting with intelligence—including liaison with the U.S. CIA and surveillance of foreigners—such controls soon included a key role in virtually all governmental planning, North Korean affairs, international affairs, labor and its unions, the collection and shakedown of needed funds, many economic and tourist functions, military, academic and other infiltration, control over oversea Koreans and, above all, surveillance and direction of all Korean political activities.

The Korean CIA—KCIA—planned, formed, and selected the initial staff for the government political party, the so-called Democratic Republican Party, an organization which, like Voltaire's description of the Holy Roman Empire, is neither Democratic, Republican, nor true Party.

This control apparatus quickly mushroomed overnight, taking over a small organization which had existed for some months before the coup and which was called the Central Intelligence Agency.

Its director, Lee Hurak, was arrested for a brief time after the coup. He much later, beginning in 1970, directed the far larger new body, masterminding the resumption of contact with North Korea from 1971 to 1973 and, in that period, much else within the Park regime.

If the name "Central Intelligence Agency" was a specious attempt at pseudorespectability as ostensibly imitating the United States, it was also a highly misleading title. Though it maintained the chief liaison with the U.S. CIA, it neither resembled nor derived from it.

Its functions are far closer to those of the NKVD, the Gestapo, or those parts of the Kuomintang controlled 30 years ago by Chen Li-fu but they functionally surpass even these.

The U.S. CIA did not inspire its Korean namesake nor was it, in the beginning, to my knowledge, even sympathetic with it. We may have midwived the precoup but not the postcoup KCIA. [I cannot con-

firm rumors that we midwived the KCIA.] My conversations with CIA operatives in 1961 gave me the impression that, like the rest of the Embassy, they supported the anterior Democratic regime and regarded its violent successor with suspicion and antipathy.

The ROK CIA is the lusty bastard of Russian-U.S.S.R. and Japanese colonial parents and its spiritual progenitor is perhaps, more than anyone, Lt. Gen. Akashi Motojiro in whom these two streams first met, an early Japanese commander of the Korean gendarmerie in 1907 who had with zealous care studied imperial Russia's control mechanisms in 19th century Poland.

The South Korean CIA's intelligence activities are vast, but the intelligence in its title has never been its core. It is, rather, a state within a state, a vast, shadowy world of an estimated 100,000 to 300,000 bureaucrats, intellectuals, agents, and thugs often the real substance of South Korean rule for which—except in most economic areas—the Korean Government Ministries and Parties are frequently a slightly more respectable facade.

Moving abroad, one finds much the same. For here, too, it is, in some respects, the real representative of the Seoul government for which ambassadors and consuls-general and career foreign service officers may be deemed the semirespectable facade.

I understand from high Korean Government sources that there are at least 18 KCIA agents in the United States with diplomatic or consular titles operating out of the Washington Embassy or South Korea's several consulates in the United States.

There are, of course, numerous other undercover agents, sleepers, and professional informers and contacts within the branch offices of Korean business corporations and among Korean immigrants in the United States.

Since the martial law, so-called Yushin, constitution in 1972, President Park and his CIA are believed to have turned the regular diplomatic and civil service officers of South Korea increasingly into a sort of auxiliary force for the Korean CIA, forcing them in some instances, according to inside sources, to perform dirty tricks for the real KCIA powers.

As Koreans, increasingly alienated from the present ruthless Seoul government, have eagerly become one of the most rapidly growing of all ethnic groups in the recent United States, the KCIA has resumed among them within this country its accustomed role of innerdirective control and power, the larger the community—like that around Los Angeles where some 80,000 Koreans live—the greater the force and instruments of KCIA control.

There is every indication that it has been active in forming, controlling, and manipulating the elections for a number of key Korean Residence Associations as testified to you last June, as well as commercial, trading, and other community groups.

The directive and controlling role to which it has for 14 years been accustomed in Korea is now gradually being transferred to rule over the Korean minority here. The more it is transferred, the more academic and other freedoms become abridged here among the growing numbers who come in touch with its world.

Before going further, two qualifications must be made. The first is that the KCIA has many functions incorporated into eight

bureaus. Most, if not all, of these bureaus are believed to have some functions in the United States, some comparatively legitimate, many not.

One must avoid the obvious temptation to condemn indiscriminately, while keeping awareness of the agency's effect as a whole. This testimony can only try to the best of my—of almost anyone's—limited ability to differentiate among the various functions the KCIA performs.

The second reservation relates, of course, to the sources and reliability of information on a secret, covert agency like the KCIA. Congress has little need to be told of the difficulty in obtaining provable information even on our own relatively more innocent or at least externally oriented CIA, let alone on one operating in a foreign base under a jealous and secretive foreign leadership in a society far more closed.

With extremely rare exceptions, KCIA agents don't identify themselves. Named agents are few. One cannot prove every link in the chain leading back from the deeds. Nor is even this agency wholly evil. It has, perhaps, more than its quota of bright, conscientious, even constructive bureaucrats.

One can only employ the best evidence possible, tested by time and source, to get as close to truth as one can. Yet the inroads being made by this agency on our own society, as the Korean population of the United States rapidly escalates to 200,000, are becoming too serious to allow murkiness to gain the upper hand over our freedoms.

We are not using evidence of this quality to condemn individuals to prison or death, but to devise policies to protect ourselves from the operations of an institution, which, in its Korean home, palpably misdirects a whole nation; here comes to threaten thousands by its presence.

These reservations made, let us see as exactly as we can what the KCIA does in this country and what the various functions it performs result in for ourselves and those we have admitted to live here as Americans or permanent residents.

Of the KCIA's eight bureaus, the first recruits personnel and collects and processes information from newspapers and magazines abroad, a perfectly normal function.

The second bureau in its internal propagandist role of overseeing the press is presumably the bureau reported to be responsible directly or indirectly for the subsidies given by the Korean Government to pro-government Korean language, or, in one or two instances like the Washington Observer, English language newspapers published in such places as Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Washington, et cetera, or distributed—along with the English language Korea Herald—from Korea through Washington and New York; and to two or so English language journals of academic tinge.

It is similarly reported to be behind the operations and financing of the pro-Park Korean language broadcasting in the United States. All these media try to give the competitive edge to the government in the struggle with the also numerous opposition Korean press whose support, of course, must be purely private and which reportedly operates under KCIA threat.

The activities of the second bureau then result not only in the propagation of distorted propaganda within the United States, but also

in unfair competition and violations of the "fairness doctrine" of the Federal Communication Commission.

Specific examples of the above activities as testified to before this committee by Prof. Jai Hyon Lee, former director of the Korean Embassy's Korean Information Office, is the "Hankook Shinmoon" of Washington, the Washington Korean Language Broadcasting, the Washington Korean Broadcasting, and Washington Korean Television.

Professor Lee, as a former high-ranking official of the Korean Government and embassy here is, of course, a witness carrying enormous weight. Let me only say that I have known Professor Lee for years prior to the violent start of the Park government, that he was then the senior Korean advisor to USIS where I was serving as cultural attaché and that he had the highest possible reputation in USIS in Seoul and throughout the American Embassy as a man of great sagacity and experience whose friendship for this country and its ideals has always been unswerving.

The third ROK CIA bureau is charged with counterintelligence and the rounding up of Korean spies. This was presumably one of the bureaus involved in the so-called Berlin incident of 1967-68 in which its agents entered a number of foreign countries and forcibly, or by wile, took Korean citizens from them without the knowledge or consent of the countries in which they were legally residing.

These Koreans were suspected of having contact with North Korean authorities in East Berlin relative to the fate of their family members in North Korea. The trial to which they were subsequently subjected in Seoul contained remarkably little evidence which would stand up in any Western court, but several were sentenced to death and killed. Almost all—17 in all—were from the Federal Republic of Germany, which canceled its aid programs for some time as a result.

But one was from England and one, I believe, from the United States. It was widely known that the KCIA agent responsible for this dastardly operation defiant of all international law, subsequently served as station chief for the KCIA in Korea's Embassy in Washington.

Another respectable and highly anti-Communist Korean professor, Prof. Tsche Chong-kil, was, according to all reports, tortured to death in KCIA headquarters not long after returning from a year's study at the Harvard Law School, on entirely unproved and unlikely suspicion of being a spy.

To this day, Koreans in this country are intimidated from expressing their opinions because they fear that at any time they might be kidnapped by Korean CIA agents here, falsely grabbed, and tortured to death if and when they visit their homeland as a result of the activities of the third and sixth bureaus of the KCIA.

No one would deny to a divided nation against the background of invasion and know cases of spy infiltration the right, indeed the necessity, of a counterintelligence operation. Since 1971, however, North Korea has greatly attenuated its former infiltration efforts as counter-productive.

South Koreans have been, since 1950, among the most convinced anti-Communists in the world and genuine spies are a rarity. Most people have the feeling that North Korean spies are more greatly

needed by the Park regime to justify its draconian measures than they are by the Pyongyang regime for subversion.

The third bureau has hence appeared to many to manufacture more spies than it apprehends. The current trend toward arresting in the anti-Communist name conservative and respectable patriots with far better anti-Communist records than President Park is more likely to weaken the anticommunism of Koreans either in South Korea or, to some extent, here than almost any other means.

Stirrings of a trend toward the left inspired far more by antagonism toward Park than by sympathy toward North Korea are already beginning to be felt within the Korean community in this country and can be expected to grow unless current ROK CIA activities can be curbed.

The sixth bureau is described as devoted to dirty tricks, sabotage and assassination, apparently having abducted the Koreans of the "Berlin incident" case. It is interesting that Mr. Sang Ho-lee, the Korean intelligence chief in Washington, Hong Tae-choi, a counselor of the Embassy, and a second secretary, Chung Il-park, both "described in intelligence circles as South Korean CIA operatives," flew to Tokyo at the time Mr. Kim was going there and returned to their Washington posts just following his Tokyo kidnapping.

With people of this ilk serving as South Korean "diplomats" in Washington it is anybody's guess how safe opposition Koreans feel even within the United States.

The seventh bureau "gathers information from abroad and refines it into intelligence for use by political leaders." This function would appear to be a normal one similar to that performed in all nations by our own—and other—embassies.

The eighth bureau carries on psychological warfare mostly against North Korean and probably has small, if any, functions here.

The ninth bureau specializes in North Korean affairs and was behind the attempts to carry out contact with North Korea. Though one, of course, regrets that these attempts had to be carried out by an intelligence and control agency, their intent was laudable and they were, for over a year from 1972 to 1973 until the Kim Dae-jung abduction, carried out with thorough planning and considerable organizational finesse.

Liaison on this subject taking place between the KCIA and American agencies is probably legitimate and should not necessarily be discouraged.

The fifth bureau, because of its enormous importance, demands special treatment. We speak here primarily of known functions which we connect with known results. We cannot prove all the links running between nor be certain that functions are invariably assigned from Seoul to the field in a watertight way.

The fifth bureau is responsible for internal security and is, with little doubt, the ubiquitously feared core of control over all political activity within Korea now implemented under emergency Presidential Decree No. 9 of May 13, 1975, which forbids, in effect, any criticism of the present governmental system outside the National Assembly. Such controls spread overseas. All letters between the United States and Korea are subject to censorship.

I heard from a high American official that a Korean citizen who had volunteered to collect and translate certain unclassified documents re-

lating to a case which I was studying as an academician which had taken place some 12 years before the Park government came to power was dissuaded from so doing by ROK CIA agents apparently as a result of intercepted letters relating only to this case.

Indeed, he was accosted inside his own office by Korean toughs, apparently in KCIA employ, who beat him up at his desk in full view of his colleagues who nevertheless did nothing to help him out of fear of what was likely in turn to befall them if they did.

American academic research on modern Korea, little enough supported as it is and needed if we are to understand a country on which we have lavished over 50,000 lives and some \$160 billion of treasure, is clearly impeded by such practices.

Responsible American correspondents are in this context prevented from proper access to development in the Republic of Korea because of the law of March 19, 1973, forbidding Koreans to "damage the prestige" of Park or his government in conversations with foreigners or statements to foreign correspondents.

Combined with Presidential Decree No. 9, this endangers any Korean informant of a foreign correspondent and even the correspondent himself within Korea. Implementation of such controls is believed to rest importantly with the fifth bureau of the KCIA.

Even worse is the effect of the KCIA enforcement of the March 19, 1973, measure as an amendment to South Korea's Criminal Code on our own freedoms here within the United States.

The law provides for as much as 7 years' imprisonment for anyone damaging this "security, national interest, or prestige" of Korea at home or abroad by criticizing the Government. Though even foreigners have been threatened under this law, its effect on Koreans living amongst us and at our universities is disastrous. No Korean attending any symposium or conference in this country—or indeed at any meeting where those unknown to him or incompletely trusted by him are present—can be certain that his words will not be reported upon to the KCIA whereupon, if what he says is critical or even if the Government wishes to construe it as critical, he can be grabbed if he ever visits his native country again, arrested, farcically tried and then thrown into jail for up to 7 years.

Since the fifth bureau also has agents in the Ministry of Justice's immigration office at Kimpo International Airport, as reliably reported in the August 20, 1973, *New York Times*, who must give final approval for the issuance of any passport and who also check all entries, Koreans fear not only for their own visits, but for the blockage of the right of any relatives ever to leave the country, something highly desired by Koreans in these times of repression.

Cases of blockage of exit—including, of course, that of Mr. Kim Dae-jung himself—are known. In addition, of course, cases of threat to or physical disruption of meetings by KCIA agents in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York are a matter of record before this subcommittee last June 10. A Chicago meeting of last summer is also understood to have been intimidated.

Nor is the effect on intellectual life only that of oral statements in meetings. Meetings themselves are manipulated through covert government sponsorship and the patronization of publication as made clear by Jai-hyon Lee and well known to himself. Koreans are now impeded from writing full and searching papers, especially doctoral

theses, on any topics related to the last 14 years of Korean experience.

If theses say anything construable as critical, they may be examined by KCIA agents in the files of universities or bought from the Ann Arbor microfilm service and the contents used to deprive their authors of freedom if they visit Korea, subjecting their names to the implication of being traitors.

Since it is now required that several copies of the doctoral dissertations of all seeking teaching jobs in Korea be deposited not only with their universities, but with the Ministry of Education, an even more automatic conduit to the KCIA is opened and some returning Koreans have had to self-censor their dissertations out of fear for their own safety.

I personally know of several instances of the above sort. The effect will increasingly be to discourage all dissertation inquiry into the last 14 important years of Korean history, an obvious invasion of American academic freedom.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out a different but apparent example of political control of Americans presumably by the Korean CIA which, if not corrected by Congress, could further abridge American freedoms, especially as they relate to Congress.

On July 8, 1975, Specialist Michael E. Kerr, of Minneapolis, Minn., was placed under guard and summarily ejected from Korea by the U.S. Army unit with which he was serving at Kimpo, Korea, after rumors that he was being investigated by the KCIA had been brought to his attention.

Specialist Kerr had, during his service in Korea, written numerous letters to this Congress, and one or two to the President, calling attention to conditions of oppression in Korea. He had written through the Army APO letters which he showed personally to other American soldiers on his base and which they signed. He had sent occasional copies of these letters to well-known American organizations such as the AFL-CIO.

These letters had been appreciated and praised by several Congressmen. Numerous inquiries to the U.S. Army, however, have failed to disclose a single specific instance in which Mr. Kerr carried on any political activities whatsoever among Koreans on or off his base or through any demonstration in presumed violation of the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement.

The Army has only made vague reply to inquiries on the subject averring political activity without specifying what it was and saying that Specialist Kerr's summary ejection violated the SOFA Agreement and was for the convenience of the service.

This appears to be an instance, Mr. Chairman, in which the U.S. military command seems to have cooperated with the KCIA which may have penetrated this Congress sufficiently to have become aware of Specialist Kerr's activities.

If there is something in the SOFA Agreement which can be interpreted to prevent American GI's in Korea from communicating with their Congressmen or President, I respectfully submit that it be made clear to the U.S. military command in Korea that any such interpretation violates the rights of American citizens.

Nothing could be more baneful for future freedom here than the cooperation of the American Armed Forces with any agency such as the Korean CIA in its attempts to abridge American freedom.

Mr. Chairman, when the coup of May 16, 1961, occurred in Korea and the KCIA rose spectrelike in the drama of Korean politics, I warned the U.S. Embassy that if such an organization got started in Korea there would be no bourn to its activities, nor any group, short of revolution strong enough to halt its growth.

I fear this prediction has been too well fulfilled. It is impossible for most Americans to imagine to what an extent this giant state-within-a-state has set man against man, sown suspicion throughout the land, atomized constructive political endeavor, transformed one of the world's most avid and ancient political traditions into the cynicism and apathy of separated, suspicions, and fearful men.

For Korea, itself, this is no prudent defense but a long-term threat to the real support of the Government. For us, it is bridgehead of repression in the midst of our free society, a force through surveillance and controls seeking to limit criticism and open discussion of a major issue, seeking through residents associations and subsidized media to create a disciplined claque for the political aims of a dictatorial regime, seeking to repress, to create fear.

In universities, there is rising concern. We have numerous bright Koreans teaching American children in our higher education system. Thousands of excellent Korean students pursue their studies here. I am quite sure I speak for very many in Korean studies when I say that the abridgements of our freedom inside this country, which I have described, press evermore on us with each week, a cause of growing concern to an expanding number of our academic institutions.

The announcement last week of the dismissal of some 460 Korean professors will have repercussions here. The pressures it betokens are bound to worsen so long as the Park regime clings by repression to power.

It is, of course, not easy to identify those involved. It is also clear, I think, that the KCIA has some legitimate function here, even if a comparatively small one.

The numbers of agents now involved, however, exceed by several times those needed for legitimate purpose. The rest should be sent packing, including all those serving outside Washington.

All organizations, furthermore, which receive their chief support in the United States from the Korean CIA should be registered with the Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The Internal Revenue Service should satisfy itself that the total income of such organizations is known and reported. Activities by Koreans suspected of having repressive aims should be brought under surveillance and control.

The United States must oppose all illegitimate and repressive activities of the Korean CIA within its borders; the worst and most ubiquitous of these are the attempts to control within our States, Koreans or Korean-Americans to whom we have promised the security and freedom of our society.

How can the United States maintain its tradition as a haven for the oppressed if it permits the importation to its shores of the very tyranny from which men most wish to flee?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Professor Henderson.

We will turn now to our second witness, Mr. Donald Ranard, and I will ask you to stand, sir.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Mr. RANARD. I do.

Mr. FRASER. We are delighted to have you, sir. Will you proceed?

**STATEMENT OF DONALD L. RANARD, FORMER DIRECTOR OF
KOREAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. RANARD. Mr. Chairman, before beginning my prepared remarks, I would like to commend Professor Henderson for what I regard as an apt, forthright and, indeed, a scholarly statement on the organizational activity of the Korean CIA.

Mr. Chairman, in view of the recent developments in Korea, it is both timely and important that your committee hold hearings on the intelligence activities of the South Korean Government in the United States. Because I share with you your concern, I have accepted your invitation to appear here today.

Allow me first, Mr. Chairman, to identify myself. I am the recently appointed Director of the Institute for International Policy, a project of the Fund for Peace aimed at development of citizen participation in foreign policy. But more directly related to this hearing is the fact that as a Foreign Service Officer now retired, I served as Director of the Office of Korean Affairs in the Department of State from early 1970 to the end of 1974.

As Country Director for Korea, I was responsible for the formulation of U.S. policy toward Korea—political, military, and economic—and for the conduct of our foreign relations with that country. In this connection, I also followed closely the intelligence activities of the South Korean Government both in Korea as well as in the United States. My testimony today emanates largely from my observations during that period, although my earlier experience in Korea at the time of the fall of Syngman Rhee and the military coup of 1961 provides me with a wider base to draw upon.

These hearings today are important for at least two reasons. To begin with, they seek at long last to publicly inquire into serious allegations of illegal activity in our country of agents or persons representing a foreign power. The fact that the foreign country involved has been a close ally of the United States is not at issue. What is of concern here today is whether representatives of that government have violated American law and have attempted to deny the human rights of Korean residents in this country.

There is another reason, and one which I believe has even greater implication for U.S. foreign policy and the image of our country abroad. To the extent that the United States allows, or even ignores, such activities within our shores, it sends signals abroad that despite lofty expressions, the United States in reality is not as attached to human values as it professes.

The fact that Korean intelligence agents have been able to carry out their schemes in the United States and to violate our laws with impunity cannot but embolden the KCIA in its evil work at home, and all but destroy the hopes of those forces in Korea who today are courageously struggling for a return to democratic institutions. For

if such activities in the United States go unchallenged, then the sentiments on behalf of human rights expressed by our Congress in economic and military aid legislation become more rhetoric. Thus the United States is not uninvolved with the activities of the KCIA, both at home and abroad—an involvement which takes on an even larger significance with the recognition that this Korean Central Intelligence Agency, as its name alone connotes, was established with the technical advice and financial assistance of our Government.

In your inquiry, it is important that you review all activities of the Republic of Korea or of Korean officials in the United States, which contravene our laws or the spirit of our constitutional guarantees and not only those of the KCIA.

While this organization is by far the largest institution involved, there are others, for example, who have operated directly out of the Blue House, and have carried on separate similar missions.

But admittedly, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency is the most influential and the most awesome intelligence arm of Korea. Established in the period immediately following the military coup of 1961 to provide for the collection of intelligence relating to the security and defense of South Korea, it moved quickly in the tradition of its predecessors, to the surveillance of the activities of people and organizations unsympathetic to the perpetuation of power by Gen. Park Chung-hee.

In time, the director of KCIA came to be more powerful and feared at home than the Prime Minister. And abroad, its chief of station—another term borrowed from American experience—was accepted by Korean Embassy personnel as more influential than the Korean Ambassador. On more than one instance, Korean Ambassadors have indicated they were unable to control the activities of supposedly subordinate station chiefs who had direct lines to the KCIA kingpin at home, and were thus hesitant to communicate to their foreign office through ordinary channels their views regarding the activities of the Embassy intelligence head.

I should like now to turn to what I regard as the KCIA persecution of Kim Dae-jung.

The concerns of the Korean Government in the United States, diplomatic as well as intelligence, during the period 1970 to 1974 were largely conditioned by one single event—the 1971 national Korean election.

In 1970, Gen. Park Chung-hee, who had seized power in 1961, was still president of Korea, having earlier amended the Korean Constitution so as to enable the continuation of his presidency for a third term. Opposing Park in the spring of 1971 was a vigorous and popular opposition candidate, Kim Dae-jung, an advocate of close ties to the United States, a realistic approach to unification and of democratic rule and human rights.

In an election characterized by the massive use of government power and finance, Park was reelected. But not before he promised publicly not to stand for office again, and only after his opposition had polled some 46 percent of the popular vote. Indeed, there were many, and I count myself among them, who believe that in a free and fair election, Kim Dae-jung would today be President of the Republic of Korea.

From the beginning of the Presidential campaign, the KCIA moved ruthlessly against Kim, both in Korea and the United States. No other public figure in Korean affairs over the past decade had so en-

raged the Blue House, and consequently the Korean intelligence apparatus. And it is sad to note that this persecution of a loyal and democratic Korean political leader continues to this day.

In early 1971, prior to the election, Kim visited the United States to meet with congressional and executive branch leaders so as to demonstrate to the Korean electorate that he was acceptable to the American Government. During his short visit here, Kim was under the constant surveillance of the KCIA who used whatever means available to them to block his appointments, to obstruct his schedule, and to limit his appeal to Korean residents in the United States. Indeed, there was reason to believe that the KCIA had actually infiltrated Kim's official party, and was thus able to report on his conversations in Washington, as well as to attempt to offset his impact abroad.

Following the election, as Kim had forecast, Park Chung-hee accelerated his march toward authoritarian rule. By the end of 1971, the country was under emergency decree, and a year later, Park Chung-hee abandoned the constitution, placed the country under martial law and had himself elected president again, this time with no limitation on tenure.

Kim Dae-jung, who was out of Korea at that time, decided not to return home. Instead, he determined to seek appointments in the United States and Japan with opinion leaders, and to address overseas Korean groups regarding the dangers to democratic rule he apparently saw looming for Korea. Again, the KCIA moved forcefully to block his appearances and his appeal. In some instances, the movement against Kim were crude and heavyhanded as in the disruption by karate strongmen of a meeting he was to address on the west coast. In other cases, it was more subtle, as for example, intimidation and threats by the KCIA to Koreans to stay away from Kim, or to avoid criticism of Park's government. But always the KCIA was on his heels.

Finally, when all such efforts to limit Kim's cause failed, he was kidnaped by the KCIA from his Japanese hotel during a visit to Japan in August 1973. It was an item of more than passing notice to the Korean communities in the United States and Japan that at the time this event occurred, the KCIA station chief in Washington had just returned to Korea on official business along with two of his subordinates.

In the United States, this agent was falsely accredited as Lee Sang-ho, but a few years earlier at the Korean Embassy in Germany, he had been known by his birth name, Yang Du-wan. That Lee or Yang, as you prefer, was the so-called bagman who had arranged the kidnaping from Germany or Korean students and others the Government wanted returned to the homeland for questioning, was a matter of no small concern to many Koreans in the United States.

The many complaints I received from private Koreans regarding the activities of the KCIA led me to warn Korean officials here that the U.S. Government would not tolerate their attempts to interfere with the rights of Koreans resident in the United States. Discussions of this nature took place between myself and various Korean Embassy officials, including the Korean Ambassador, on at least a half dozen occasions during mid-1973.

At first denying the allegations, Embassy officials subsequently admitted their inability to deal directly with the problem. I also warned the KCIA station chief himself who denied involvement in any of the incidents reported, and on one occasion attempted somewhat subtly, he thought, to intimidate me.

Finally, in the fall of 1973, when reports of KCIA intimidation and infringement continued, the Korean Ambassador was called in for a meeting with the Deputy Under Secretary of State, at my recommendation, and told in blunt terms that the U.S. Government would not countenance the activities of the KCIA to control Korean residents in the United States; such activities were to cease immediately. A few months later, after a sufficient time had elapsed so that Mr. Lee could depart without loss of face, he was recalled to Seoul where today he is a top-level supervisor at KCIA headquarters.

In mid-1973, amidst charges of KCIA harassment of a Korean Embassy officer, Lee Jai-hyon, who refused to be reassigned to Korea, I took the initiative to meet with the FBI and called for an investigation of the KCIA in the United States. After exploratory meetings, such an investigation began, but for reasons which I never quite understood, it never really got off the ground. When it finally petered out several months later, it had produced little more than mere confirmation of the basic information I had submitted initially.

As to why this investigation had never really produced more concrete results, I seem to recall an explanation that, (a), Koreans in the United States were reluctant to talk, and, (b), the FBI had a large workload at that time of other investigations. Much also seemed to be made of an explanation that to proceed properly, the FBI would need to talk directly to KCIA personnel at the Korean Embassy, which obviously the State Department had no power to direct because of their diplomatic immunity. This seemed to me to be mere rationalization, and my own conclusion was that the FBI, or those above it in authority, had no inclination to follow through on an investigation which could wind up embarrassing an ally.

Just as the opposition of Kim Dae-jung drove Park's government into almost paranoid rage, one other cause has long driven the Korean intelligence apparatus, that is, the maintenance of American support as manifested in the treaty commitment, the stationing of U.S. forces, and the provision of American military assistance. And to every Korean Government, from the formation of the republic to the present, the seat of these determinations is not the executive branch but the congress, which explains why it is that our Congress is of such importance to Korean intelligence.

The KCIA has made it its business to follow congressional actions on a day-to-day basis, to know the status of military and economic assistance legislation, the views of individual Congressmen and influential chairmen regarding stationing of forces, human rights, and other issues affecting Korea, their overseas travel, and their election campaigns.

Indeed, Korean Ambassadors as well as station chiefs are only so popular in the Blue House as they are able to demonstrate an influence with our Congress.

Evidence regarding the activities of the KCIA in the United States is indeed hard to obtain. For obvious reasons, Koreans are reluctant

to speak publicly or for the record. Many have relatives abroad, or in various ways are in need of favors or services of the Korean Embassy in Washington.

Notwithstanding this, on the basis of my observations during the period 1970-74, I believe the following to be true, and I am prepared to meet further with this committee in closed session to document my views.

The KCIA has interfered with the rights of Koreans in the United States to assemble and to express their views freely regarding affairs in Korea.

The KCIA has organized demonstrations in support of the Park government, and at other times, attempted to break up demonstrations against that government. It even planned in late 1974, at a time of government-manipulated anti-Japanese sentiment, to organize demonstrations in the United States against Japan.

The KCIA has attempted to influence the selection of officers for the various Korean resident associations in the United States and has tried to influence their policies, particularly with respect to support of the present government.

The Korean Government, either directly through the KCIA or indirectly with its help, has made offers of financial support to candidates for office in the United States. One such offer was recently reported by the Washington Post. I can confirm that this particular offer was reported to me by the person to whom it was made.

The KCIA has attempted to utilize Koreans in positions of access to influence. Again, I take for granted the recent revelations in the Washington Post regarding the use of one such person currently serving as a staff secretary in Congress.

There are curious links among organizations friendly to the present Government of Korea. One Korean individual, a former Korean military attaché in the early 1960's has since worked in an executive position for several such organizations.

The KCIA has supported various Korean newspapers and pressmen in the United States. It is alleged to sponsor a Korean research institute in Washington; It, or companion intelligence, organizations have supported seminars in Washington, or in Korea, to which American scholars have been invited with all expenses paid.

I should like to conclude, Mr. Chairman, with the following recommendations which I believe are in order as concerns the activities of the KCIA in the United States:

The nature of these allegations warrant a thorough-going investigation by the FBI into the intelligence activities of the South Korean Government in the United States.

On the basis of the present evidence, the Department of State should make emphatically clear to the Republic of Korea Government that it will not countenance the present role and conduct of the KCIA in the United States. So that there be no misunderstanding regarding this message, it should be expressed in a diplomatic note, accompanied by an oral protest made in person by the Secretary of State to the Korean Ambassador.

Expressed by anyone else in the State Department, the message will be read as mere form rather than substance, and it will be accepted in that light. Moreover, after the note is handed over, the substance should be made public.

The State Department should at the same time make clear to the South Korean Government that the only acceptable function of its KCIA in the United States is intelligence liaison.

The State Department should set a limit on the number of KCIA representatives it is prepared to accredit, and it should carefully screen the background of those assigned to ascertain they are indeed bona fide intelligence analysts. In my opinion, two, and at the most, three such intelligence liaison representatives from Korea would be sufficient for the actual work involved.

It should also be made clear that intelligence liaison representatives may be assigned only to the Korean Embassy in Washington. The assignment of intelligence personnel to any of the Korean consulates in the United States should be prohibited. This much has been told the Korean Government before, but the practice has continued, and if reports are to be believed, the number has increased.

Finally, inasmuch as the State Department has issued certain of these stipulations before, only to have them ignored, it should be prepared to back up representations with disciplinary action. Specifically, I can think of no more beneficial action than for the Department of State to declare persona non grata any KCIA station chief under whose tenure further transgressions against our laws take place.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much.

Our third witness now is Mr. Kim Woon-ha, editor of New Korea, a Korean language newspaper in Los Angeles.

Mr. Kim, will you stand, please? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. I do.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you. Mr. Douglas Reed, who is at the witness table with Mr. Kim Woon-ha, is employed as a representative who speaks Korean and who will, when necessary, be on hand to interpret for Mr. Kim Woon-ha.

Mr. Kim, why don't you proceed, sir.

**STATEMENT OF KIM WOON-HA, EDITOR OF NEW KOREA,
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.**

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Mr. Chairman, to begin with I wish to express my appreciation to you for your initiative in holding hearings on abusive and illicit activities of the Korean CIA in the United States. This will be very beneficial to both Koreans and United States citizens.

Indeed, Korean CIA agents in the United States have committed many brutal deeds. The effect of these deeds is increasing. This causes concern on the part of the U.S. Government and its citizens, so the importance of this hearing should be emphasized.

First, Korean CIA agents who have taken freedom and human rights from people in Korea and demoted Koreans to the level of domestic animals are now manipulating and intimidating Koreans in the United States by using clandestine means. They are creating a prison-type atmosphere for many Koreans living in the United States just as they have done in Korea.

These Korean-Americans are losing freedoms guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution just as their relatives in Korea have lost their freedom. They cannot express their feelings in public assemblies and are losing their human rights here; these Korean-Americans feel great pain from this kind of bondage.

The Korean community in Los Angeles where I live is the biggest in the United States. Because of abusive KCIA activities, the Korean-American residents of this area call Los Angeles the second Seoul, and they call the Korean Consul General as a generalissimo, and they call the KCIA Los Angeles chief as an emergency decree commander. Los Angeles is not U.S. territory to Korean-Americans; it has become rather a territory of South Korea. To these Koreans, the mayor of Los Angeles is not Tom Bradley but the Korean Consul General.

I would like to speak about how the KCIA is influencing Korean-Americans and Americans in the Los Angeles area.

First, I would like to describe my own situation. I am publisher and editor of the weekly *The New Korea*, the oldest Korean language newspaper. My newspaper was established in 1905 in San Francisco. Until the 1960's, it was the only newspaper for the Korean community in the United States. Before I came to the United States, I worked for *Chosun Ilbo* which is the oldest newspaper in Korea and very influential. I was associate city editor for 10 years.

From 1969 to 1970, I served the Korean Journalists Association as chairman of the Committee on Freedom of the Press. From March to December, 1971, during the Korean Presidential campaign between Kim Dae-jung and Park Chung-hee, I was first vice president and acting president of the Korean Journalist Association; I headed the first movement for freedom of the press.

My colleagues and I organized a nationwide resistance against Korean Government and KCIA pressures on the press. At that time, the KCIA had many agents in pressrooms and were trying to increase the intervention by preventing truth, real events, and criticism of the Government from being printed. They increased arrests and torture of journalists.

We could not endure it any longer; therefore, we protested it and resisted nationwide by calling for the withdrawal of KCIA agents from our companies. Because of this resistance, my colleagues and I of the Korean Journalist Association were summoned several times by the KCIA. I underwent inquisitions and intimidation. They came to my house several times frightening my wife and children. The leaders of this resistance were fired and replaced.

At that time, the president of the association resigned because of KCIA pressure. I took over the presidency, but was also forced to resign. Immediately after that, a Presidential Emergency was announced. I could do nothing in Korea. Therefore, in June 1972, I came to the United States as a special correspondent for the *Chosun Ilbo* in Los Angeles.

In August 1973, I decided to take up residence in the United States and moved to the Los Angeles bureau of *Tonga Ilbo*. In my new position, I was once again surprised because Korean-American journalism in the United States suffered conditions similar to those in Korea. This was true in the United States which guarantees freedom of the press. At that time, *Hankook Ilbo*, *Tonga Ilbo*, *Miju Shinmun*, *The New*

Korea, and the Korean Television Broadcasting Co. had offices in Los Angeles.

There were two KCIA agents who also held the titles of consul and vice consul. They directly controlled the news media. They controlled news and advertising. When reporters did not obey their instructions, they intimidated them; and additional intimidation came from newspaper headquarters in Seoul at the direction of KCIA-Seoul.

Their methods of intimidation included threats of losing jobs, refusing extension of passports and other redtape, pressuring newspaper companies to recall the Los Angeles-based journalists and sometimes physical threats were used. I was also intimidated and experienced direct intervention from the KCIA for about 1 year. In July 1974, I made up my mind to resign as editor-in-chief of the Oriental Daily News.

In August of that year, I took over The New Korea and announced a policy in that paper of protecting human rights of Korean-Americans, of protecting their well-being, of promoting the general welfare of the Korean-American community, and of upholding the tenets and spirit of democracy.

This is not Korea; this is America. Korean-Americans in this country are not people of South Korea; they are U.S. citizens or in the process of becoming U.S. citizens.

Most Korean immigrants dislike dictators. They immigrated here in search of freedom and human dignity. Why should they suffer at the hands of a dictator here? Why should they accept the intrusion on their freedom and human rights?

Reflecting on this, I decided to work for the restoration of human rights and to work for social justice for my motherland. This decision and determination were immediately reflected in The New Korea.

Korean residents overwhelmingly welcomed this kind of determination. My newspaper became a gospel of democracy, an advocate of human rights for the Korean people, and it enjoyed the reputation of fighting for these things. As a result, the Korean Consul General and the KCIA tried to influence me to become pro-Park.

In September 1974, Mr. Young Park, the Korean Consul General in Los Angeles recommended that the Korean Government invite me to Korea at government expense. They gave me several roundtrip tickets to Korea and said if I went to Seoul, the Korean Government would treat me very well. I rejected the offer and returned the tickets.

The press attaché of the Korean Consul General in Los Angeles invited me to lunch and dinner several times. He asked me not to criticize the Korean Government's pressure on Koreans and the illicit acts of Korean Government agents. I ignored his request.

I cannot remember the exact day, but I think it was in March 1974, that the KCIA agents, who were also the consul and vice consul, invited me to Pear Garden, a Korean restaurant in Los Angeles. They intimidated me by saying that I would experience retaliation if I continued to criticize the inhuman activities of the Korean Government and to publish activities of anti-Park resistors.

As I rejected their requests repeatedly, Consul Gen. Young Park, the KCIA station chief, and the press attaché invited me to luncheon at the Grand Garden restaurant of Los Angeles. They emphasized their request again. They especially asked me not to criticize President Park

directly. They pressured me to publish false stories slandering Adm. Young Woon Lee who was the former chief of staff for the Korean Navy. He is a leader in the movement for democracy and is vice chairman of the Korean congress for democracy and unification.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit that false story for the record.

Mr. FRASER. You have a copy of it?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Is it in Korean or English?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Korean.

Mr. FRASER. We will accept it. We will have to get it interpreted. We will accept it as part of your testimony.

[The document referred to follows:]

PERSONAL RÉSUMÉ OF YI YONG-UN

(Translated from Korean by Key P. Yang, Korean Area Specialist,
Chinese and Korean Section, Library of Congress)

Birth

Place of birth: 515-52 Inhŭng-dong, Pyongyang, P'yŏngan Namdo, Korea (North).
Present address: 22, 5-chome, Godanda, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo, Japan. Ikeday-Birth Division No. 406.

Military date: July 14, 1914.

World War II career: (1) Lieutenant Commander in the Japanese Navy (at the end of World War II).
(2) Chief of the General Staff (Korean Navy): February 23, 1959-September 28, 1960 (7 years and 7 months).

Military record: He was sentenced to serve a 3-year prison term on the charge of desertion from the military by the Revolutionary Military Court, and was discharged from status for return on May 2, 1962. (Therefore, it is illegal for him to use his military service for national reference purposes.)

He now lives in Japan with his wife, 2 sons and a daughter. He has dual nationality, Korean and Japanese.

PERSONAL CONDUCT OF YI YONG-UN

The Central Committee

The Central Committee of officers and members of the Sŏhae Club, a fraternal organization of reservists and their colleagues, regulars, and civilians, of the Korean Navy and Marines, on behalf of Yi Yong-un. Yi Yong-un wishes to reveal to the public the true character of Yi Yong-un, who was formerly Chief of the General Staff of the Korean Navy, and was discharged from that position before the end of his term. On two occasions, January 13 and 15, in Tokyo, Japan, he made irresponsible and groundless statements concerning the internal politics and problems of the Korean Navy, and the national security of Korea before 40 newsmen and TV correspondents. The purpose of this Committee is to inform the public of his personal affairs of Yi Yong-un by this Committee is to inform the public of his cancerous conduct which is detrimental to the prosperity of our fatherland and the future of our Korean Navy.

MISDEMEANORS OF MR. YI YONG-UN

1. Returned to Korea behind in Japan, and was in 1949, leaving his Japanese wife, two boys and a girl Sungmann Rhee. He was specially appointed as a naval commander by President

2. After the Korean government divorced Ms. Pong-yang Kim but divorced her later. amassed wealth by graft. In April 1960, he was accused of illegally the protection of Song Yo. Even though he tried hard to hold his position under the protection of Song Yo, he was dismissed from the position of Chief of the General Staff of the Korean Navy, on the charges of illegal disposal of a decommissioned LST and 25 other vessels (involving an amount equivalent to 220 million wŏn).

3. After the military coup, he was arrested by the Korean military government for his illegal disposal of a decommissioned LST and 25 other vessels. He was arrested in May 1961, he was arrested by the Korean military government until August 1963.

4. During the period, March 1967, he established a Korean-Vietnamese partnership company named Tonga Harbor Stock Company, in Seoul, Korea,

and recruited stevedores from the Seoul and Inch'on areas through newspaper advertisements. He embezzled 10 million w6n by beguiling over 100 people besides a man named Yon Pun-hum. Having issued a number of bad checks involving colossal sums, he left Korea on the pretext of purchasing a 10,000 ton ship. Since then has been living in Japan and Vietnam. Because of these misdemeanors he was listed as one of the most wanted criminals. Reward for his apprehension was announced in a Seoul Newspaper, *S6ul Sinmun*, March 1, 1967 (See the attached).

5. While he was in Saigon, Vietnam after July 1967, he opened up a restaurant called "Ch'ungminjang," and set up an office in Room 208 in the Ch'ungnam Hotel in Saigon to operate an illicit business for swindling money from Koreans in Japan and from Korean soldiers stationed in Vietnam through black marketing of PX goods and American dollars, and false promises of employment. Subsequently, he escaped to Japan, where he has been hiding until now.

REWARD FOR MAN WANTED: SEOUL SINMUN (MARCH 1, 1967)

[Picture]

Yi Yong-un, Age 55

Wanted on the charge of issuing bad checks for colossal sums. A 20 thousand w6n reward will be given to any informant who reports his whereabouts to a police station.

February 1967, Editors.
By all the crew

CONCLUSION

As is evident from the description above, Yi Yong-un is not in a position favorable to his return to Korea. His criminal behavior may best be attributed to his unstable income, his sense of insecurity in life, and his succumbing to nothing. In sum, the Committee would like to declare that Yi Yong-un has now to do with the Korean Navy from which he has been discharged and can internal politics since he left Korea 10 years ago. Thus, he is not qualified for Korea. All his discuss or criticize the political affairs and the national security will realize his misdemeanors are the result of his ignorance. We hope that he will realize the consequences of his own misbehavior.

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. This story was handed to me already printed. In spite of this kind of request and intimidation, I did not obey their instructions, and they then applied very subtle and brutal pressures on my newspaper. They pressured advertisers not to support parties, and then invited Korean businessmen to golf clubs and private parties, and then asked them not to help the New Korea and to cancel their advertising contracts with me and not to give me any information committee.

Mr. Young Park also organized a Korean information committee, which consisted of representatives from the Korean Government, Korean institutes, and big Korean businessmen. He became chairman of the committee; then he asked each member not to help my paper and not to give me advertisements.

Under these circumstances, Korean Air Lines canceled their advertising contracts with me. Korean Air Lines had signed a contract with me on July 31, 1975. They wanted to run the ads for 26 weeks at a total price of \$1,430, but after a few weeks, I canceled their ads. He came to my office and appealed to me to cancel their ads. He said he was sorry that he could not give the reason for the cancellation, but that I could guess the reason for the ad contracts cancellation. "If you report this cancellation in your newspaper," he said, "I will be fired." Thus, he wanted me to remain silent.

To compensate me for the cancellation, he gave me about \$300. He was innocent of any wrongdoing, so I could not report this immediately. That I should be able to guess where pressure came from is easily understood among Koreans. It goes without saying among Koreans that the reference is to the KCIA.

The KCIA regularly reports news media activities to headquarters. If they have trouble which cannot be handled here, they ask Seoul headquarters to handle it directly. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit the Korean Air Lines ad contract for the record.

Mr. FRASER. We will be glad to take it as part of your testimony. [The contract and letter referred to follows:]

신 한 민 보 The New Korea

1308 WEST JEFFERSON BOULEVARD
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90007

CABLE ADDRESS
"KOREAN" LOS ANGELES
TELEPHONE:
(213) 735-0424

광 고 신 타 서

광고주	대한항공 미주지사	
주소	1813 Wilshire Blvd. L.A. CA. 90057	
전화	484-1900	484-2550
화수	26	회 (26주 월 기타)
기간	1975년 7월 3일	1975년 12월 25일
금액	\$1430.00 (26회 * 55)	
	1975년 7월 31일	
동의인	광고주	
	광고 담당자	김은희

분	포	종료연에. 변칙 83 약기.
크	기	5단 (6월 13일) (대한항공사비판대결을 위하여 특히 8단 광고를 적절하게 세분화)
문	안	새로운 모습 소개: 대한항공의 80년 33인 사업 비용을 소개 하리 것.
도	안	신공사에서 만든 것.

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Other major advertisers canceled their ad contracts. Still others reduced the amount of their ads. The thing of greatest importance here is that new advertisers could not submit ads to my paper for fear of KCIA retaliation, though they did advertise in other papers.

They told me they knew I was all right and wanted to give me ads, but they couldn't give me ads because they wanted to protect their lives and business interests. They told me they were sorry.

The case of one realtor is also relevant here. She said she tried to ignore KCIA pressures, but finally she said she could not endure it any longer. So, she asked me to withdraw her ad from my paper. She said if she didn't withdraw her ad, her business would be damaged. Thus, my advertising revenue began to decrease.

The KCIA also ordered restaurant and grocery owners not to display in their shops the books I published. One of the books was Kim Dae-jung's essays; the other the poems of Kim Chi-ha.

After issuing this kind of stern order, one of the grocery owners returned those books. Other owners put them in the corners of their stores where they were not easily seen. Some restaurant owners bought all of them and gave them in bulk to their close friends.

Another instance. Since 2 years ago, Korea Town Development Co. has held an annual Korean festival. The New Korea has sponsored the "Little Princess and Prince Contest" for this Korean festival during the past 2 years. The KCIA pressured the Korean Festival Executive Committee to discontinue the sponsorship of the contest by the New Korea. They pressured Korean residents not to join in the various activities of the New Korea. They wanted to minimize the influence of the New Korea's activities.

The KCIA began to distribute very vicious slander and false propaganda about my newspaper throughout the Korean community. In August 1975—I can't recall the exact date—Korean National Assemblyman Kee Chun-kang, who was formerly chief commander of the Korean Marine Corps, visited me and said he was meeting me on behalf of the Director of the KCIA, Mr. Shin Jik-soo, and Minister of Culture and Information Lee Won-kyung.

At that time he offered me a deal. If I stopped criticizing the Korean Government, the Korean Government could give me a special fund through direct and indirect channels. The amount would be considerable. He said this was the final offer.

"If you reject this," he said, "you will face retaliation." I flatly rejected his offer. Right after his return to Korea, the Los Angeles KCIA sent one guy to me who has a close connection with the KCIA and is known as an underground KCIA agent.

That guy invited me to lunch at Kyung Hae Rhy, a Korean restaurant. At that time he said he brought the final notice from the KCIA, which he said came from Seoul headquarters and was confirmed by the Los Angeles KCIA.

He asked me to choose from among three alternatives. One was to stop criticizing the Korean Government and receive a newspaper fund or a Government position if I wanted it. The second was to sell the newspaper or close it down. The third was to face retaliation.

I asked him what kind of retaliation there would be. He said they would begin to isolate me from the Korean community as a first step. I rejected all three alternatives.

Immediately after this, KCIA agents including Young Park, Korean Consul General, distributed vicious slander to discredit me by calling me a Communist.

Among Koreans, being called a Communist means very serious damage. The KCIA told Korean organizations, institutions, and readers that to continue to have a close relationship with the New Korea would discredit them as Communists. With this kind of slander and false stories, they brought me great damage and discredited by newspaper.

They created a fearful atmosphere around me. Many friends of mine and supporters began to worry about their relationship with me. Two of my staff resigned. I put want ads in my paper to recruit reporters and an ad manager. I carried this ad for 1 month. There were no applicants because of the fearful atmosphere created by the KCIA. Now, I am publishing my newspaper with the aid of my wife. I have spent several nights without sleeping at all.

Besides my own case, I would like to speak of the plight of another newspaper. Since the criminal code, which prohibits criticizing Korean institutes and Government to foreigners, was promulgated with the issuance of Presidential Emergency Decree No. 9, the KCIA has given warning to publishers, editors, and reporters.

If they reported any anti-Government news openly, and if publishers, editors, and reporters received more warnings than permitted, they would be punished. A new KCIA agent in charge of the press came to Los Angeles. He had been a correspondent in Japan for the Korean Broadcasting Co. and became a KCIA agent.

He has control of all pro-Government news media. Many of my Korean friends who are reporters in Los Angeles told me about this man and KCIA control of the press, but they did not want to speak out publicly as eyewitnesses for fear of retaliation from the KCIA. This is a matter of great importance which I hope to impress upon you.

The KCIA is following tactics to control the Korean community by intimidating all kinds of organizations. Those under the influence of the KCIA and the underground KCIA are organizing all kinds of groups to control anti-Park Chung-hee people so that they cannot join in the Korean community. In this way, the community is controlled. The KCIA is also trying to manipulate organizations which have already been formed and to bring these organizations under their influence.

For example, Mr. Young Park, the Los Angeles consul general, pressured the Korean League of Southern California to come under his influence. In pressuring this organization, he became a permanent member of the board of trustees for the Korean Center which was purchased by the Korean League of Southern California.

The Korean League of Southern California raised funds from Korean residents in the area that it could purchase the Korean Center. The Korean Government donated \$150,000, which was half the amount needed for the Korean Center.

Because of this Government donation, Young Park insisted that he must be elected a member of the board of trustees. Many Korean residents want to be free politically, physically, and mentally from the Park Chung-hee government, so many Korean residents opposed the consul general's bid to become a member of the board of trustees.

Because he was involved in the purchase of the Korean Center, it was inevitable that the Korean Center would be under the influence of

the consul general. Therefore, the Korean Center will not be for all Korean residents of southern California. Many think it belongs only to the pro-Park regime residents.

In connection with the dispute over this Korean Center, a local Korean businessman who donated \$20,000 filed a lawsuit, but he dropped his suit because of pressure from the consul general.

With the consul general honored as a member of the board of trustees, I worry that the Korean Center which should receive the love of all Korean residents of southern California will remain under the influence of a brutal, dictatorial, and foreign regime. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit a newspaper article from my paper which dealt with this Korean Center issue.

Mr. FRASER. We will include it as a part of your statement.
[The newspaper article referred to follows:]

[From the New Korea, Oct. 30, 1975]

NEW KOREAN COMMUNITY CENTER—CONSULATE OFFICE IN DISGUISE

(By Yung-gill Kook)

It is reported in the local Korean newspapers that an escrow transaction was finalized for the purchase of a "community building" located at 981 So. Western Ave., Los Angeles.

The reaction of Koreans in Los Angeles is varied. Some Koreans may be genuinely gratified in the belief that their dream of procuring their community building has finally been realized. Such sentiment, however, is naively simplistic. These people will certainly be disillusioned before long in a realization that their dream is merely an image of their own reflected on a mirror, not a realization of their dream.

The outcome of the entire tragedies surrounding the community building purchase is that Koreans in this community will not be the real owner of the center, but the local Korea government representatives.

A sober and deplorable fact is that Korean Consulate General by successfully claiming the ownership and management has seized a strategic position at the heart of the Korean community activities.

Korean Consul General Young Park will practically act as a governor-general without portfolio in the management and operation of the Korean community activities in Southern California.

When Korean government sources originally offered \$150,000 donation for the community building fund, it was taken as no strings attached by the local community.

Following a natural interpretation, donation is an act of gift-giving which does not require any reciprocal compensation from the gift-recipient.

Korean Consulate demand of a joint ownership created a basic issue of grave nature undermining an autonomous and independent growth of Korean community—by the Korean government. The issue is even more serious in view of the fact that Korean government is currently authoritarian dictatorship and is ceaselessly striving to dominate the lives of the Korean residents as well as Korean-Americans in the United States.

Korean Consulate and KCIA have so far tried to influence the Korean community lives—indirectly—through personal contacts.

Now, the Consulate has acquired a legitimate position not just indirectly influence but control the center of the Southern California Korean community activities—directly.

To the blatant Consulate demand, Korean community exhibited some signs of resistance. The reaction of Korean community leaders, however, did not amount to anything significant—as expected to our dismay. These self-styled Korean community leaders were so weak-kneed that their reaction to Korean government authority was neither voice nor echo. Why can't our community leaders give piece of our mind to anybody and any authority? Why do our self-assuming community leaders fear and succumb to Korean authority?

Park phobia among Korean leaders is neither normal nor natural. Instead of being independent minded and leader-motivated, these people surrender them-

selves to the wishes of the Korean Consulate authorities—as dayflies before cannons.

Korean community center must naturally be center of the community activities for the Koreans and by the Korean resident. The center should be where free communications and free expression of thought be assured. Such place ought to be free from external intervention and threats.

Against such requirements, the new community center has already degenerated into another office of the L.A. Korean Consulate. The Korean Consulate sets its course to dictate the direction of the Korean community and pose as the community center of spiritual and political leadership.

After all this means—Korean residents have not bought a community center, but all the money which the earlier Korean community leaders contributed to promote the unity and harmony among Korean-Americans are lost—to build a center to serve Park regime's political cause.

The Korean Consulate has stated one of the reasons for its joint ownership—to prevent potential Communist takeover. The Korean Consulate has not hesitated to employ such name-calling and deadly phrases in the United States. Korean government uses and abuses the word "Communists" with clear intent of political excursion.

The flagrant use of the word in the Korean community here in the United States may create division and hostility among Koreans.

For the sake of natural and harmonious growth of Korean community surrounding the Korean community center, we advise Korean Consulate to withdraw its claim of a joint tenancy to the newly purchased community building.

An adamantly persistent claim of the community building ownership will invite unnecessary confrontation from the community.

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Thank you.

Furthermore, the Korean CIA is trying to intrude into American society and trying to manipulate members of that society. For example, the so-called Friends of U.S. Senator Tunney planned to hold a fundraising dinner party for U.S. Senator John V. Tunney last September 12 at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles.

Two people who were invited to this fundraising party came to me and revealed that the KCIA was trying to raise money to give to Senator Tunney and thus encourage him to be pro-Park. One plate at that dinner party cost \$100. They asked Korean local businessmen to join in at that party. If some businessmen didn't have enough money to attend, the KCIA promised to give it to them.

Those relating this showed me the invitation card which they received on which the name of Young Park, the consul general, appeared as a distinguished guest. We confirmed this story through some businessmen, and we informed Senator Tunney's Los Angeles and Washington, D.C., offices about this.

Senator Tunney's office in Washington sent word to a good acquaintance of ours. Senator Tunney would not attend that fundraising dinner party. The party did not take place.

Immediately after this news was published in my newspaper and the Oriental Daily News, the man who made the reservations for the party room went to the hotel and removed his signature as securer of the room.

The KCIA invited influential American journalists of the Los Angeles area to Korea. Of course, the KCIA gave them free round-trip tickets and offered to wine and dine them. They tried to gain the sympathies of journalists in the southern California area which is home of the largest Korean-American community in America. They are continuing to invite influential American figures from this area to Korea.

Mr. Chairman, when I received retaliation from the KCIA, I felt very angry, but I could not speak out and expose this kind of story because I was afraid of brutal retaliation. The KCIA's brutality is very well known. When somebody becomes their target, he can lose his life, so I could not speak out.

The Korean CIA kidnaped about 30 Koreans from West Germany and England in 1967. I am well aware of these cases because I traveled in these very countries immediately after these kidnappings. They also kidnaped Kim Dae-jung from Tokyo, Japan, in August 1973, and put him in jail on the 11th of this month.

They killed by torture Prof. Chung-il Choi who was educated at Harvard University Law School and who was a professor at Seoul National University. They also executed eight innocent men charged with being Communist accomplices in a plot to overthrow the Government.

The Korean CIA sent their aides to me several times and intimidated me. Actually, Korean Air Lines which lands and takes off in Los Angeles on trips between Seoul and Los Angeles, carries one or two KCIA agents on every flight. These agents' presence on the planes is a threat to Korean-Americans who fear being kidnaped.

The KCIA also can retaliate against me through my parents and children in Korea, so I could not say anything at first, but I cannot endure any longer. I have reached a limit that I cannot accept. I know from my own personal experience that many Korean immigrants cannot speak out to relate their own stories because of fear of retaliation from the KCIA.

It is necessary that some courageous people appear in the Korean communities of the United States and that the KCIA's brutal activities be exposed and their agents be expelled from this country.

I prayed and asked for courage from God, then decided to expose KCIA activities and to fight their illicit acts. I decided to do my best to realize freedom and security for the Korean community in this country. Mr. Chairman, I should like to submit newspaper articles of mine which dealt with exposure of KCIA activities.

Mr. FRASER. We will accept them as part of your statement.

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Thank you very much.

[The newspaper articles referred to follow:]

[From the New Korea, Sept. 11, 1975]

KCIA GETS ON TUNNEY'S CAMPAIGN TRAIL

(By Yung-gill Kook)

A fund-raising dinner for U.S. Senator John V. Tunney may create unnecessarily an adverse effect—due to the highly sensitive Korean CIA involvement. If the fund-raising dinner sponsored by "Friends of U.S. Senator John V. Tunney" be carried out under the present framework (on Friday, September 12th, at the Ambassador Hotel Venetian Room, Los Angeles, California), the ominous impact will be so great that its effect could mire the highly sanguine election prospect of the Senator whom Korean-Americans highly respect and support. Such consequence will be most unfortunate for Senator Tunney—as an innocent victim of circumstance.

Now, the entire matter is up to Senator Tunney to decide between a discreet course of action and disregarding the strong sentiment of citizens for the restoration of democratic process and human rights in Korea.

The plan for the fund-raising dinner had apparently been in preparation for some time, but the information surfaced only last week out of guarded secrecy

as if an element of conspiracy involved. When the initial revelation came to light, it was from a person whom we knew well. But for the obvious reason that any Korean-resident in the United States is painfully aware of, the person requested to remain anonymous.

According to the person, Korean CIA agent offered \$100.00 in order for him to participate in the Tunney fund-raising. He also intimated us that few other persons were similarly offered likewise. The person further disclosed that some 50 Koreans were to be a nucleus of this particular fund-raising under the Korean CIA instigation. He however, admitted that he solicited KCIA personnel assistance because the KCIA personnel knew many Koreans in his circle members of golf club. How many persons listed as "Friends of U.S. Sen. Tunney" are out of this golf circle are not yet ascertained nor conformed.

The "Friends" list is filled with nearly 90 percent of names recognizable by the writer. Their names are noted for the loyalist attitude towards the repressive Park regime. Ironically, in the list is a U.S. Republican Committee member, Miss Sonia Suk can be seen. She had only few months ago arranged an evening of dinner for Robert Finch.

Motive behind the KCIA involvement is seen as dubious—in view of notorious Park Tong Sun Georgetown scandal, "Giseng" politics for the U.S. Congressmen in Korea, infamous "private trust fund" report, and disclosed aims of Park regime to buy-off U.S. Congressmen, etc., make Korean-Americans for the restoration of democracy and human rights to guard against Park regime illicit influence in the United States.

Out of our sincere wish that Sen. Tunney whose election prospect is bright would not be mired in inauspicious and damaging circumstance in a KCIA instigated fund-raising as foreign agents, we beseech that Sen. Tunney conducts himself with discreet circumspection to the problem and avoids the forthcoming fund-raising party.

Koreans residing in the United States have been witnessing menacing threats and pervasive intimidation. To them, this could be another stunning revelation. On the other hand, no news surprises any Korean insofar as conspiracy and clandestine activities of KCIA operation in the United States are concerned.

Fund-raising in political campaign is a legitimate and lawful practice in the United States. Koreans have in the past had privilege of raising funds for various candidates.

This particular one has, however, become already odious due to the KCIA intervention. Within a few days since the first specter of the news, it has been learned that Korean Consulate General Young Park and the resident KCIA personnel requested many Koreans to participate in the event. It may sound silly and ridiculous for the Americans, but the fact of the matter is that great number of Koreans residing in the United States either as permanent residents or as U.S. citizens cannot dare to disobey Korean Consulate General's requests, let alone KCIA hint—without anticipating potential retaliation.

According to the cooperating testimonies, the forthcoming project was believed to have come out of KCIA, for KCIA and KCIA man alone requested these people to participate in the proposed fund-raising, and no mention of any specific individual name has ever been mentioned to them.

[From the New Korea, Sept. 18, 1975]

SENATOR TUNNEY'S STATESMANSHIP

(By Yung-gill Kook)

In behalf of the Korean-Americans in the United States, we express our sincere gratitude to Sen. John V. Tunney for his act of statesmanship. We are profoundly impressed with Sen. Tunney's capacity to make resolute decisions and wish to congratulate his wise and proper disposal of confounded problems at hand. Korean residents are greatly relieved as the Senator took a discreet course—rather than going after the fund which could easily prove ruinous to a man of potential success.

Sen. John V. Tunney is a member of the Judiciary Committee and of the Commerce Committee. He is chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitu-

tional Rights. Sen. Tunney has been noted for his outstanding contribution in the area of civil rights, among other things.

While Sen. Tunney and his staff were not aware of, the fund-raising dinner sponsored under the guise of "Friends of Senator John V. Tunney"—engineered and organized to the minute detail by Korean CIA (KCIA) in cooperation with Consul General Young Park of Los Angeles—might have critically damaged the highly sanguine prospect of Sen. Tunney's reelection efforts even before Sen. Tunney could have made a serious campaign kick-off.

Such perilous consequence could have proven disastrous—owing to the alleged implication of KCIA in the electoral process of the United States.

The allegations had initially been supplied to the office of The New Korea and the New Korea carried the story in its English editorial (September 11, 1975). Tong-A Ilbo subsequently published a headline news in the American section (Korean edition) of the newspaper—fully corroborating the factual informations contained in the prior report of The New Korea.

It is incomprehensible that KCIA has made an attempt to involve in the internal political process of the United States.

What could possibly be the motive behind such action is enigma to everybody. Had KCIA seriously meant to buy off Sen. Tunney? Or had it conceived a limited aim of having the Senator morally obligated with a fund-raising? That would be a ridiculous nonsense. On the other hand, a successful KCIA intervention in a fund-raising for such a Senator as Tunney could enhance KCIA position to the eyes of some political figures in the United States and elevate its controlling role over the Korean-American citizenry. At least for awhile, we feel it very fortunate that Sen. Tunney's wisdom has prevailed and the whole issue of KCIA meddling in American politics has not come to a unmanageable proportion.

We, nonetheless, must not let guard down, for none is certain if KCIA would not attempt to explore a possibility for vicarious political contribution.

Although that may be a possibility, but improbable. As long as Sen. Tunney is concerned, his integrity and rectitude of the Senator are in no danger of being compromised nor put in jeopardy, Korean efforts to raise funds for Sen. Tunney should be encouraged and continued.

Problems still remain insofar as Koreans in relation with Korean authority is concerned.

Ever since the October "dictatorial" constitution of 1972 was adopted, the local Korean Consulate has become a primary source of political intrigue, of divisive influence in the Korean community, of controlling force behind Korean community activities, and, consequently destroying a natural and autonomous growth of the Korean community. Whenever Korean residents decide to follow an independent course of action, Korean Consulate General and KCIA have threatened many Koreans and are still keeping many Koreans under the fear of retaliation.

It is no wonder that every voluntary Korean community activities in Southern California invariably encounter disruptions from usually anticipated sources: whereas any activities which Korean Consulate and KCIA bless and support present facade of unity, if temporarily, though not so long.

Look back this year alone! Korean Association had to cancel the annual picnic—in order to hold a KCIA instigated anti-Communist rally. Korean Association abandoned an annual August 15th Liberation Day programs of festivities to conform with the Korean schedule. Now in building a Korean Center, Korean government has been promising \$100,000 donation. Korean Consulate suddenly demanded a joint tenancy for the prospective property. The reasons given by the Korean Consulate were: To prevent potential take-over of the building by Communists and to provide necessary legal counsel. The resident Koreans interpret the Korean Consulate move to control Korean community activities.

In view of ever intensifying KCIA illicit activities, an investigation by U.S. government is sooner or later inevitable.

The matter of KCIA involvement in the American political arena cannot be overlooked. We know that it is entirely within the purview of the Senatorial authority to investigate the KCIA activities within the realm of the United States.

Such investigation should be initiated before long.

[From the New Korea, Nov. 6, 1975]

KOREAN CONSULATE GENERAL: CONDEMNED

(By Yung-gill Kook)

The New Korea which had dedicated past seventy years for a wholesome and constructive growth of its mother country concluded that dictatorship in Korea must be resisted and set its publication editorial policy ". . . in promoting liberal democracy" since September 5, last year. The adoption of such policy is perfectly natural and nothing radical about it.

Korean government, Korean Consulate office here in Los Angeles, however, did not see The New Korea policy eye to eye. In contrast to their lipservice to the glory of democracy, L.A. resident Korean Consul General did not hesitate to brand The New Korea as a Communist publication and its staffs as the Communists.

Ever since President Park announced the Emergency Decree No. 9 last spring, Park regime was not content with its iron control within the country.

Park regime had been putting all-out effort to control lives of Korean immigrants and the U.S. citizens of Korean extraction.

Korean CIA agents have harassed Korean-Americans by persuasion, intimidation, and outright threats. Although they had harvested some success through these means, they were not content with it.

They have set out to dominate every aspect of Korean lives in America.

The recent events alone may be suffice to learn what the local Korean Consulate General and KCIA are up to.

In purchasing a Korean "community building", the Korean government insistence of its ownership prevailed. The Korean authorities originally wanted a joint ownership of the community building with the Korean Association. After facing some token opposition against the Korean Consulate ownership participation, the Consulate proposed a board of trustees consisting of seven members, ostensibly representing various community organizations.

Some publicized the Consulate move as concession, but such deceptive gesture cannot fool anybody. For the original Korean Consulate demand of ownership participation has not been deterred. The final outcome is not the result of Korean community consensus, but of the Consulate idea to which the building committee members were more than willing to agree for fear one may be branded as anti-government. The building board of trustees in the end will be dominated by the Korean Consul General with six figurehead trustees stand in window-dressing.

In the process of accomplishing this position, Korean Consul General and the officers of Korean Amateur Sport Association of America employed all sorts of threats to force Mr. Kim Si-myun to drop a lawsuit against the Korean community building committee.

The pampering attitude of Korean government authorities encourage and condone a long record of violent activities of the officers of the Korean Amateur Association of America.

Recently the president of the Association beat a U.S. Korean citizen causing several teeth loose and threw a flower vase against face of a distinguished Korean of U.S. citizenship and resulted a ghastly wound.

Five members of this organization barnstormed into a local newspaper office and threatened the editor-in-chief Sun-joo Lee to annihilate the entire family members.

These people are undoubtedly committing heinous acts of felony case.

While the U.S. governmental authorities has been paying close attention to these instances, Korean governmental authorities which has on occasions emphasizing Korean resident "purification" is not only condoning these fellows but pampering them as "our guys".

Now, we condemn Korean Consulate General and KCIA for their conspiracy to force Koreans to cancel advertising in The New Korea newspaper.

It is about time for the U.S. government authorities to take firm measures to restrain undeclared war of Korean Consulate and KCIA against the U.S. citizens of Korean descent.

[From the New Korea, Nov. 21, 1975]

KCIA AGENTS ALL OUT TO GET NEW KOREA

South Korea's dictatorial President Park Chung-hee's (Park is his family name) repression of human rights is not limited to South Korea (The Republic of Korea, or ROK, is the official name of the country). Having succeeded at last in silencing the last bastion of the free press in South Korea by applying pressures to the advertisers to cancel their contracts with The Dong-A Ilbo, the largest and the only outspoken daily in Korea, Park regime is now applying the same tactics to the American citizens of Korean extraction and Koreans living in the United States.

In flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the United States, consulate officials and agents of the South Korean government in Los Angeles have been abusing consular privileges and have brought pressures upon Korean-Americans and Korean residents in California to mute their criticisms of Park regime.

Through seduction, open intimidation, and actual threat, those South Korean officials are illegally engaged in clandestine operations to control and manipulate life of the Korean-Americans.

First, in recent months my paper, The New Korea, which is the only independent Korean community newspaper in Los Angeles since 1905, was an object of the Korean consul general's subtle but brutal retaliation. Young Park, South Korean consulate general in Los Angeles, and the operatives of the notorious Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) under the disguise of consulate staff in the city, have brought pressures on Korean Air Lines (KAL) Los Angeles office, Ms. Sonia S. Suk's real estate company, and other major advertisers to cancel their contracts with my paper.

My paper had concluded a contract with the Korean Air Lines last July 31 to run the airlines advertisements for 26 consecutive weeks starting the same month for \$1,430. However, a few weeks later an ad manager of the airlines dropped by in my office and asked to discontinue running the ads saying that he was instructed to do so from his head office in Seoul. We did so as we were told to by the airlines.

As I understand, the KAL had taken a policy of so-called separation of business and politics and decided to do business with us because they knew The New Korea was the only Korean community newspaper that can speak out against corrupt and lawless Korean government and its agents in Los Angeles, thus getting ever popular among the Korean residents in the United States.

Pressed to explain why the airlines decided to halt the ad abruptly, the embarrassed KAL officer said, "I am sorry I cannot explain the reason for the cancellation. But without saying, everybody knows why it is."

In the case of Ms. Sonia Suk, a local realtor, she asked to take out her ads from my paper saying, "I really cannot stand their (the consulate officials') pressures to refrain from helping The New Korea. Let me protect my business interests."

As the result of the consulate's pressures, one ad sponsor after another followed suit leaving some of the ad columns blank. And this series of unbelievable acts on the part of the advertisers resulted in most peculiar and interesting ad columns a newspaper can have. Our readers are beginning to fill in the blank ad spaces with their statements of encouragement for us.

A young woman who identified herself only as Sunie asked in the ad, "The New Korea, Where am I supposed to emigrate for the second time when you tumble down?" She said she immigrated to the United States in disappointment after the Dong-A Ilbo was knocked out by the government forces. A second middle aged amateur adviser said, "How come you keep chasing and suffocating me?"

Second, the Korean government agents have issued stern orders to the local Korean shopowners not to display books and booklets published by my paper. The Olympic Market and the Somun-nan-jip beef dealer in Los Angeles returned the "Kim Dae-jung Essays" and "Kim Chi-ha Poems" to us saying, "We cannot sell them in my shop because the consulate officials ordered not to."

Third, Park Young, the consul general, told the organizers of the annual Korean Festival last September not to let The New Korea sponsor the "Little Princess and Prince Contest" in his move to discourage promotion of the paper during the Festival period.

The consul general is also coercing board members of The New Korea to quit their positions. He has used Mr. Kim Si-myun and Prof. Kim Hyung-il, both board members of my paper, to buy off the publisher of the New Korea in the favor of the Korean government.

Fourth, as the publisher of the paper persists in his independent editorial policy despite the Korean government's cunning maneuvers to win over him, the consul general is trying to discredit him as a Communist. According to the Rev. Kwon Hi-sang, the consul general described The New Korea as "Communist" last September.

The South Korean government's persecution of the Korean news media in the United States knows no bounds.

On Oct. 5, 1975, the Korean Television Broadcasting Co. of Los Angeles which airs Korean language programs on weekends on Channel 22 made a public statement through its own program that the press attache of the Korean consulate general in Los Angeles has "attempted to annihilate this broadcasting."

In the statement, Pai Ham-duk, president of the Korean television, charged, among other things, that the press attache has frequently demanded in threatening manner that the company air certain materials the Korean government source supplied, and that he has also pressured advertisers to withdraw their advertisements from this television company in an attempt to bring it under the sway of the Park Chung-hee government.

These incredible activities of the Korean officials are in clear violation of the First Amendment and other U.S. laws. Besides, these are most unfriendly, unorthodox, unforgivable, and very hostile acts of a foreign government in violation of the sovereignty of the United States.

To uphold the ideals and principles set forth in the Constitution of the United States, and to maintain this great country as a free, democratic, peaceful and safe society to live in, I respectfully demand that the people and government of the United States take effective measures to put an end to all such illegal activities of Park Chung-hee government in this country, and expell its officials responsible for these activities from the United States so that people could live free of such fear from Park's spooks.

[From the New Korea, Nov. 21, 1975]

AN APPEAL TO CONCERNED CITIZENS

It is with great humbleness that I dare turn your attention to the cause of the New Korea and ask for your generous assistance in carrying out our challenging tasks.

The New Korea is an English-Korean language weekly published in Los Angeles. It was founded in 1905 by Mr. Chang-ho Ahn, one of the great leaders of modern Korea who fought the Japanese colonial occupation of Korea and died in a Seoul prison in 1938.

From its inception 70 years ago up until Korea's independence in 1945, the New Korea had been the rallying point of all conscientious people who supported Korean independence movement.

After Korea was liberated from the colonial rule in the wake of the World War II, the New Korea has striven to help newly arriving Korean immigrants in the United States adjust to the new cultural setting and to promote friendly Korea-U.S. relations on the basis of free democratic principles.

However, the incumbent administration of South Korea headed by Mr. Park Chung-hee began to stifle all democratic opposition forces since it enacted a martial law constitution in 1972 in a move to pave the way for Mr. Park to become a life-long President.

In the last three years, more than 200 Korean intellectuals, students, clergymen and politicians were arrested and subjected to severe physical and mental tortures of the notorious Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).

Mr. Kim Dae-jung, who ran unsuccessfully against Mr. Park Chung-hee in the 1971 presidential election, was kidnaped by KCIA agents in a Tokyo hotel in August 1973 and was smuggled into Korea in a bizarre drama across the Korean Straits lying between Korea and Japan. Mr. Kim is still under house arrest.

In April 1975, nine members of the KCIA-manufactured "People's Revolutionary Party" were hanged in Seoul for alleged "Communist conspiracy" to overthrow Park Chung-hee government. Poet Kim Chi-ha, a Catholic, is now on trial for antigovernment poems. Kim who is also accused of alleged "Communist conspiracy" may get a death sentence by South Korean Kangaroo court.

What is most distressing is the way the Korean government is persecuting

Christianity in Korea. Bishop Danial Tji was imprisoned for allegedly helping financially Poet Kim.

The Revs. Park Hyung-kyu, Kim Kwan-sok, Cho Sung-hyok and Kwon Ho-kyung are now being tried for speaking out for the protection of backbreaking laborers' human rights.

The Revs. George Ogle and James Sinnott of the United States were expelled from Korea for advocating the innocence of the so-called People's Revolutionary Party members. Nobody knows who the next victim will be.

The Korean religious community in the United States is not free from the KCIA interference, either. The KCIA operatives in the United States are exerting tacit pressures to local Korean ministers to the effect that they speak in favor of Park Chung Hee regime.

It is under such circumstances that the New Korea decided to act, among other things, as the spokesman of the freedom of religion. The New Korea is running religious columns in its move to awaken the readers to the Korean governments vicious schemes to patronize the religious community.

Since I assumed the ownership of this newspaper in August 1974, I have tried to sharpen perspectives of the New Korea as the leader of the Korean-American community and as a guardian of the universal human rights and of the freedom of religion.

The New Korea, however, is faced with serious financial problems because of the decreasing advertising revenues. Fact is that the Korean Embassy and consulate officials as well as the KCIA operatives in the United States are dissuading in very subtle ways our readers and advertising sponsors from doing business with us with an obvious purpose of squeezing the New Korea financially.

The Korean government on the other hand is funneling an enormous amount of money to pre-Korean government newspapers and TV stations in the United States to rally the community support for the repressive Park Chung-hee government.

If the paper's worsening financial situation continues, the New Korea will have no choice but to cease its publication in the near future to the great disappointment of the Korean and American readers. Your help is badly needed to encourage those in prisons and all democratic forces working for the restoration of democracy in Korea.

Please do not remain indifferent to our calls for help. We would greatly appreciate whatever penny or whatever dollar you can afford for us. God bless you.

WOON-HA KIM,

Publisher-Editor, The New Korea.

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Mr. Chairman, I have a deep appreciation for your committee because of your accomplishments in the field of human rights. Your committee can accomplish great things through this series of hearings.

Mr. Chairman, my grandfather was interpreter for the first Korean residents who came to Hawaii in 1903. Since then, for 73 years he has lived in this country, and I am taking care of him now. My uncle is a U.S. citizen and a professor of theology at the University of Oregon.

My younger brother is a U.S. citizen and architect. My younger sister is also a U.S. citizen, and her husband works for the Department of Transportation here in Washington. I am a lawful permanent resident of the United States.

Today many Korean-Americans, including me, are suffering from oppression by officials of another government in this country. I come here on behalf of weak, pitiful, fearful, and good Korean-American citizens in this country.

Mr. Chairman, to uphold the ideals and spirit of freedom and human rights in the Constitution and to maintain a free democratic, peaceful, and safe country, I respectfully demand that the U.S. Government and citizens take the necessary steps to end all kinds of illicit activities on the part of the Korean Government agents, and I would like to demand the expulsion of those who are in charge of this kind of illicit activity.

Mr. Chairman, I truly appreciate your giving me this opportunity to speak before you.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Mr. Kim.

Our final witness this afternoon is Dr. Kim Hyung-il. Dr. Kim, will you stand, please? Raise your right hand.

You do solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes; I do.

Mr. FRASER. We are delighted to have you, sir, and will you proceed.

**STATEMENT OF KIM HYUNG-IL, PRESIDENT, KOREAN COMMUNITY
FEDERAL ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA**

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. First of all, as a Korean-American citizen and a professor at California State University at Long Beach, and as the president of the Korean Association of Southern California, I take this hearing as an evidence of the special and lasting friendship between the two nations—the United States and the Republic of Korea—in genuine concern for the Korean residents for which I am deeply grateful.

First, my view on the political situation in South Korea, in response to Dr. Henderson's remarks. I cannot help but to admire his knowledge on Korean CIA, which far exceeds mine.

In recent years, dissent and strong criticism of the South Korean Government have been heard from some groups among the Korean residents and their friends in America.

In the case of anti-South Korean Government voices, primary criticism has focused on the curtailment of individual freedom and human rights, giving an image of South Korea as if it is under a dictatorial rule. On the other hand, South Korea has received some publicity in international circles as the case of a success, story of the USAID program since South Korea has been apparently overcoming her disadvantages.

Indeed, the economic growth and the elevation of the livelihood in general is remarkable.

If South Korea is a model nation in economic growth and political stability, then it is important to determine how such status was achieved and if the image of internal politics of South Korea, as pointed out by antigovernment voice, is more or less true it is equally meaningful to ascertain the factors which tend to create this misconception and to determining the problems faced by South Korea.

It is important to understand the South Korean situation not in the context of the high ideals of American democracy and traditional theory of global justice, but in the context of South Korea's position in international politics; namely, in the context of comparison to other Asian countries, which are allies of the United States such as the failure of other countries, like South Vietnam. The success or failure of those countries can be attributed to a lack of national determination, motivation, and strong ideological stand with the all-out national security posture in the fight against communism, and, the success is possible with hard work and undivided national unity is true even within divided Asian countries.

The unequal social economic status and the political stability of developing nations in Asia can best be understood as stemming from the strong leadership and mobilization of entire national resources and all-out security posture.

There is little doubt that scholars differ in their interpretations of the socioeconomic status of South Korea and that the definitions of success or progress vary.

The South Korean situation should be understood not in the context of the ideal theory of global justice or universal principle or rhetorical commitment to the protection of human rights.

An implication of the ideal theory of global justice exemplified as the rule of nonintervention seems inconsistent with the international commitment to the protection of human rights.

As the conflict can be illustrated with reference to Hungary and South Africa, and so forth, rules of international law impose different obligations depending on whether their observance in particular cases would contribute to or detract from a movement toward a more just institution and world peace.

Divided countries, like South Korea, faced with Communist aggression from the North; it is difficult to separate the two domains of the act of pure political criticism or domestic policies and subversive activities mainly due to the semiwar conditions and geo-political situation in which the nation finds itself.

In addition, there are three other main elements; namely, the land, the people, and the government. In the case of divided nations, this general will to be a nation is also divided.

In the case of Korea, the division is ideological; the South being democratic while the North is Communist. Since World War II, such divided countries have been through many internal struggles; caught in the tension between maintaining political stability on the one hand for national security, and on the other hand, for internal social order and economic growth.

Unlike postwar Germany, where mutual recognition of statehood, or nationhood, has taken place, Korea, since the division in 1945, has been under the constant threat of a recurrence of the war. Because of this threat, national security has become the most pressing problem for South Korea.

Against this background, it might be argued that a satisfactory national consensus was not formed as to the elevation of national security to such a high priority. Is there a "clear and present danger" that would warrant such political move? Can such a danger justify curtailing individual rights of freedom of speech and assembly?

These questions are usually asked by some intellectuals and religious leaders of South Korea and, not usually, by the general public. These views would seem to rest on three main assumptions:

(1) As long as the U.S. troops remain in South Korea, there will be danger of invasion from the North.

(2) The only rational means of combating Communist aggression is through an increase of Western form democratic measures.

(3) The "repressive" measures taken in the name of national security are only a device for prolonging the political life of the party in power. There is no real danger warranting such measures.

These assumptions are based on theoretical possibility and not the factual judgment, evidences all of which are not accessible to many for military strategic reasons.

Truth and falsity depends on accurate assessments of these factual situations, evidences which outweigh the former.

Yet, these criticisms of South Korean internal politics would also seem to appeal and attempt to justify more basic ideas of civil disobedience or global justice. It is not clear that democratic ideas and guarantees of acts of civil disobedience, as found in and allowed to a degree, by Western countries, will ever apply to the special case of South Korea. Perhaps an analysis of these ideas will help.

They can be divided into two main groups—pragmatic and moral.

The pragmatic analysis of civil disobedience does say that it is sometimes right if it leads to real social progress. In other cases, though, the situation is different. Oftentimes, a small minority will agitate for change against the undemonstrated will of the majority. The changes the minority wants may not even reflect the ideas of most of the people.

In the case of South Korea, social gains must be solid and firmly set because there is always the danger of invasion from the North.

For this reason, broad scale socioeconomic progress and all-out national security posture is to be preferred by the majority of the people in South Korea.

To do this requires the participation of a united national effort and cannot afford agitation by a small dissenting group.

In this case, civil disobedience is not as effective at first as it might seem. Rocking the boat may be exciting, but it does not necessarily advance the ship of state.

The moral considerations involve a still more basic analysis of civil disobedience. Moral conscious, whether it be an internationalized father figure or a nonrational inculcation of social features, is not infallible.

Each person does not always act the same way when questions of right and wrong are involved. Because of this individual movement away from outside control, society must impose basic constraints, otherwise there would be chaos. Each man would do as he would like.

For self-preservation, society imposes laws. In one case, to be a society means to have laws. This right, or necessity, of society to demand obedience to laws implies a corresponding right of people to obey them.

This is not to say that all laws are right. Like individuals, societies can be wrong. Some people say that the draft laws conflict with a basic human right to life. Other laws, such as the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 to 1850, are just wrong and usually repealed.

The idea of self-preservation for a society extends to outside matters as well as internal. The consequences of acts of civil disobedience should be as important as the acts themselves.

Good intentions for acts of civil disobedience do not always mean good results. Sometimes arousing antigovernment sentiments only weakens the state and allows for outside forces to become powerful.

Communist infiltration of some protesting groups has happened and will happen again. Sometimes when civil disobedience seeks to

mobilize political forces in society to correct a problem, the result is a countermovement to tighten internal control.

Ghandi was able to exert political pressure on the British only because the British are a thoroughly civilized people with an abiding sense of fair play.

Martin Luther King was able to mobilize support in this country because most people are more compassionate than the civil rights movement suggests. Thus, in some cases, civil disobedience is most effective when the problem is in reach of a solution.

These facts about civil disobedience are not universal. They will apply in situations only if some conditions will hold. It is not clear that these assumptions are valid in a divided country such as Korea.

The recent Indochina disaster is a good example. Now, we have in South Vietnam only a silence which is both deafening and stifling. Where are those Catholics who vocally condemned the dictatorship of the Thieu government and demanded freedom and human rights, those Buddhists who immolated themselves without hesitation to instigate an antigovernment struggle, the university students who demonstrated daily for campus freedom, or those journalists who cried for the freedom of the press? They all went into a silence which may never come to an end.

These people who were often hailed as democratic heroes helped bring their own people under a communistic rule of terror instead of democratic rule of freedom by crying only for individual freedom and human rights even to the point of asking U.S. troops to withdraw and thus polarizing national opinion at a time when their national survival was at stake because of Communist threat. What a tragic and ironic end to their struggle for freedom and democracy.

The Indochina debacle in a sense awakened the Korean people of the Communist danger they face and helped produce in Korea a strong national consensus with regard to the national security matters and unity on their ideological stand to fight the Communist threat in unity. Participating in these rallies last year were many opposition political leaders who were outspoken critics of the government.

The problem is our problem, the survival of a nation, not people versus government, student versus university administration—all South Koreans and United States face it together.

The gravity of the risk is tremendous and too often ignored by outsiders of the Korean situation. The morally idealistic and social justice minded leaders of the movements, such as the antigovernment, could be used as instruments by those whose motives and tactics are less scrupulous.

This is a danger that can threaten our entire democratic way of life for which South Korea and the United States of America have sacrificed much all these years, and it is this common political ideology and goal that binds the two nations in the arena of international politics and for mutual assistance and cooperation.

Have there been anti-Indian Government protests among the Indian residents in the United States? For that matter, from any other ethnic resident group from Communist-bloc countries, such as South Vietnam, Russia, and so forth?

Take this congressional hearing granted us today as overwhelming evidence of the genuine concern and lasting special friendship to South

Korea and her residents in the United States for which I am deeply grateful.

Since I have expressed my view on the political situation in South Korea, now I would like to present more specifically the situation of the Korean-American communities in the United States; more specifically, the Korean Association of Southern California, for which I have responsibility.

First, the historical background. During the prewar period when Korea was under the rule of Japan, the Los Angeles area was the center for the independence movement, with two major organizations, one supporting Syngman Rhee and the other supporting another patriotic leader by the name of Anchango.

Even after the independence of Korea from Japan in 1945, these two organizations were not in harmony over the political issues and politics of the Government in Korea.

One group was supportive of the Government, and the other was very critical of the government of former President Syngman Rhee. This kind of disunity and factualism continued between the two groups.

Most of the members of the two groups were old by 1962, the year when the present Government launched its new nation-building programs.

Some of us who had completed education in the United States and obtained immigrant status and established the livelihood, began to have concern for the future and for a better Korean community in the Los Angeles area.

Social service-minded residents did their best to persuade other remaining members of the two organizations to merge, to redevelop, and to reorient the organizational goals from the independence movement, which had already been completed, to social service and civic and cultural ones.

This would be the advantage of becoming immigrants and future generations of the Korean community with their cultural contribution in the United States as the primary objective rather than the political issues of the mother country, which tended to divide rather than unite the community.

Since the attempt to merge was not successful, an alternative was to organize a new communitywide organization by supporters from both organizations as well as many of the young people who do not have any affiliation with either of the organizations.

In 1969, the predecessor of the present Korean Association in Southern California was organized.

Since then, the organization has acted as the bridge between the two organizations and wished it to merge in the near future when the remaining elderly members of both organizations come to complete agreement.

The establishment of a Korean community center is the organization's major project. The Korean Association's activities were concerned to relatively meager cultural activities until 1969.

As the number of immigrants increased, the organization gained the recognition by more people and by more segments of the community. This has given incentive for many ambitious, social-minded persons to contend for the position of presidency of the organization since 1969.

Next, my role. I was a charter member of the organization and have served on the board of directors and as chairman of the board. I have also been vice president and vice chairman a few times in the past.

During my presidency in 1970, with many other members in the community, we were able to establish an office and outline the major activities and objectives of the organization. We filed and obtained a non-profit organization charter from the State of California.

PURPOSES OF THE ORGANIZATION

The purposes and objectives of this Korean Association are to organize, establish, administer, and to provide educational sociocultural and recreational activities and services and programs for the welfare of Koreans in the Greater Los Angeles area, in order to promote and develop the moral, intellectual and social welfare of the Korean community.

Second, foster and develop the highest ideals of American citizenship by developing the immigrants to adjust themselves to the way of life in the United States.

Three, preserve and enhance the heritage and values of Korea with the cultural traditions, ethics, and philosophies.

ACTIVITIES

Maintaining and operating the Korean Community Center, providing social services, social workers helping with the various problems new immigrants face and establishing informational services for them.

Three, educational seminars on various topics, scholarship grants to new students, business management, religious, and cultural topics. English lessons and other vocational education.

Four, youth programs supporting summer camp and other cultural activity for the youth.

Fifth, communitywide cultural and recreational events such as the celebration for the Independence Day for Korea and New Year's dancing or show party.

Sixth, all people's programs, group tours and English classes, and recreational and welfare programs for the aged.

Seventh, supporting and coordinating other activity of the various organizations in the community.

Eight, participating in a citywide festival and other civic events.

Now, the focal points before your committee would be the relationship to the consul general's office. The Korean Association is and should be neutral about internal politics of Korea.

Since one of the functions of the consulate is to protect and help the Korean residents in the United States, it regards the Korean Association as the representative without ignoring other organizations in the community.

The need of such cooperation on the part of the Korean Association is to help the Korean residents when they need the help of the consulate.

However, at times, some disagreement and resentment develops. When a request by the association is not given adequate attention by the consulate, however, such a disagreement or resentment are usually solved by rational dialog for the common good and best interest of the community.

Policies affecting the welfare and conveniences of the Korean residents in the United States are forecasted in a form of appeal for reconsideration by the Korean Government through the consulate's office.

Of course, it cannot be engaged in political campaign or other activities such as anti-Government activities, not by intimidation of Korean CIA, but rather by the nonprofit organization laws of the State of California.

To blame the Embassy and consulate office from the Republic of Korea as the cause of the disunity and oppressive activities among the Korean residents in the United States is to shift a responsibility of self-governing process of their community development on to some external force, when the real cause is awaiting the community itself; namely, the lack of participation and inability to resolve differences of opinions and factualism.

It has often been the case that the consulate officers are blamed with the charges that they are engaged in oppressive activities by some dissatisfied and frustrated minority dissenters among the Korean residents, as if they are some kind of drum to be beaten or a ball to be bounced around.

That is, they are a convenient target on which they take out their frustrations. This is somewhat analogous to a family fight situation in which the wife blames the presence of the house guest—either male or female—who does not take sides for the disharmony and dispute between the husband and wife while the actual cause is something or someone else.

Or else we say in Korea, as the bird flies away, the pear drops. The dropping of the pear may be caused by overripening or rottenness rather than by the shaking of the branch of the tree caused by the flying away of the bird.

Some of these serious accusations are not founded in actual evidence, but inferences drawn from unfounded assumptions in their minds, as far as I can determine.

This unnecessary elevation of the Korean residents, the community problem, to a level of an international problem by bringing this matter into a congressional hearing such as this, serves certainly neither to the best interest of the communities in the United States nor the interest of the two nations—South Korea and the United States of America—but only result in polarization within these communities and creation of a possible misconception about the nation of South Korea on the part of the public in the United States.

Unknowingly, such a self-righteous act by the critics thereby may serve someone's interest; namely, directly the emotional satisfaction of some individuals involved and indirectly the interest of our common enemy—the cause of communism.

I am sure, by the way, that this feeling is shared by the silent majority who are so busy making their livelihood that they hardly have time or interest in such a dispute within the Korean community.

Last, present, and future cause for this Korean Association of Southern California. My motive and reason for running again for the presidency of the organization last December was a concern about the polarization of the community by bringing up the issue of the internal politics of South Korea as the focal point.

It has been my posture that the Korean Association should reemphasize its purposes and objectives as a nonprofit community organiza-

tion leaving opinions about the South Korean politics and individual and personal level, and to mobilize all possible human and financial resources in the community in order to build a community which requires a united effort for the primary objectives of the organization; namely, the social services and cultural educational activity.

In recent years, there have developed about 50 churches of various denominations.

These organizational activities reflect both the rapid increase of immigrants with a diverse interest and background, and the needs to meet the demand of the growing community.

In such a development of state, it is an unavoidable phenomenon that the purposes and interests of these various interest groups overlap and sometimes come in conflict.

Hence, there is a strong need felt by the majority for the further development of the Korean Association as the representative body coordinating these various organizational activities for the common good of the community.

To meet this is the future function and task of the Korean Association in Southern California. In order to achieve such a united representative body for the Korean community, I have already proposed a restructuring of the organization for the participation of all, including those who have been very critical of the Korean Government and the association in the past, and to minimize those elements which tend to fall faster, the polarization and developed factions within the Korean communities, bearing in mind the teaching of the Bible, which says, "If you buy for one another, take heed that you are not consumed by one another."

An often repeated phrase—united we stand and divided we fall—in nation building as well as in community building, for the Communist tactic is to divide and conquer.

As has been the case in the Korean community here in the past and in the different ideological divisions created among Koreans in Japan, polarization of the community over political matters would bring no unity or serve the common interest of the community overseas, which appraise for the reunification of their motherland.

We must always remember and admonish ourselves with the question, if we cannot accomplish by our own effort in self-governing the harmony and unity in a small community without appealing to external control, how can we hope for the reunification of a divided nation of 15 million Koreans?

As the American saying goes, let's not make a Federal case out of a small Korean community affair. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Dr. Kim.

Dr. Kim, do you know Mr. Kim Woo-ha?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes; he, in fact, a good friend of mine; and when he took over the New Korea newspaper in Los Angeles, he asked me to be on the editorial board, and I still am on the editorial board, unless he dismissed me.

Mr. FRASER. In your statement, you didn't make any reference to the testimony we have heard today about the role of the Korean CIA in the Los Angeles area. Is that because you don't know anything about it? You have no knowledge of any Korean CIA activity in the Los Angeles area?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. As I have indicated in my statement, Dr. Henderson and Dr. Ranard seem to know more about internal structure of the Korean CIA than I do. As far as I can understand, any Korean CIA agent, if they were sent to this country, they would be sent through diplomatic channels, and I am quite sure they were all under the supervision of the Ambassador or the consul general. And I am quite sure that they, as the diplomats, are all well aware of the Federal laws that controls the agents of a foreign power in this country.

Mr. FRASER. My question was, do you have any knowledge about activity by the Korean CIA in the Los Angeles area?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Not to the extent these gentlemen have been presented, something that I learned today.

Mr. FRASER. My question is, do you have any knowledge about activities by the Korean CIA in the Los Angeles area?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Such as.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know of any activity by Korean CIA agents in the Los Angeles area?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Not to my knowledge, not those allegations made by these gentlemen here. Those are something—

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Kim, I am not limiting my question to that. My question to you is, do you have any knowledge of activity by the Korean CIA in the Los Angeles area?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No specific activities I know of, but I would say this, that in this 20th century power politics that it has been a known fact that every country has some kind of intelligent agents in other countries, and I imagine that South Korea is no different from any other country.

Mr. FRASER. Are you saying you believe it is likely there are Korean CIA agents operating in the Los Angeles area?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I suspect there might be, but not some of the activity that are charged with.

Mr. FRASER. Then what activities do you have some knowledge of?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I do not know. They might have some activities gathering some information which the policymakers in South Korea may need.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know any Korean CIA agents in the Los Angeles area?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I know some of the consulars.

Mr. FRASER. Some of the what?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. The consules.

Mr. FRASER. You mean members of the consul?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Who do you know there?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Consul general, Mr. Park and a few others.

Mr. FRASER. Who else do you know in the consulate?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Mr. Chung Wo has been staying in the Los Angeles area for a number of years. Some of the recent consuls I have acquaintances, but I don't know them very well, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Do you have any reason to know whether or not any of those people are members of the Korean CIA?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. What do you know?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I know they are here to perform some functions that the Korean CIA has.

Mr. FRASER. That is, members of the consulate in Los Angeles are there to carry out certain functions on behalf of the Korean CIA; do you know that?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. That distinction between what is official consulate and what is the function of the Korean CIA overseas, I cannot make a distinction.

Mr. FRASER. I understand. I only want you to answer what you know. I don't want you to say something you don't know.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. They all act as the consulates out of the consul general's office.

Mr. FRASER. Is it your understanding, or do you believe some of those you know who work at the consulate are members of the Korean CIA?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes; I heard they are.

Mr. FRASER. That is your belief they are, based on what you have heard?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know the range of activities they engage in?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. That is something that I do not know because the KCIA activity, sir, carries out in such a way it should not be known to the public.

Mr. FRASER. So that some of the things they do you may not have knowledge of, is that what you are saying?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes; but as far as I can determine, some of the allegations made here today are not founded on any factual evidence, as far as I can determine.

For an example, someone mentioned that they were having a tight control over the dissenting groups or the critics of the political situation in South Korea, which is not necessarily true, because last Sunday, and I believe it was a Friday, there was a kind of a demonstration in front of the consulate general's office, and right in the heart of the Korean town in Los Angeles.

So in what way they were controlling, I just could not understand that point.

Mr. FRASER. In other words, if they are controlling the people of Korean nationality in the Los Angeles area, they were not controlling them enough to stop the demonstration? There wasn't sufficient control to prevent the demonstration?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I don't think the few of them, even if there were the members of the Korean CIA, I don't think they could ever been able to control if the sentiment of the majority of the Korean residents in the United States are such.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Kim, you are a legal philosopher?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes; I teach legal philosophy at the university.

Mr. FRASER. In this country, we place a great importance, as you know, on the freedom of the press.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Would you agree that if there were any interference with freedom of the press in the United States from any external source that this would be wrong?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Well, I am well aware of the principle of free press, and I have no way of knowing whether these major—let me first explain some of the background.

Years back, there were one of the major newspapers in Korea established who established their print office in Los Angeles, and then another major newspaper followed it, and then another, so at the present time we do have three major newspapers in the Korean language, in addition to Mr. Kim's The New Korea, which is a weekly paper whereas the other three are daily newspapers.

And the freedom of press, I think, again is a matter of degree.

Mr. FRASER. Excuse me, go ahead.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. The very concept of freedom is not something that is absolute. It is a matter of degree, and in the Communist countries, you do have absolute freedom to support the communism, but you did not have any freedom to say anything against it.

Now, in the democratic societies which allow freedom of press and freedom of speech, relatively in greater degrees, but we do not go on if there were mounting pressures or criticisms that would endanger our democratic institutions.

What I mean by this is, that these three major newspapers are sometimes publishing articles which are very critical of the Korean consulate general and sometimes they are very critical of some of the courses of action that some organizations are taking, such as mine, the Korean Association of Southern California.

In fact, there are many articles in the newspapers of these three in the past years that were highly critical of the Korean Association, which shows they do have the privilege of freedom to a large degree.

Mr. FRASER. My question, Dr. Kim, was, do you believe it would be wrong for a foreign power or an external power to interfere with press freedom in the United States?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, sir, as a legal philosopher, I could not say that.

Mr. FRASER. I see. If it were true that Korean CIA agents operating out of the consulate were interfering with the right of the newspaper known as The New Korea to publish its views freely, would you regard that as wrong?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. That is some gray area in the law, I would say, in limited knowledge of law that I have. That is, whether or not the Korean residents in the United States are technically and legally the citizens of the Republic of Korea until such time they are naturalized to be a citizen of the United States, that is my understanding.

Hence, they might have some unfounded fear of the presence of some of the members of the CIA or some of the consul general's officers.

Mr. FRASER. That wasn't my question. My question dealt with interference. I am supposing now the truth of what we have heard this afternoon. I am not expecting you to accept it as true. But supposing for a moment it is true. If it is true the Korean CIA is interfering with The New Korea, a newspaper published in the United States, am I right to say you don't think that is necessarily wrong?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No.

Mr. FRASER. How far can the Government of South Korea go in interfering with the rights that are guaranteed under the U.S. Con-

stitution to the people who live in the United States? How far would you give the right to the South Korean Government to infringe these rights?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. In other words, what I would say, the Republic of Korea does not have any extraterritorial rights in this country, except the immunities granted to the diplomatic offices; and if they extend any activities over to Korean residents on principle, I have to say it is wrong, but such a judgment as right and wrong must be based upon the correct assessment of the facts and evidence.

If we do not have a correct assessment of the evidence, our judgments and our views might be a wrong one.

Mr. FRASER. We will have to take a short recess. There is a vote in progress. We will be back in just a moment.

[A short recess was taken.]

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will be in order again. The session may be interrupted again within the next few minutes.

Dr. Kim, I would just like to ask you a few more questions, if I may. You indicated that you know Mr. Kim Woon-ha, who is sitting next to you. In your judgment, is he a person who tells the truth?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. In my opinion, he is a very moral person and very concerned with the mother country, South Korea, and also he is very idealistic, and I respect and regard his integrity. But some of the allegations that he has made today against the consulate general and other allegations, I do not know whether they are founded on factual evidence or it could be some motive that I have no way of knowing.

Mr. FRASER. What you are saying is, you understand that he is a moral person, idealistic, concerned about Korea?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. What did you say about your view of his integrity? Is he a person of integrity, in your judgment?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Sometimes a person can be a very moral person, and his conviction and his intention may very well be a very noble one, or sometimes such intention is not necessarily for the best interests and common good of the community. I make distinction between intentions and consequences.

Mr. FRASER. Do you yourself have any knowledge as to whether what he has told us today is true?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I do not have all the facts because those things are some of the things, as he has said, is a kind of personal meeting with some persons I do not know of.

Mr. FRASER. Do you have any knowledge about the allegations he has made here today?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. He has often attributed some of the things about management of the New Korea to the activities of the CIA in the past, and in a very recent month or in the last year or so, his newspaper tended to be rather very strongly critical. Some of the articles published in that newspaper are informations obtained through some sources in Japan where the organizations seem to be backed by the sympathizers of North Korea.

Mr. FRASER. My question is, do you have any knowledge about the allegations he has made here today? What he has told us, and you have heard his testimony, have you not?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. What he has told us is that the Korean CIA has been attempting to either persuade him to change what he publishes or go out of business. Now, do you have any knowledge as to whether what he has said is true or not?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Mr. Chairman, you are asking me to make a valued judgment—

Mr. FRASER. No; I am not. If you have no knowledge, then you can say that. If you have knowledge, I would like to know what it is.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. What knowledge—specifically what, may I ask?

Mr. FRASER. Do you have any knowledge as to whether or not the Korean CIA operating in Los Angeles has attempted to either dissuade him to change what he publishes or to put him out of business?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I have no knowledge of that, sir.

Mr. FRASER. You have no knowledge at all?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. So far as you know, it may either be true or untrue?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. And you have no way of judging it?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No way of judging, because I do not have all the facts. And as I have said earlier, a person's judgment must be based upon the correct assessment of the facts available to him, and so far, I do not have all the factual evidence on which I could make such judgment.

Mr. FRASER. You don't have any evidence?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. You have no knowledge?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Through your appearance here today, you don't in any way intend to challenge or dispute what he has said?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. My main reason for being here was to present to you the problems and the general characteristics of the Korean-American communities in southern California.

Mr. FRASER. I understand that. I appreciate the fact you have done that, but we have a very serious allegation before this committee; that is, in the case of the New Korea newspaper, which is published under the protection of the U.S. Constitution, that a foreign power is deliberately attempting to either alter the character of that publication or to destroy it.

My question to you, and which you have already answered, was can you tell us whether or not these allegations are true?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. You don't know?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ranard, you referred in your testimony to an occasion on which there was an effort to contribute money to American elections. Can you elaborate on that?

Mr. RANARD. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The most recent one that I know of has already been printed in the Washington Post, and deals with the attempt by Row Chin-wan, who curiously at an earlier point of his career, was also the president of a Korean resident association, to provide money to an executive in the White House, in the Executive Office of the White House, some time around mid-1974, I think, for whatever candidates they would care to select.

In other words, this was an effort to provide campaign contributions. I was informed of this after the fact. It was told to me by the person to whom the offer was made, in the presence of two other people from the National Security Council, and I returned and reported it. That would be the most recent one.

Mr. FRASER. Before you leave that one, who was it that made contact with the White House?

Mr. RANARD. Row Chin-wan, who today is an assemblyman in Korea, and has been, I believe, since some time after the constitution was revised in 1972. I would say since about December 1972. He is American educated, and was a former president of a Korean resident association in the United States—Washington, I believe. He has been back in Korea, as I say, since 1972. He visited the United States on a variety of occasions since then. The one I had reference to occurred some time in mid-1974, possibly around August, somewhere in that period, when he made these overtures to a Mr. Nidecker who at that time was on the staff of the Executive Office of the White House.

Mr. FRASER. At the time he made the offer to the White House to contribute money in the American congressional elections, to your knowledge, was there any representation made on whose behalf he was speaking?

Mr. RANARD. Again, Mr. Chairman, I will have to recall what was told me. I don't recall specifically that there was any representation made in terms of whom he was speaking for. However, would you be prepared to accept my own interpretation as to whom I think he was speaking for?

Mr. FRASER. I would be interested in knowing, yes.

Mr. RANARD. I can only go on the basis of logic here. Considering that Row Chin-wan, up until 1972, had held only medium level positions of one sort or another in the United States, one of which I think was as a manager of a motel; considering the fact that his income as an assemblyman, beginning sometime in 1972, might well have been in the neighborhood of \$17,000; that he made several visits to the United States, and that on these occasions he did not conduct himself in a penurious fashion in terms of where he stayed, for example, the Watergate or whom he entertained, I can only assume that Mr. Row was not acting on his own initiative or out of his own bankroll. This would, therefore, lead me to believe that others were financing him. As concerns those others, I would think they were people closely connected with or involved in the Korean Government.

Mr. FRASER. Professor Henderson?

Mr. HENDERSON. I simply make clear, Mr. Row is a member of the democratic republic party, the government party in Korea and, therefore, can be presumed to be speaking for the interests of the government which this party represents.

Mr. FRASER. You were about to tell us about another incident prior to that time.

Mr. RANARD. Yes; there were one or two other instances, one of which goes back to 1970, I believe, Mr. Chairman, and I believe it actually involved a member of this committee who had the very good judgment to immediately recognize it for what it was and to turn it down.

I would prefer not to say more about that, Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as my understanding of it is obtained from intelligence reporting and

I prefer not to discuss that in open session. I will be prepared to specify the exact nature of it.

Mr. FRASER. In executive session?

Mr. RANARD. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. We will reserve further questioning on that.

Mr. RANARD. Fine.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Mr. Chairman, may I volunteer?

Mr. FRASER. Yes, Dr. Kim.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Being a professor, I am by nature a very rational person, and I detest any emotional outbursts. As I was speaking to you in answer to your question, I heard someone from behind me saying that I will be killed. And this is a kind of intimidation, and this kind of thing is going on among the Korean residents.

Shall I ask your protection today as I walk out of this hall? Let's not be emotionally involved. All I am concerned about is to present to you the case so that you would come to have an accurate opinion about what is going on among the Korean residents.

It could very well be someone totally different from anyone who has anything to do with the Korean Consulate or Embassy who are playful enough to do this kind of thing.

I heard from some consuls that they were threatened by phone calls from anonymous persons, and so when you weigh this, I don't know what to say.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Kim, what you are saying is that statements of this kind are made back and forth within the Korean community?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes; and I detest this thing going on. And somehow we have to resolve this through some kind of rational discussion among ourselves rather than bringing this matter to waste your time, and I feel a kind of shame being a Korean-American at this time, because to bring this kind of matter to the Congress. It could be very well solved by some means other than this. And shall I go on? To alleviate some of the points that Mr. Kim has mentioned, I have no animosity toward him.

I, in fact, like him very much—

Mr. FRASER. My understanding is you have no knowledge about his—

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. About some of the statements in the paper. For example, in page 1 these Koreans, the mayor of Los Angeles is not Tom Brady but the Korean Consul General. Whose mistake is this? It's the Koreans, the majority of Koreans who regard the Korean Consul General to be the mayor of Los Angeles.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Kim, let me say that our interest here is in whether any laws of the United States have been violated. And it would appear to me there may have been some violations of law if what we have heard this afternoon is true. And if you do now believe you have some knowledge about those allegations, I would like to pursue and detail exactly what you know, but I think the main objective of the hearings is to find out to what extent a foreign power is interfering in the domestic affairs of the United States in ways that are contrary to the laws of the United States.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I wish I could accumulate factual evidence to present to you. My powers are limited, and I do not have access to all the evidence I need to present to you, sir.

Mr. FRASER. If you want to change your statement and now tell me you do have some knowledge about these allegations, I would be glad to explore it with you.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No; I have doubt about some of the allegations, which are very serious, which were elevated to a manner of international problems, as I have stated earlier, as a philosopher of law, professor, I cannot condone any activity which would infringe about the national sovereignty of the United States.

They should be confined within the laws of the United States, such as the Federal laws that you have cited, but I am quite sure that all these people are well aware of those facts, and they would act accordingly. And I regret to say instances in the past such as the *Kim Dae-jung* case, as some of the witnesses cited, I have the same feeling about it, and it was a kind of mistake the Korean Government has made in the past. But I don't think the present Korean Government is pursuing the same course of action.

Mr. FRASER. Has the government changed since Kim Dae-jung was kidnaped?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Most of the allegations made today seem to be the affairs in the past, but I do not know any of these instances occurring.

Mr. FRASER. Was Park Chung-hee president at the time that Kim Dae-jung was kidnaped?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes; he was.

Mr. FRASER. He is president today?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes. The present state of a certain man cannot be judged by his past mistakes. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. Yes; Mr. Ranard?

Mr. RANARD. Mr. Chairman, I alluded to the persecution of Kim Dae-jung, so I would like to comment on Dr. Kim Hyung-il's remarks. I have a great deal of respect and admiration for Kim Dae-jung. I cannot accept the fact that this persecution is something that only happened in the distant past.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, as of just a couple of days ago, Mr. Kim was arrested again. He is still under trial for an offense going back to 1971 in which he had the temerity to call the President a generalissimo.

These activities by the KCIA against him have continued right up through March 1, and they will continue. And I think it's a disgraceful thing that has been perpetrated on this man; equal, I must say, only in my own experience, to what the Soviets have done or even the Nazis have done in attempting to make people nonpersons. It is as though the Korean CIA is attempting to erase Kim Dae-jung completely; that he was never born, never breathed, never married, never ran in an election for public office in which he achieved more than 5 million votes.

I find it difficult, among all the things that have been said here by Kim Hyung-il, to accept this last one. I can accept some part of the rationalization or sophistication that I have heard from him, as I have heard it before. It seems to run along lines that the security of the Korean Peninsula overrides any values in terms of human rights.

Yet, if I recall what our own Secretary of State has said, even most recently, one of the lessons we learned out of Vietnam was that popular

will and legitimacy are important requisites for resistance to external aggression.

I don't believe that the situation in Korea, in terms of the security issue, overrides human values. But even if it did, Mr. Chairman, we are not talking about the security situation on the Korean Peninsula—we are talking about efforts in the United States to deny Korean residents the right to assemble or the right to free speech.

Thank you, sir, for allowing me to at least amend the comment that has been made.

Mr. FRASER. We have got to recess briefly again. There is another vote in progress, so we will be back in a few minutes.

[Short recess taken.]

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will come to order again.

Let me say first in regard to Dr. Kim's earlier statement that somebody in this hearing room made some threat toward him: I want to state very clearly that there is a Federal statute that makes unlawful any effort to intimidate a witness.

Dr. Kim, did you want to respond to what Mr. Ranard said at the close of his last statement?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Some comment I would like to make to that was, it is a matter of the scale of values and certainly disputable points as whether founded to elevate national security to such a high point as to suppress the freedom of individuals, but be that as it may, to delve into that situation would be to getting into the area which is beyond the scope of this hearing.

That would be the interference of the internal politics of another country, so I would rather like to caution the other witnesses to confine speeches or allegations to within the scope of the hearings, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, during the time in which you have alleged there was pressure on you to change opinions or statements you are publishing, did you receive any offer to purchase your newspaper from you?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. As I said before, I said all those stories under oath, one day KCIA sent their agent to me from KCIA, and he asked me to take one of the three alternatives. One of the alternatives was to sell or to close my newspaper down.

Mr. FRASER. One alternative was to sell or close your newspaper down?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Yes. At that time, he said he could arrange a buyer if you wanted to sell your newspaper.

Mr. FRASER. Who was the person who told you that you had these three alternatives, one of which was to sell your paper or close it down?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. He said he came to me on behalf of KCIA.

Mr. FRASER. Did he say that?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Yes.

I would like to say this. It is a very unhappy matter I must say about Dr. Kim Hyung-il. My grandfather built churches for the Korean immigrants. My grandfather invited Dr. Hyung-il Kim as a minister for the church. When Dr. Kim had tuberculosis, my grandfather sent him to the sanatorium in Texas. My grandfather also helped his wife. Since my grandfather and my younger brother got close relationship with Dr. Kim.

All of my family respected him as a minister and a professor. When I took over the New Korea, I needed his help and support. I asked

Dr. Kim to help me. He accepted my request. So I named him as a member of editorial writers and a member of the board of directors. He gave to me good advice. Some of it was good for me; some of it was bad for me.

When Mr. Young Park, Korean consul general at Los Angeles, came to Los Angeles, Dr. Kim had a very close relationship with Mr. Young Park. I don't know whether this kind of story can be permitted here or not, but I would like to say this: Dr. Kim several times recommended me to take a moderate way and not to criticize the Korean Government. But I could not accept his advice to be silent against the Park government. Sometimes he came to me and to my office. He said he met with Mr. Young Park, consul general, at the lunch. Mr. Young Park persuaded him or tried to persuade him to make me a moderate man. At the time, Dr. Kim said he could arrange some Korean Government funds and deliver it to me.

Mr. FRASER. Financial?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Financial support.

Mr. FRASER. For you?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Yes. And he said he could ask, you know, some money to Mr. Young Park. At that time I rejected that kind of request. After that, the Los Angeles-Korean community had a special election to elect the president of the Korean Association of Southern California. Dr. Kim was recruited a candidate for the Korean consulate general in Los Angeles as a presidential candidate. To the Koreans it is difficult to criticize a minister and a senior friend of my family. So I could not take out his name from my newspaper as a member of the editorial writers and directors.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Kim.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I would like to respond to the remark, and as he has just said, that we do have a long family relationship, and I certainly intend to keep it that way. I respect his personhood, but as I have said earlier, that this year, unfortunately, in the Los Angeles area in the Korean communities for election for the president of the Korean Association of Southern California, the issue was not centered on the primary objectives and purposes of the organization, but rather it was somehow into political issue which tended to polarize the community. And I do have many friends in the community, and I am a man who do not take any extreme positions. That is my philosophy of life. And I, from time to time, advise Mr. Kim as the president of the New Korean newspaper not to publish some articles which are expressions of emotions which can be very extreme in such an occasion, and I did not do that by someone's advice, but I did it by my own.

I do have an acquaintance with the present consul general, Mr. Park, in Los Angeles, but I got to know him when he arrived in Los Angeles and not before.

Although I had met him once in Korea, but my relationship with the consul general in Los Angeles is not as deep as my friendship with many of them in Los Angeles, one of whom would be Mr. Kim.

And so I did not offer him any such financial remuneration for his toning it down.

Mr. FRASER. Say that again?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I did not offer him any kind of financial offer through the consul general's office. I cautioned him and advised him

to tone the articles down, not to take too extreme a course of action through the news media.

Mr. FRASER. Did you?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I did it by my own.

Mr. FRASER. Did you suggest that if he did change his editorial position that there would be money forthcoming from some source?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. There was no discussion of money at all?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. You just heard Mr. Kim say that there was.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. So one of you is not telling the truth?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes. All I did was say to him, I know, since he came to this country he does not have any job by which he earns his living and he is a Korean and his newspaper reporter for many, many years, and if pursuing that career in this country it would be awfully difficult for him in a financial way, and I asked him to find some other ways to make a living than the newspaper which has a limited circulation within the community as a weekly.

And I suggested he find some other avenues to pursue. That is about all I had said to him, and I did not say anything that would have to do with a financial offer to him through the consul general's office.

Mr. FRASER. Well, whether or not the consul general's office was involved, did you suggest any financial help to him if he were to quit the newspaper?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, sir. I am not a man of such financial means, and I also have to say this: That I have been criticized by many in the Korean community as a puppet of the consul general's office, without any factual evidence, during this campaign. And the fact has been that the fundraising party raised close to \$10,000, and I had to spend my life savings, so to speak, in order to pursue my objective, which was to unite the Korean community rather than to let it polarize by the political issues.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Kim, let me go back to this point because I want to be very clear about it. Mr. Kim Woon-ha has said that you told him that you could get some money for him if he changed his editorial position, if he were to become more moderate.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. As I have said, no, sir.

Mr. FRASER. And you have said that there is no truth to that at all?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, sir. I did advise him——

Mr. FRASER. So in effect, so far as you know, Mr. Kim Woon-ha is telling a falsehood; he is lying, as far as you know?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. He might have mistaken the advice that I have given him in that way.

Mr. FRASER. Is there something you could have said that might have led him to believe that there was an offer of money and financial support?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I could not recollect exactly when it was and how I said it. I don't think I have said in any way to implicate that the consul general's office was ready to make an offer, any kind of financial offer.

Mr. FRASER. But you are not prepared to say that Mr. Kim Woon-ha is lying.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. As I said, it can be said to be lying, but I would be hesitating in saying that because I respect the personhood and rather like to say he may have taken it in such a misguided way in his own way.

Mr. FRASER. He misunderstood what you said?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes; or misinterpreted.

Mr. FRASER. Do you think it is possible he did misunderstand you?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Very likely when he has his position in such a way as he has been taking whatever advice some people would give him, maybe taking in that way. Perhaps he may take anyone's advice as kind of an advice which has to do with something with the consul general's office or Korean CIA.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Kim.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Which need not be the case.

Mr. FRASER. I would like to get one last view or opinion from you. If it is true that the Korean CIA has been trying to force Mr. Kim Woon-ha out of business, would you regard that as unacceptable and that some action should be taken to prevent any such interference in the future?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. By law, yes. The news media should be governed by the laws of the United States, not the laws of the Republic of Korea here in this country. As a Korean-American, as you can perhaps understand, if you are criticized so severely as to be called a traitor to your own country, which is a public office, if you occupy a public office such as consul general—if you are called by some newspaper to be a traitor or a very severe criticism, it would be natural for you to take dislike about a newspaper. But I don't think they could do anything more than to resort to some ways and means to persuade Mr. Kim to do otherwise. They certainly cannot resort to any violent activities or any illegal activities as such.

Mr. FRASER. Such as putting pressure on advertisers?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. That again I do not know whether actually there was such a pressure. It could very well be the case that sometimes these companies can make excuses. After all, there are three major daily newspapers in which they can put the ad in, Korean newspapers, at such an expense, and since his newspaper is a weekly they may have considered it would not be worthwhile to spend so much expenses. So perhaps they would have used that as an excuse and told him that it was CIA which told us not to put the ad in your newspaper.

About these things again, I do not know what are the facts behind—

Mr. FRASER. You have heard these allegations before?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Have you? You are a good friend of the consul general?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. As I have said, my friendship in fact with Mr. Kim would be a deeper one than my acquaintance with any of the people in the Korean consulate.

Mr. FRASER. I wondered, since you do know the consul general reasonably well, I understand, have you ever asked him about these allegations?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. You never asked him?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, sir. I have never discussed anything so concerned about the politics of Korea—just acquaintance. When I pay him visit in his office we discuss the matters concerning the Korean community.

Mr. FRASER. You are an American citizen?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. And in meeting with the consul general you are aware of charges that the Korean CIA was operating out of the consulate and you were aware of charges that the consul general or the Korean CIA was putting pressure on Mr. Kim Woon-ha's newspaper? Am I wrong about that—you were not familiar with those charges?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, sir. All I am familiar with is sometimes when I meet these people they would say—they told me that they have headaches because of these critics demonstrating in front of the general consulate's office and demonstrating in downtown, and so forth. But my answer to that was what can you do?

Mr. FRASER. So until today you had no knowledge that Mr. Kim Woon-ha was alleging interference by the Korean CIA?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Not to this degree of gravity.

Mr. FRASER. Today is your first knowledge of it?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Would you expect to raise this with the consul general when you go back?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I certainly would. And as I have indicated in my paper for the future course of the association, some way and means we have to find to resolve this within our communities.

Mr. FRASER. Is the consul general also a member of the KCIA?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know that?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes, sir, he is not. He is an official from the Republic of Korea, and he is certainly not a member of the association, but—

Mr. FRASER. My question is, is he a member of the Korean CIA?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, sir, I don't think so.

Mr. FRASER. I see. Although other members of the consul you think may be.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. May be.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, you have heard Dr. Kim respond to your statement by saying that he thinks you must have misunderstood him with respect to the suggestion of financial support for you. Do you think that it is possible you may have misunderstood what he said?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. As I said before, I exposed my story in my newspaper, and the chairman of my board of directors had meetings several times. Dr. Kim attended those meetings. I presented my story several times, so I think he understood and knew all my cases.

Mr. FRASER. Well, so that you are saying that he understood your concern about the interference or the pressure that you were getting?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. I think so.

Mr. FRASER. He says that today is the first time he understood the gravity of the charges. But you testified earlier that Dr. Kim had suggested that he could get money from the consulate.

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. And he says you may have misunderstood him on that score.

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. I understood perfectly. He said that story in Korean.

Mr. FRASER. You don't think you misunderstood him.

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Not misunderstood.

Mr. FRASER. You were speaking in Korean?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Yes. And I would like to say this: There are about 10 consuls and vice consuls in the Korean consulate general in Los Angeles. Five of them are KCIA members.

As I said, one of them invited me to the lunch. At that time, the vice consul, who is actually a Korean Navy lieutenant commander—

Mr. FRASER. Say that—actually what?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Korean lieutenant commander.

Mr. FRASER. Korean lieutenant?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Lieutenant colonel?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Yes, sir. He threatened me. I am Korean Navy officer; I am faithful Navy officer for the Honorable Park Chung-hee.

Mr. FRASER. For the honorable—

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Park Chung-hee.

Mr. FRASER. The President?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Of Korea?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Yes. He said he could not endure; my newspaper is criticizing against his Honorable Park Chung-hee. So he said he gave me a notice. At that time, a consul, who is present director of Korean Americans in the United States of America department in KCIA headquarters and was a consul for Korean consulate general at Los Angeles, was there at Pear Gardens' Korean restaurant.

Mr. FRASER. Pear Gardens?

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. Yes. He is also Korean Navy commander.

He also said to me, "Be careful". He was replaced to the Korea last year.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. May I fill you in with a little more detailed information about the newspaper called New Korea.

That newspaper was one of the older newspapers in the Korean community in the United States. That was the organ of one of the organizations I mentioned during the period of independence movement, and that was the press put out by the organization and supported by that organization, which was a very anti-Syngman Rhee government during 12 or 15 years of the Syngman Rhee rule over South Korea. The press was very, very critical of that government, and members of the organization which supported that newspaper were getting old by 1962; and yet, that newspaper survived. And then Mr. Kim came in and took over and attempted to revive it.

At that time, now I recollect, one board meeting also in private conversation with Mr. Kim, I suggested that don't we need much wider community support for this kind of newspaper. It is about time to shift and reorient the editorial direction in such a way it would have appeared to the community and make it a kind of newspaper for the Korean Association of Southern California as an independent newspaper, not like the other three major daily newspapers which would have their foreign offices in Korea. That I thought was a desirable course of action to take. That way, perhaps we could have much more

communitywide support, and there would be no financial problem in running the New Korean newspaper.

That is what I suggested to him. But his reply to that was that it is already too late for that. By then he was taking very adamant position against the Korean Government, and I said the main purpose and function of the Korean press here in the United States should be the Korean community among the Korean residents rather than the anti-Government movement which would attempt to be political.

That is the difference of opinions about the Korean politics, and I in fact feel that I am put in such an awkward position this afternoon because he and I had been very good friends over such a long, long period, and it is a matter of the differences in opinions, and I am very rather shamed to bring this kind of family affairs to the Congress.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Kim, I would share that view if it were just a difference of opinion between the two of you, which would be understandable, but the charges this afternoon are far more serious than that.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you perhaps appoint—this committee could perhaps appoint a few members of the Korean communities in the United States to gather all the counterevidence and submit to you—

Mr. FRASER. I think we would welcome any evidence. I think this is a matter for the Federal Bureau of Investigation if they believe that the record shows an apparent violation of U.S. laws. It would be ironic if people who sought to have the protection of American freedom found that a foreign government was pursuing them here and depriving them of those freedoms.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. That is why I suggest to let the FBI or other governmental agencies, law agencies to take care of, and let's not let subjective feelings and emotions carry to a national level by bringing this into the Congress, which I think would do nothing but harm the good relationships between the two nations. Any illegal activities can be controlled or can be investigated by FBI.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. FRASER. And you would agree that any illegal activities should be stopped?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes. On principle, as I have said, as a legal philosopher, I cannot condone anything that is illegal according to the laws of this land.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Henderson, I would like to invite you to comment at this point on any further matters that you feel we have overlooked in the hearing this afternoon. I recognize the unusual nature of the inquiry we have been pursuing, but do you wish to throw some further light on it?

Mr. HENDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like the opportunity of including in the record, if I could, the New York Times articles of August 17, 1973, and August 20, 1973,¹ to which I have very extensive reference during my testimony.

Mr. FRASER. Would you make those a part of the record?

Mr. HENDERSON. Make that a part of my presentation.

Mr. FRASER. We would be glad to have those.

¹ See appendix 1, p. 83.

Mr. HENDERSON. I might also say that one could perhaps examine a little more into the question of financial donations that are being made to American universities on the part of Korean Government agencies. One is the gift of \$1 million by the Korean Traders Association, and two articles have appeared in the Korean press—I believe they were in the Chosun Ilbo¹—reporting that it was the purpose of that donation to make Harvard University and the intellectual community of the Boston area pro-Korean, pro-Korean Government, and to silence the critics of the Korean Government in that area, including Professors Reischauer, Jerome, Cohen, and myself.

I don't believe that these articles are necessarily reflected in the actual negotiations that have taken place between the university and the Korean Traders Association, and it is quite true, I think, that the Korean Traders Association has its own money, has a lot of it. But it is describable as a Korean Government agency, and it very well may be that in making this kind of a donation, it is responsive to the overall political planning being conducted by the Korean CIA.

Similar donations have apparently been made to the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Hawaii in connection with the building of its own building. These could possibly represent the further infiltration and further attempt to influence from the outside objective academic inquiry into the Korean situation.

Mr. FRASER. I don't remember whether it was in your statement or Mr. Ranard's, but there was a reference to subsidies to other Korean language publications and broadcasts in the United States apparently from the Korean Government.

Mr. HENDERSON. There is one made to the, I guess, Research Institute on Korean Affairs.

Mr. RANARD. I didn't make any reference to broadcasts. I think I did make reference to the fact that there was support of a Korean research institute in Washington. I don't recall making one to broadcast.

Mr. HENDERSON. I spoke of the broadcasting units, referring actually to Mr. Lee's testimony of June 10 before this committee. And he, of course, is a witness on whom we can rely on such matters.

Mr. FRASER. Korean research institute. I am not familiar with that. Is that Washington based?

Mr. HENDERSON. Actually based in Silver Spring, Md.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. May I comment on that?

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. We do have a USIS in Seoul, Korea, and there is no reason why the Government of the Republic of Korea could not establish their information service center here in this country under the mutual treaties that we do have, and on the points of subsidy to the research institute connected with the various higher learning institutions in this country, as for one, Harvard University and other places, as Dr. Henderson indicated, I would rather say we should welcome this rather than discourage this. As an academician, if I have a friend high up in the Korean Government, I would certainly persuade them to do whatever they can to help me in establishing such academic research center in the very university where I am teaching.

¹ See appendix 5, p. 108.

But unfortunately, I do not have such friends high in the Government, and I don't think those are anything that we should be concerned about.

And, Dr. Henderson, if you are doubtful of this, I would like to invite you to come to go to South Korea, and I think they would do whatever they could to help you in getting materials for your research. As far as academic researchers are concerned, I think they would allow you to do so.

Mr. RANARD. Mr. Chairman, one of the difficulties I have had with Prof. Kim Hyung-il is what I rather regard as his inability to distinguish between right and wrong. I don't think the issue is, by and large, whether or not the Korean Government should become involved in educational exchange with the United States. Certainly we would encourage that. I think the basic issue is whether or not the Korean Government is allowing front organizations to develop in the United States supported by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency for whatever devious purposes it might have in mind.

I think that is what we are talking about, and not whether or not there is a chair at Harvard or X University in connection with teaching of Korean language studies, and so forth.

If we do make these distinctions, I think we might understand what we are trying to direct our attention to in this discussion of what the CIA is doing in the United States.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Again, my comment on that would be in the past the very presence of the USIS in Seoul, Korea, has been accused to be the frontline for the USCIA agents, and—

Mr. RANARD. Once more, please.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Any help or subsidy from the Government of the Republic of Korea can be regarded to be the front of the Korean CIA, for that matter, and all these allegations must be made. Those allegations are very serious ones, I should say, and must be substantiated by some factual evidence, which we do not have.

Mr. HENDERSON. In that regard, I just suggest that translations of the two articles in Chosun Ilbo¹ I should send to you and they should be included. They make their own comment, I think.

Mr. FRASER. These are published in Seoul?

Mr. HENDERSON. Published in Seoul. I think I can send you translations of those two articles, and I think the intent involved is made fairly clear there.

I do want to also say in regard to Mr. Kim's comments—and as one of the main officials of USIS in Seoul, formerly, none of us are objecting to the Korean Information Service in Washington or the activity it carries out here in normal governmental propaganda, if you will—that kind of activity—which is fully the kind of thing that USIS Seoul has been doing. We have no objections to this whatsoever.

What we refer to is something quite different. It is, as Mr. Ranard put it very well, the establishment of real front organizations, which I don't think the Korean Information Service necessarily is, whose purposes can be detected even in the writing of newspapers under the control of censorship in the Republic of Korea.

¹ See appendix 5, p. 108.

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. I would like to say this: To tell the truth is duty of the free press. I heard Dr. Kim was invited to Korea by the Korean Government in 1973. I heard that Dr. Kim, too, was mainly visiting Korean universities in Korea during the 3 months. At that time he delivered a speech to support Park Chung-hee regime as a distinguished scholar of foreign Koreans.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Perhaps I should clarify that again. It actually was in 1970 when I was serving as president of the Korean Association. I was not invited by the Government but the consulate general had made a recommendation for me to go to visit the father country from which I had been absent over 18 years. So I went back and toured around the country. And I didn't make any speeches at that time; I was mainly concerned with visiting my relatives and looking them up, and so forth.

But in 1973 to 1974, that during that academic year I was given a sabbatical leave from my university, and I spent about 6 to 7 months in Europe. And on the way back I made a worldwide trip by way of the Middle East and all the South Asian countries I traveled, then went back to Korea. And no one invited me in; I just went back. I was traveling with my family.

And while I was staying there I met some old friend of mine who introduced me to the officials in the Government, who made arrangements for me to go to visit some of the university which I liked so very much, and I welcomed that opportunity and went to different universities.

The head of these organizations, universities, were acquaintances of mine and friends of my wife's side or my side, and I did make some speeches to the student body as well as conducting seminars to the faculties of the different colleges. But I didn't make any kinds of speeches or anything, that is so, in support of the government.

You can say it was not critical of the government, but I should also mention that I had an interview with the newspaper, which is Chosun Ilbo, which is known as a critic of the government.

Mr. FRASER. Used to be.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes, sir, let's say used to be.

Mr. FRASER. Right.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. And I was given an interview with a reporter of that newspaper in which I made a rather critical remark about the course of the policies the South Korean Government was taking, especially in the economic field. Although I am not an expert in the economic field I did point out the disparity between the rural areas and urban areas and this should be corrected as soon as possible.

I did indicate that and I did also mention some other remarks in homes that they would heed to these suggestions. And I am very glad since I left in the spring of 1974 that that was given before I think the so-called revitalization of the rural area movement started, and I sure hope that they would correct this situation.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ranard, I understand that in 1971 the State Department requested an investigation into Radio Free Asia for possible violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act; is that true?

Mr. RANARD. Yes; it is true, Mr. Chairman. But I am not sure whether it was in 1971—my recollection would place it the end of 1970. I place it at that time because I think it occurred not long after I became Director of the Office of Korean Affairs. My suspicions were

aroused as concerning the activities of that organization, some of the membership on it, the letters that were being distributed, the requests for information we were getting from the general public, what appeared almost at times to be an attempt on the part of the Radio Free Asia to, even by its name alone, connote that possibly this was an undertaking subscribed by the U.S. Government.

So at that time, as I recall it, I wrapped up a variety of my concerns plus some other indications, one or two things I have alluded to here, put them into a case and submitted it to the Department of Justice. I think we then had an interim reply from Mr. Mitchell, who was then Attorney General, and subsequently, we had a final reply indicating that on the basis of their review they couldn't see any connection between Radio Free Asia and a foreign principal.

I must say this rather surprised me because I had in my possession at that time letters that had been sent throughout the United States by President Park Chung-hee in which he had asked for contributions to Radio Free Asia.

We also had information regarding the actual use of transmitters in Korea, I think on a free basis, for Radio Free Asia.

So I must say I was rather surprised.

Mr. FRASER. Radio Free Asia was then operating out of where?

Mr. RANARD. Radio Free Asia, I believe, was incorporated in Delaware. It had its executive offices here in Washington. Curiously enough, at an address on Connecticut Avenue, which I think also housed the headquarters of something called the Korean Freedom and Cultural Foundation. I am not sure whether this also was the same location, subsequently, of another organization known as Unification Church. But in any case, Radio Free Asia was incorporated in Delaware. Executive offices here.

Much, I think, of the technical work involved in the preparation of scripts for broadcasting was done in the United States, and the actual transmission was, I think, out of Korea by transmitters, I believe, that were actually owned by the Korean Government.

Mr. FRASER. The information that we have over some source indicates that a Robert Amory, formerly Deputy Director of U.S./CIA, may have played a role in limiting the scope of the inquiry into these allegations.

Do you have any information on that?

Mr. RANARD. Mr. Chairman, I do not. At no time was I ever aware as to why the Department of Justice concluded as it did; that is to say, that this organization was not subject to the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

Mr. FRASER. We have discussed briefly some of the relationships that may exist between the Korean Government and Korean CIA and some American organizations. I think in your testimony you used the phrase "curious links." You probably covered that in elaboration of it. If you haven't, I would like to ask you to elaborate.

Mr. RANARD. I think I have alluded to as much of it as I think I would be prepared to say at this time. Mr. Chairman, if I recollect anything further I would ask your indulgence in making it available under closed session.

Mr. FRASER. In the discussions so far this afternoon we have talked about certain organizations, such as the Korean Research Institute.

Are there other organizations where a question arises that you feel free to comment on at this point?

Mr. RANARD. I think for my own self I have pointed to the ones that come to my mind. Maybe others will come up as we go along, and I will certainly be glad to elaborate on them at a later time.

Mr. FRASER. During the time that you were in the Department of State and were involved in or concerned with the question of Korean CIA activities in the United States, did you ever come under any kind of pressure or suggestion that you should limit your concerns or should not press them too strongly?

Mr. RANARD. Well, to begin with, Mr. Chairman, I came under subtle observations of that sort from the Korean side. I think I alluded in my testimony to one attempt by the actual person involved to subtly intimidate me. He let it be known he thought I was spending more time on concerns regarding the Korean CIA in the United States than I should have been.

In my own office I would say, by and large, no. I think there may have been some who felt that, considering the broad nature of my responsibilities, that I probably apportioned a little more time to finding out what was going on with the Korean CIA than they might have. But I don't feel as though I was ever under any pressure.

There was one occasion—I have never known really how to assess it—but there was one occasion when a colleague of mine in our own CIA expressed a concern that possibly the result of any pressure on the part of the State Department or exposure or request for examination by the FBI of the activities of the Korean CIA might have some repercussions as to our own CIA activities abroad. But on the whole, I think I would be inclined to take that as sort of just a philosophical reaction that he might well have had. In any case I had no pressures placed on me. Until, as a matter of fact, your question a few minutes ago or your observations regarding why the Department of Justice might have taken a given position with respect to Radio Free Asia, I had never heard this mentioned.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. May I make the last remark I would like to make. Just as much as I admire and respect genuine concern for the Korean residents by your committee as well as some of the witnesses that are here, that I would like to bring this to your consideration and attention. That is, if we are so concerned about the extension of the Korean CIA activities in this land of freedom we should also be cautious about the extension of the opposition in internal politics of the Republic of Korea into this land of freedom.

By being sympathetic with some of these allegations, perhaps you are supporting the opposition party in South Korea—in a foreign country—in the United States. If we were to do so, perhaps we should mortalize many other American citizens who are in support of what is going on there.

Thank you so much.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Kim, you are saying that by showing some concern about the activities of the Korean CIA to coerce or intimidate Koreans who are either citizens or residents here, we may be in effect offering support to the political opposition in South Korea?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. The opposition party.

Mr. FRASER. I see. Just to explore that, your theory would be that by our expressing concern about interference with freedoms, since that is the same cause that political opposition has taken in South Korea, it might be construed that we are on the same partisan side?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes. In other words, not perhaps in such a direct way. But as I have said, I respect the genuine concern by these two gentlemen for the residents from Korea here in this country opposing such a fundamental principle such as freedom of the press and so forth.

By doing so, perhaps we are unconsciously and unknowingly supporting the opposition party in South Korea which are making all these serious accusations.

Mr. FRASER. Are you referring to that part of the opposition in South Korea which is in or out of jail?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. In and out of jail.

Mr. FRASER. Either one?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Yes. Since they do not have all the freedom that we enjoy perhaps they would like to have some branch here in the United States and stir things up in support for their cause. I am not against the moral principles.

Mr. FRASER. As long as—

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Or the principle of justice. But we should not entangle ourselves into the party politics of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. FRASER. Well, I wasn't intending to get into the party politics in South Korea. I am interested in your thought that we are getting into it by trying to defend the rights of people who live in the United States.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. At this level I would say this matter can be taken care of by the law enforcing agencies of the United States rather than by Congress. That is my personal opinion, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

Do you think, Dr. Kim, it is possible that President Park, who apparently feels, rightly or wrongly, that the rights of the people of South Korea are subordinate to security interests, that he may feel that these security interests also give him a right to suppress certain basic rights here in the United States?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. Mr. Chairman, as I have pointed out in my statement, that is a very difficult question because it has to do with the scale of values, where to put the priority.

Mr. FRASER. I understand. Do you think he may have thought about it and decided he does have a right also to suppress freedom here in the United States?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I don't know whether he knows it or not.

Mr. FRAZER. If the Korean CIA is doing that, presumably he knows about it, doesn't he?

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I don't know whether he knows it or not. If he knows, he should stop it, and I would do all I can to advise him or suggest to him not to do things like that, that it is a foolish thing, it would jeopardize the good relationship between the two nations. Infringement of the sovereignty of the other land. You cannot expect me as a professor of philosophy to condone that, would you?

Mr. FRASER. No, I wouldn't have thought so, no.

Mr. KIM WOON-HA. With all my respect to Dr. Kim, I don't believe most of the things he said today.

Mr. HENDERSON. I think that pertinent to Dr. Kim's remarks are the law of March 19, 1973, which forbids Koreans to "damage the prestige" of President Park or his government in conversations with foreigners or statements to foreign correspondents. In other words, it is quite clear that the present laws and criminal code—the March 19 law in fact became an amendment to South Korea's criminal code—include foreigners in it including, of course, especially Americans. They have specific reference not only to Koreans but to foreign critics and correspondents. American correspondents have been warned by the South Korean Minister of Public Information that they might fall under this law when they were in Korea reporting for the benefit of the American public in English for American newspapers, and we also must remember that the law provides for as much as 7 years' imprisonment for anyone damaging the security, national interest, or prestige of Korea at home or abroad.

Mr. Kim, by criticizing the Government, it does not matter whether a Korean is at home or abroad, so long as he criticizes his Government he is subject to criminal prosecution under the present laws of the Republic of Korea. This is, of course, an absolute invasion of the freedoms that we wish to give to people who have citizenship or permanent residency rights in our country.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ranard, let me just finish with this question on Korean CIA or Korean Government involvement in the Korean residents' associations. To what extent do we have knowledge of such involvement or efforts to influence what happens?

Mr. RANARD. Well, Mr. Chairman, you have had some testimony under oath today, I believe. Beyond that, I would say that I have no doubt whatsoever based upon my purview of intelligence material that crossed my desk, over a period of 4-years' time.

Mr. FRASER. No doubt that there has been an effort?

Mr. RANARD. Yes, it existed and it continues to exist.

Mr. FRASER. Now as for the Korean Government or Korean CIA influencing elections or controlling of Korean resident associations, the purpose of that would be for what—to maintain friendly control?

Mr. RANARD. I think the purpose of it would be twofold. I think the question is why would the Korean Government interfere in the election in the United States of overseas representatives' organizations. Why would they do this?

I could give you a long historical answer going back to the time of Syngman Rhee, but, Mr. Chairman, I think that basically it really relates to the fact that foreign support is crucial to Korea. There would be two reasons why they would do it:

(a) Either to develop progovernment support in the United States, or (b) they would do it to curtail any possible opposition. These overseas organizations are important; their significance would be regarded as perhaps all out of proportion to the fact that there are only about 150,000 Koreans in the United States. I think in my own testimony I spoke at one point about Kim Dae-jung being in the United States in January of 1971 to, more or less, prove to his own country that he was acceptable to the U.S. Government. He was a candidate for president. The United States has underwritten the

security of his country. We have provided the treaty. We provided the money. We provided the forces.

No Korean could be elected President unless it could be taken for granted that he had the support of the United States or that he was acceptable to the United States. Every candidate for president since the republic was established would visit the United States seeking appointments at high level with the President and Secretary of State and others so that these could be played up back home and, therefore, the electorate would understand that this man is important.

The Korean organizations are a focal point overseas for expression of this support and it doesn't surprise me at all that the Korean Government would be interested in what their reaction would be.

The point of the matter is the Korean Government has actually interfered in the elections of these associations. I mean nobody any disparagement, but having listened to Kim Hyung-il I think he is proof of the point that has been made. As a matter of fact, the question was not asked me as concerns what I meant when I said that attempt at one point was made to intimidate me by the Korean CIA station chief.

I think I said it was subtle. In fact, what he said to me was that his Government could not understand why I was sympathetic to opposition voices in Korea. Was I against the present Government? Wasn't I an officer of the State Department? Wasn't I taking an unneutral position?

Now, Mr. Chairman, on the face of it that is a harmless remark. But I might say that any foreign service officer above the rank of third secretary having had some experience in totalitarian regimes would recognize this remark for what it was.

Professor Henderson and I would have, having served under Syngman Rhee's regime and knowing the pressures that were brought on the American Embassy at that time to listen only to them and have no meetings whatever with any part of the opposition. Foreign policy has to be based upon our interest with a foreign country, and not necessarily a given foreign government; a government here today may disappear tomorrow and so we should have contact with others, including loyal opposition voices.

What was said to me by the head of the KCIA was reminiscent of my early days in Korea in 1959 when repeated attempts were made to intimidate the Embassy from talking to political leaders outside government. Until today, having heard what I consider to be an adaptation of this same view from Kim Hyung-il, I would say I haven't heard of that in some time. But I regard what he has just said as meaning that the U.S. Government should not be following activities in other countries by opposition voices because by so doing we might appear to be antigovernment.

Well I would merely submit, Mr. Chairman, that an astute foreign policy for Korea might well listen to the opposition voices. Thank you, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Well, this hearing has run on longer than any of us anticipated. I don't want to foreclose any of the witnesses from any last statement, and so if any witness does have something further to say I would be glad to listen, otherwise—

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. My only final remark would be just what he said, I have no objection to the State Department of this country listening to what the opposition voices are in South Korea in forming policies for their country, but what I am saying was that carrying over this kind of thing, perhaps unknowingly we might be extending some of the things going on in South Korea.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Kim, all I can say is if standing up for the observance of constitutionally guaranteed rights in the United States for people who are resident here, if doing that gives encouragement to the opposition in South Korea, then so be it.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. I didn't say that. I—

Mr. FRASER. I thought earlier you said that.

Mr. KIM HYUNG-IL. No, the two issues are separate. They are separate issues.

Mr. FRASER. Well, I guess we probably plowed that field several times.

My thanks to the four of you for a very informative session, which we appreciate very much, and we will be glad to hear further from any of the witnesses with respect to this matter.

This will close our first hearing which will be regarded simply as the beginning of our inquiry into this matter.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 6:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

ACTIVITIES OF THE KOREAN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE UNITED STATES

THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in open session, at 2:20 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Fraser (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today the subcommittee meets to continue its inquiry into reports of improper or illegal activities by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the United States. Having received numerous allegations that the Korean Central Intelligence Agency is engaged in efforts to silence opposition to the Park government among American citizens and Korean nationals in the United States, our inquiry is an attempt to establish what the actual facts are.

In our public hearings on this subject last week, Mr. Kim Woon-ha, editor of the New Korea newspaper in Los Angeles which has been critical of the Park government, reported that the KCIA has pressured him by instigating an advertising boycott, inviting him on an expense paid trip to Korea, offering him bribes and calling him a Communist. He also asserted that Dr. Kim Hyung-il—also a witness at the hearing—offered to try to obtain money for him from the Korean Consul General if he agreed to change his editorial position. Dr. Kim Hyung-il, president of the Korean Association of Southern California, denied making any offers of money to Kim Woon-ha. He said he has no knowledge of KCIA activities in the Los Angeles area.

Prof. Gregory Henderson of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy described the organization of the KCIA according to its eight bureaus. Mr. Donald Ranard, former Director of State Department Office of Korean Affairs, said that on the basis of his official experience he believes KCIA activities in the United States include organizing demonstrations for the Park government and attempting to break up antigovernment demonstrations, attempting to influence activities and elections of Korean residents associations and offering financial support to candidates for public office in the United States. He also reported that in 1973 the Korean Ambassador was warned by the Deputy Under Secretary of State that the U.S. Government would not tolerate KCIA efforts to control Korean residents in the United States and that in the same year he requested an FBI investigation of such activities.

Since Mr. Ranard indicated that he would have further information to provide if asked to testify in executive session, I have called this meeting of the subcommittee today with Mr. Ranard as the witness. Is there a motion that the subcommittee now reconvene in executive session?

Mrs. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I so move.

Mr. FRASER. It is moved that the subcommittee move into executive session.

All those in favor indicate by saying "aye."

I need a rollcall vote.

Mr. BOETTCHER. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Aye.

Mr. BOETTCHER. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Aye.

Mr. BOETTCHER. Mr. Rosenthal.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Aye.

Mr. BOETTCHER. Mr. Harrington.

[No response.]

Mr. BOETTCHER. Mrs. Collins.

Mrs. COLLINS. Aye.

Mr. BOETTCHER. Mr. Derwinski.

[No response.]

Mr. BOETTCHER. Mr. Findley.

[No response.]

Mr. BOETTCHER. There are four ayes.

Mr. FRASER. Accordingly, the motion is carried and we will then convene in executive session which will mean that members of the public are not permitted to be present.

[At this point all persons except members of the subcommittee, staff, and the witness left the room and the subcommittee proceeded in executive session.]

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will be in order in executive session.

Mr. Ranard, would you proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF DONALD L. RANARD, FORMER DIRECTOR OF KOREAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. RANARD. Mr. Chairman, I don't have a prepared statement to make and with your indulgence I thought I would respond to any questions that you might care to ask me based upon my testimony at the last session.

Mr. FRASER. All right.

One of the questions that has arisen is what the relationship is, if any, that we are aware of, that you are aware of, with respect to Tong-sun Park.

Mr. RANARD. Mr. Chairman, it would be almost impossible not to know about Mr. Tong-sun Park, especially for somebody in my position having been on the Korea desk since 1970. It might be useful if I were to detail my recollections of meeting with him, how I became aware of him and what I understood he was involved in.

I became Director of the Office of Korean Affairs sometime in the spring of 1970 and I believe a few months thereafter I was invited to the Georgetown Club to attend a dinner reception for the visiting Minister of the Interior, a General Park. The invitation was extended by Tong-sun Park whose name really didn't mean much to me at that time. I think I had heard some rumors or some information about a Tong-sun Park having considerable influence and so forth but it really didn't mean too much to me.

I went to the affair. I felt obligated to go in the sense that I was in charge of Korean affairs and we were providing hospitalities to this visiting minister who was here on a government grant. The affair was attended by some 100, 150 or so people in official life in Washington, including Members of Congress, a few Senators I believe, and others.

Subsequently, I think it was on the occasion of leaving that affair, Tong-sun Park said that I could feel free to use the facilities of his club any time I wanted to do so, something which I regarded as a subtle invitation to accept the hospitality of a club that I was not a member of and was basically in this case an eating club. So therefore I would assume what he was in effect saying to me was that if I wanted to free-load at his club any time why that would be great.

I attended one other affair, I think not too long after that, which was hosted by the Gulf Oil office here in Washington which was having an affair for a visiting Korean assemblyman. It was a small dinner party of about 8 or 10 at the Georgetown Club. This was the sort of thing that American businessmen with investments abroad are frequently called on to do. From that point on I never attended anything at the Georgetown Club but from then on I might say that my knowledge of Tong-sun Park was to increase.

Park was frequently involved as some sort of middleman in making arrangements for people visiting from Korea. I can recall on one occasion the Vice President's office calling me to say that a Tong-sun Park had asked that Agnew talk to a certain Korean and what did I think about it? Inasmuch as it was something that we were not interested in, I remember turning that down.

There were any number of other occasions when Park was involved in peddling influence, if you will. He was a name dropper par excellence. His name began appearing in the press with increasing frequency. Sometime at close to the very beginning of my knowledge of him his name also began appearing I believe, on letterheads of an organization in the United States called Radio Free Asia along with that of another person who was a Col. Pak Bo-hi, a former defense attaché at the Korean Embassy in Washington. Tong-sun Park's also appeared [security deletion].

Tong-sun Park's name kept coming up at other times. It appeared several times in correspondence between the American Ambassador and me in which I was told that he was a man to watch out for, that is be careful of contacts with him. I had no such contacts with Park but nevertheless Seoul continued these observations. His name also frequently kept coming up in connection with the sale of rice abroad. As you know, under Public Law 480 legislation American rice was sold abroad sometimes for foreign currency under very convenient concessional terms that run 30, 40 years at very low financing. Park seemed

to be the man Americans had to do business with if they were going to sell rice to Korea.

On another occasion his name was mentioned in an American Embassy report in connection with an offer to provide funds to a Member of Congress. I alluded to this person, Mr. Chairman, as a member of this committee.

Mr. FRASER. That is, Tong-sun Park was the person who made the offer?

Mr. RANARD. Yes, he was the one who made the offer.

Mr. FRASER. Of campaign funds to a member of the committee?

Mr. RANARD. Of this committee.

On another occasion Park called me on the telephone and wanted to talk to me. I had adopted a fairly stiff "hands-off" policy with this person as also had our Embassy in Seoul. I picked up the phone and he asked me to dinner. I made known I was not going to have dinner with him. He asked me to go to lunch and I would not have lunch. Well, could he see me in my office? I felt that I had to accord him that privilege and he came to my office in the presence of somebody else. I would judge this to be late 1973, early 1974. During his visit Park began a long harangue about the fact that the U.S. Government seemed to misunderstand his activities, and particularly was this true of our Ambassador to Korea who had let it be known that nobody on the Embassy staff was to have any contact with Tong-sun Park. Park said to me that his reputation was being damaged. Word was being passed around by our Ambassador that Park worked for the KCIA, and Park wanted it known that he never did work for the KCIA, and so forth.

I heard him out. In essence my response at that time was that our Ambassador in Korea was a very knowledgeable man with excellent contacts, and I had a great deal of respect for his knowledge of affairs in Korea. That was the end of that.

I think I have detailed pretty generally my knowledge of Park, although I am sure with a person like Mr. Park I probably have not said everything. His name has appeared, Mr. Chairman, in I don't know how many reports in the press, even as of recently. The Washington Post did a long story on him, and I would refer you to their story of July 27, 1975. I would also refer you to the Washington Star story of February 1, 1976. I think the Post, one on July 27 deals largely with the sale of rice.

There is one other thought that occurs to me, and then I will stop because I think at about that time you may want to question me further.

Sometime I think around 1973 a person of unimpeachable credibility, an American, mentioned to me that Congressman Passman had told him that Tong-sun Park was a man of some great repute and that he had contributed a substantial sum of money to a gubernatorial election in the State of Louisiana. This much, by the way, is referred to in the Washington Post story which I think indicates that the Governor, Edwards, admitted that the offer had been made but states that it had been rejected.

I think I should stop at that point. I think that is enough almost to fill an encyclopedia.

Mr. FRASER. [Security deletion.] Could you say something about Radio Free Asia itself, just a little bit of background?

Mr. RANARD. Yes. I think I first became aware of Radio Free Asia at about the same time I became aware of one Tong-sun Park. That would be sometime between the period of mid-1970. Radio Free Asia is mentioned extensively in Senate hearings—the Symington hearings on security agreements of early 1970. It is mentioned extensively there because Senator Fulbright and Senator Symington and others raised various questions about it.

I didn't know much about it at that time but in essence Radio Free Asia was an organization incorporated in Delaware, as I recall, with various Americans on its board, including Congressmen and others, for the purpose of broadcasting to China and North Korea. Subsequently it also became involved in broadcasting to North Vietnam. That is, an anti-Communist message. As they got involved in broadcasts to North Vietnam, I think they implied that they could be helpful in obtaining a release of American prisoners of war. They maintained themselves pretty largely through solicitation of funds which they conducted continually in the United States.

The State Department became involved because letters began to come into the Department from the public raising questions about Radio Free Asia? Is it an organ of the U.S. Government? Who is running it? What is its purpose? What do you think of the program that it is involved in?

I think it has subsequently gone out of business. That is more or less what at the beginning was my knowledge and understanding of Radio Free Asia.

Mr. FRASER. The meeting [security deletion] that you described as you recall referred to raising money in the name of Radio Free Asia but also indicated the money might be diverted into particular certain intelligence activities?

Mr. RANARD. Yes. I am relying on my memory. There is absolutely no question about such an intelligence report. I can't recall whether it went on to explain specifically how the funds would be used beyond intelligence but intelligence was part of why the funds were being raised.

The meeting, as I say, was attended by [security deletion]. Other intelligence people were present. The whole idea was to discuss raising funds for, as I recall it, the Korean intelligence activities.

At various times I wondered about Radio Free Asia and the fact that it was dependent upon solicitation of funds. [Security deletion.] People would send in \$10 or \$15 or \$1, or what have you for what they regarded as a patriotic duty. It was an organization broadcasting to China or to North Korea an American message, if you will, and subsequently to North Vietnam.

You recall the emotionalism that was involved in bringing American prisoners home from Vietnam, and here was an organization that was alleging it could do the trick that the Government was not able to do. Radio Free Asia was involved in the solicitation of money. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FRASER. To what extent can the conclusion be drawn or to what extent do you hold the conclusion that Tong-sun Park operates in cooperation with or on behalf of the Korean CIA in this country?

Mr. RANARD. [Security deletion.] As I say, I also drew the conclusion that Tong-sun Park had considerable funds. As a commission

agent involved in the sale of rice, if a deal was closed to sell \$50 million worth of rice at 1 or 2 percent, you are talking about a sizable amount of money that funneled in to Tong-sun Park.

Now, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency has played an enormous role in Korea in connection with business and trade. Partly this is attractive to the organization in terms of personal graft, but it is also a large source of operating funds. That being the case American businessmen might well at the very beginning of a trade involvement with Korea find themselves talking to somebody in the KCIA as well as to someone in the Ministry of Commerce. The KCIA have become deeply involved in foreign trade. Just the other day I noticed a report out of Seoul indicating that all information with respect to oil exploration in Korea is now in the hands of the KCIA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FRASER. Could you identify who Colonel Pak Bo-hi is?

Mr. RANARD. Colonel Pak Bo-hi was an assistant defense attaché at the Korean embassy sometime in the early 1960's. He subsequently left that to become Executive Director of Radio Free Asia at which time he was also, I believe, Executive Director of the Korean Freedom and Cultural Foundation and also was manager or director of the cultural presentation that visited the United States perhaps annually at that time called the Little Angels. Most recently Pak Bo-hi has been involved in some executive position with the Unification Church.

Mr. FRASER. Do you have any knowledge of any relationship between the Unification Church that is headed by Reverend Moon and the Korean Government or the Korean CIA?

Mr. RANARD. Well, I would start first with a large area of some suspicion about the Unification Church and then I would try to document that by one particular instance that I recall. My first suspicion would be that given the nature of the Korean Government and what I considered to be a near totalitarian system, given the nature also of their repression of religious organizations in Korea—at least western religious organizations—I would find it hard to understand how the Unification Church would seem to exist completely beyond the control of the Korean Government. That would therefore raise with me some doubts to begin with, but specifically I recall on one instance [security deletion].

Mr. FRASER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. RANARD. Yes.

[Security deletion.] You may recall, Mr. Chairman, that beginning sometime in 1974 the Unification Church became closely identified with the defense of President Nixon as the episode of Watergate was beginning to close in. There were two or three occasions when the youngsters from the Unification Church held demonstrations in support of President Nixon, one in Lafayette Park at which the President's daughter went over and was photographed shaking hands with them.

I think the connection was that the Unification Church, beyond whatever is its fuzzy religious philosophy, is anti-Communist. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FRASER. We have a vote on so I guess we will have to take a short recess.

Mr. RANARD. All right.

Mr. FRASER. We will return in a few minutes.

[Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the subcommittee recessed until 3:05 p.m.]

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will reconvene.

Mr. RANARD, I would like to continue our inquiry into any connection between the Unification Church and the Korean CIA. I think you gave us a statement in which you described your understanding or your knowledge of this. Is there anything further that you are aware of that would help identify or clarify these relationships?

Mr. RANARD. I think I covered them, Mr. Chairman. I think on the Unification Church, I gave some explanation of my general cause for concern and then specified an instance [security deletion].

Mr. FRASER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. RANARD. Yes. I can't be specific but I recall specifically there was the message [security deletion.]

Mr. FRASER. Now going back to Tong-sun Park, to your knowledge did any U.S. agency ever inquire of the State Department with respect to whether Tong-sun Park might be entitled to diplomatic immunity in the event some judicial proceedings were to be brought against him?

Mr. RANARD. Yes. The period of time on that would probably be sometime around 1972. I was asked by a person representing the Department of Justice whether or not the Department of State had any reluctance to a subpoena being issued to Tong-sun Park to appear in a court case. That is to say, did he have diplomatic immunity?

I replied immediately that he had no diplomatic immunity to the best of my knowledge. So far as the Department of State having any reluctance to a subpoena being served on him, I think I said at that time that so far as I was concerned, absolutely none, but give me a couple of hours or so and I will let you know whether anybody above me feels otherwise. Within a matter of a couple hours I phoned back and said absolutely none; if you want to subpoena him, fine, you can do so.

The next question was could I obtain photographs of Tong-sun Park which could be used by the Department of Justice in a case which was about to open, a legal proceeding, and I said yes, I could obtain them and I did. I obtained the photographs from our Embassy within a matter of 4 to 5 days, I think. I cabled for them and they were sent by diplomatic pouch.

I was then visited by somebody from the Department of Justice who picked up these photographs as I recall and we had a discussion and I probed to find out why they wanted them. [Security deletion.]

There has been subsequent information on that appearing again, if I may cite the record for you, in the Washington Post on February 13, 1976. There was a Washington Post inquiry into Tong-sun Park's relationship with former Congressman Gallagher.

Mr. FRASER. Have you had any information with respect to any employee of the Congress who may have been working with or cooperating with the Korean CIA?

Mr. RANARD. Again, sometime around 1970, 1971, the name of a Mr. Kim Kwang began to appear. He was possibly a voluntary staff worker in Congressman Gallagher's office, but he was in some way or another attached to Congressman Gallagher's office or alleged himself to be when he traveled overseas and on a couple of occasions visited embassies. I recall reports coming back from our embassy in Tokyo reporting of a meeting between Mr. Kim Kwang representing him-

self to be a staff member in Congressman Gallagher's office and asking for information and assistance. I had the impression from the cable reporting on him that he was fairly young but quite brash and aggressive person.

Subsequent to that about the time when a parliamentary visit went to Korea—that would have possibly been the spring of 1971—we got involved in some sort of a dispute as concerns who would get on the official plane. Congressman Albert was going and Congressman Gallagher also was going. Congressman Gallagher was then chairman of the Subcommittee on the Far East of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, as it was called in those days. Some members of the staff of the House committee were concerned about the fact that Congressman Gallagher wanted Kim Kwang to go on the plane as well as I think Tong-sun Park.

They asked me about it and I recall saying that I didn't think it was a very wise idea for a planeload of American Congressmen to land in Seoul and have walking off that plane those two Koreans, one Tong-sun Park and another one Kim Kwang. I could not quite see that was going to do the image of an independent American parliamentary visit much good.

I think what happened was that Congressman Albert called the State Department for advice about it. Albert, as I recall it, was something in a quandary; he had to make a decision as to whether he would let them go and Gallagher wanted both to go on the plane. Ultimately it turned out that they did not go on the plane, but went privately.

Beyond what I have said about Tong-sun Park. I would add that we also had some suspicions about Kim Kwang. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FRASER. There have been some references in the newspaper to Susie Park Thompson. Are you familiar with that name?

Mr. RANARD. Yes. That is another name that occurred beginning, as I say, at about the time I took over in 1970. I had heard the name mentioned somewhat in the same context as I heard Tong-sun Park's name being mentioned only certainly on a lesser scale. Whereas Park was a big influence peddler, Susie Park Thompson was something of a secretary on the Hill.

If I recall correctly, the first time I laid eyes on her was in connection with this 1971 parliamentary trip that went out to Korea. I went out to Andrews Airport to see it off and she was present and I believe went on that trip. At various times over the years her name kept coming up as she made trips to Korea with congressional groups. Her name also was gossiped about in connection with entertaining people on behalf of the Korean Embassy.

A person—again someone I would consider of unimpeachable credibility, not the same as the other one but another one—somewhere in that period of 1972 to 1973 mentioned to me that here was a person who had contacts with the KCIA. I have since in another Washington Post story seen her name mentioned once more in connection with visits and arrangement of dinners at which the head of the Korean CIA in Washington is present. I think the story alleges that she has brought together Congressmen for dinner parties before and after visits to Korea.

I think that is about my knowledge of her. I could say possibly I saw her on one other occasion at another reception, again I believe in the presence of another Congressman.

Mr. FRASER. In the hearing of last week I inquired about a possible role by a Robert Amory who was a former official of the U.S. CIA in relation with Radio Free Asia. Do I understand that you may not have understood the question at the time or that I phrased it poorly?

Mr. RANARD. It was not the way you phrased it, Mr. Fraser, it was your pronunciation. I read your inquiry as did I know about a Robert Moore or Amore? I notice in the transcript which I have already checked that it was spelled there as A-m-o-r-e. I responded, I think, to the effect that I didn't know who he was. Once I read it there I suddenly realized that you were talking about a Robert Amory or a person I had known as Robert Amory. Had I interpreted the question correctly at that time, I would have responded along these lines:

Robert Amory was an official in our CIA at the time of the Bay of Pigs according to not my personal experience but rather what I have read. As I recall the revelations of that, he was subsequently transferred to another agency, I think as they decided who was responsible for some part of that fiasco Bob Amory went over to the Bureau of the Budget where he became a budget director of, I think, their international activities. I met him in that connection in 1963 or 1964 but that was purely in a budget relationship. I was involved in presenting something to the Congress at that time and he was involved in examining it. That was strictly a business relationship.

Subsequently, sometime around 1973 I think, Amory had since left Government and was then with a law firm in Washington and he was engaged by Radio Free Asia to make inquiries in the State Department as to why the State Department was critical of Radio Free Asia, what had Radio Free Asia done and what could they do to improve their relationships with the Department of State.

Radio Free Asia was aware of our views because as I indicated earlier we would get letters from people in the United States raising questions about what did Radio Free Asia do and so forth and these letters bothered us for a variety of reasons. We put together a fairly standard reply that ran more or less along these lines: That Radio Free Asia is not an organ of the U.S. Government. We have reason to question some of its claims. We don't believe there is any proof that it has been at all helpful, for example, in connection with any allegations it makes regarding its ability to get prisoners of war out of Vietnam and so forth.

The letters as they had gone out I am sure funneled back to Radio Free Asia. We were diplomatically saying "If we were in your shoes, we would not have anything to do with them."

Well, other things came up. I recall on one given instance also somebody on our congressional relations staff going up to the Hill to talk to a few Congressmen whose names appeared on the letterhead only to find that they were not aware that their names were being used on the Radio Free Asia letterhead, and this also appeared with respect to some other names as well. So this was becoming known to Radio Free Asia and they engaged Bob Amory to make some inquiries presumably because he had good contacts in the Government.

I didn't talk to Amory but rather the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia discussed the matter with him. I am not sure whether it was discussed on the phone or in person but in any case substantially the same thing was being said. This also, by the way, was reported in the press although I don't have the citation on it. Sometime in 1974 or so there was another long Washington Post article which mentions Bob Amory's connection with Radio Free Asia.

Mr. FRASER. We have another vote on. I guess I better go vote and we will recess for a few minutes.

[A short recess was taken.]

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will be in order.

In your public testimony you stated that the Korean CIA has interfered with the rights of Koreans in the United States to assemble to express their views freely concerning the affairs of Korea. Can you recall some specific instances which are within your knowledge?

Mr. RANARD. Well, yes. Mr. Chairman, I also said at that time that I thought there was one particular event which more than anything else agitated the Korean CIA to action and that event was the Korean election in 1971. Much of the activity the KCIA got involved in and still are involved in relates really to Kim Dae-jung. If you were to pin point his presence in the United States, which was sometime after the fall of 1972 or sometime around December of 1972 or maybe January of 1973 through the time he was kidnapped, I think you will find an awful lot of incidents at that time.

There was one, for example, on the west coast when they directly interfered with a meeting he was holding. A Korean CIA agent posing as a consul at the Korean consulate along with a couple of karate strongmen attempted to break up the meeting. The police were actually called. The date was May 14 and the place was San Francisco.

April 14 of the same year a meeting took place in St. Louis, Mo., a convocation of Korean Christians and scholars, about 120 of them. During the middle of the meeting—I think during an evening session—the program chairman was interrupted with a telephone call from the KCIA in Seoul. This of course was a subtle attempt to intimidate.

There have been other reports, some of which I cannot recall specifically. If it were possible for somebody in our intelligence agencies to sit down and look at certain periods of time when tensions were rising in Korea, I could tick those off very easily because they were all related to Kim Dae-jung. If you were to look at those particular periods, I think you would find these activities of the KCIA mentioned in intelligence reports. Those periods would be, for example, the period of January 1971 when Kim came to the United States and sought appointments here and he was under the very heavy surveillance of the Korean CIA. There would be the period of the election which was in April of 1971.

Another would be the period at the end of 1971 when Korea went under emergency regulations. Another would be the period in 1972, again at the end of the year, when Korea abandoned the Constitution.

Or the period at the beginning of 1973 and right through the middle of 1973 when Kim was in the United States and was seeking audiences and was traveling around and trying to talk to newspaper people and

others to make them aware of what he conceived to be a coming danger in Korea.

There would be the period of the kidnaping; or the period around the end of 1973 when Koreans were attempting to petition the President to revise the Constitution and put back the guarantees on human rights. There would be the period right through the time I left at the end of 1974 when again there was turbulence in relationship to the assassination of Madam Park.

What I am saying is that if you took any one of those particular periods and if you requested either the State Department or our intelligence agencies to look back over the reporting at those particular times, you will find ample evidence that the Korean Government was acting, that its intelligence agencies were stimulated and agitated to control the freedom of Koreans in the United States to speak out or to assemble or to demonstrate.

Mr. FRASER. You stated that in late 1974 the Korean CIA planned to organize anti-Japanese demonstrations in the United States. Do you have some specific data?

Mr. RANARD. Yes, I can be very specific about that.

I will place that period about the end of August of 1974. Madam Park was tragically assassinated in Korea on a public occasion, I believe, about the 15th of August by a Korean resident in Japan and this became quite an issue. There were people who thought that beyond the human tragedy involved and the President losing his wife as he did, there was on the part of the Korean Government an attempt to try to take Koreans' minds off the problem of human rights and focus it on at that time the fact that the President's wife had been assassinated by somebody living in Japan.

As it was, Japan had been pressing Korea for a solution to the Kim Dae-jung kidnaping, and here suddenly the shoe was on the other foot and the Koreans were turning around and were starting to press the Japanese because they had not prevented the exit of a Korean living in Japan to go to Korea and become involved in an assassination plot.

There was a great deal of diplomatic difficulty at that time and both sides were coming to us trying to get our good offices in the solution of the case as concerns the young Korean assassin. The Koreans wanted the Japanese to apologize. The Japanese felt a partial responsibility but not a complete responsibility because the assassin was not a Japanese, he was a Korean even though living in Japan.

Sometime about that period Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka was visiting the United States. [Security deletion.]

Acting somewhat on the basis of that but corroborated by the fact that private Koreans had called me about this because they were then getting the signals that they were supposed to demonstrate—acting on that basis I called the Deputy Chief at the Korean Embassy and told him that I had information of their plans to demonstrate and that he was to pass the word to his KCIA people to knock it off, no demonstrations will take place. I said if there is any doubt in his mind as to why, I would refer him to a recent bill of Congress which as I recalled in connection with the visitation of official visitors to the United States made it a fine of something like \$5,000 and a term in jail for any attempts to interfere with or harass such visits. I had

something to hang that on beyond just the fact that they were conducting themselves in a way, that I would consider inimical to our Constitution. But in any case, no demonstrations took place. They got the message very strongly and my action, I believe, was also followed up by another source.

Mr. FRASER. Are you aware of attempts by the KCIA beyond which you have indicated earlier to interfere in the affairs of the Korean residents and associations?

Mr. RANARD. [Security deletion] that I had leading me very directly to the conclusion that the KCIA was involved in an attempt to manipulate such an election. In any one of these elections in Washington they always had their candidate as against an opposition candidate. Usually the issue basically was whether or not a candidate supported the Park government. The KCIA candidate didn't always win, and that much I can recall in one specific instance.

I might say that having heard Kim Hyung-il speak at your hearing the other day, my reaction that I am right has been increased at least 1,000 fold as concerns the activities of presidents of Korean residents associations. I would add to that further the fact that the person who has undoubtedly—and I don't say alleged because it was reported—made the offer of funds for congressional elections in the United States was himself a former president of a Korean residents association in Washington. So I have absolutely no doubt of this in my mind whatsoever, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Did you ever get information that the Republic of Korea planned to assign a public official in intelligence to the United States ostensibly for diplomatic or consular duty?

Mr. RANARD. Well, by and large every one of the KCIA people they assign here was for that purpose and I knew that much, but there was in addition to that one curious incident that I have almost all but forgotten but I think I could recollect enough about it. It occurred again sometime in the 1973 or 1974 period. I would place it more in the 1974 period.

I recall [security deletion] pointing out that a reasonably senior Korean police official would be assigned to the consulate in Los Angeles as a consul and that his responsibilities would be to monitor, to follow and to watch very closely the conduct of Koreans resident in that city. A case would be made for the need of such a person because there was a large community in California of Koreans—some aliens, some permanent residents and others who had the usual kinds of problems with the police concerning parking tags or other problems of that sort—and there was a need, you see, to have a liaison man.

[Security deletion.]

It was not long thereafter, maybe 4 months, 5 months, but what I had an official inquiry as I recall, from our Embassy, I think it may very well have been a letter from our Embassy raising the question with me and I took the position that inasmuch as it was pretty obvious why he was going to be there that there was no real need for such an assignment. Moreover if it was merely a question of providing Korean residents in the United States with such service, the Korean consulate could telephone the police whom I am sure would do all that was necessary. That basically is a consul's function anyway, he is supposed to provide such assistance and service to his countrymen in this country.

I don't recall what happened, Mr. Chairman. I was in the process of getting ready to leave State, and I don't recall whether or not that person ever came and was assigned.

Mr. FRASER. When Kim Dae-jung was here, in what specific ways did the Korean CIA attempt to block contacts between him and the U.S. officials?

Mr. RANARD. Well, he came to the United States on two occasions. The first was when he came in January of 1971 to seek appointment with the State Department and also to become known to our press and to the Korean residents here. I don't think I have ever seen a more frantic stimulation of activity by Koreans to prevent the appointment than occurred that January. The Korean Ambassador at that time was absent in Seoul and he made a long distance telephone call to his wife to direct her to call a high ranking State Department official to implore State not to in any way allow State Department officials to meet Kim Dae-jung. It would be impossible, it would mean his job.

Mr. FRASER. It would mean the Ambassador's job?

Mr. RANARD. It would mean the Ambassador's job. We have to understand what was behind this at that time. Here I would make a parenthetical remark that the existence in Korea of a CIA headed by a man who was far more important than the foreign minister was enough to throw the fear of God into any Korean diplomat. In other words, he had to always be aware that any activity he undertook was being observed by the KCIA. However the more pressure the Korean Ambassador put on to block a meeting for Kim Dae-jung, the more our backs turned up. He had one or two meetings with the State Department.

Again at that particular period of time there were all sorts of pressures brought to bear on the Korean community not to meet with Kim Dae-jung. The KCIA followed his activities, they watched him like a hawk. Then he went back and campaigned and subsequently he came here at the end of 1972. He was in the United States or Japan, I can't recall which, at the time when the Korean Constitution was changed, and Kim was wise enough to know at that point not to go back. He then remained in the United States for a period of several months seeking appointments, as I have said, with the press and with others.

The Korean CIA of course was tailing him. They kept him under complete surveillance and doing whatever they possibly could to interfere, frequently reminding Koreans that it would be dangerous for their welfare to talk with Kim. In other words, their efforts were crude to the extent of blocking or breaking up meetings such as on the west coast or just passing the word around, "Don't talk to Kim Dae-jung."

Mr. FRASER. Did Kim Dae-jung go from the United States to Korea?

Mr. RANARD. No. Kim Dae-jung left the United States sometime I think in June or July of 1973 to go to Japan, not permanently but just on a visit. There is a large and active Korean association there, large and active number of Koreans in Japan who were interested in him. He went there with the intention of coming back, I believe, to the United States—I can't be sure of that. He had the problem of trying to decide where he would make his headquarters for the period

of time that he was going to be out of Korea. It was obvious to him that he could not go back to Korea. He didn't think he should in any case because he felt a personal danger if he went back to Korea.

So the question was would he live in Japan or in the United States. Japan offered him the opportunity to have quicker and greater access to news of what was happening in Korea through the many, many Koreans living there who were traveling back and forth. It might also have offered for him an opportunity for a better organization for his efforts.

On the other hand, the United States offered him the opportunity to be at the very center of that one government that probably has more to say about Korea than any other. If he could be in the United States and could meet with officials or with our press or with Congress, he would have the opportunity to, he thought, develop an influence. I think he was in between deciding which one he would do when he went to Japan and was then kidnaped by the KCIA.

Mr. FRASER. When did you first learn he was kidnaped?

Mr. RANARD. Well, he was kidnaped on August 8 and on that day I was in New York at our U.N. mission where I was meeting with Ambassador Scali and the British, Australian, and Japanese ambassadors or deputy chiefs of mission where we were then planning for the forthcoming session of the U.N., and particularly what our diplomatic approach would be to handling the Korean question.

My memory is that about 11 o'clock on August 8 I was given a piece of paper with a note that my office in Washington had called to say that the radio and press was reporting that Kim Dae-jung had been kidnaped from a hotel in Seoul.

Mr. FRASER. You mean Tokyo.

Mr. RANARD. A hotel in Tokyo. I was asked to call my office and I did because I recognized immediately that it would be incumbent upon us to get out as quickly as we possibly could a reaction to this kidnaping. So I called my office and we talked it over and we laid out over the telephone the groundwork for such a press statement which was very forthright and which I think the press and others still attribute to as one of the reasons why the man is still alive. That plus the Japanese reaction.

Mr. FRASER. I gather you assumed at the time you learned he was kidnaped that the Korean Government was responsible?

Mr. RANARD. We were not completely certain about that right then but on the basis of what we had seen of KCIA actions since 1971 in connection with Kim we concluded as much. I did not have any intelligence on August 8 or even the weeks before that that there was a plot to kidnap him, but when it happened, immediately our reaction was that—and we wanted it known immediately—the U.S. Government was deeply concerned about this man's safety.

From experience we had before, I think if we had couched a response on that day in the kind of language we sometimes see now coming out of official Washington about we are concerned about human rights but security is more important, I think if we had said something of that sort, too bad. In other words, if we had said on August 8, well, that is kind of too bad but on the other hand you always have to watch out for North Korea, I am not sure the man would be alive today. Instead we came out with a very positive statement and we were able

to get it out because it was discussed on the telephone and it was issued. That statement said first we were deeply concerned about his safety. Second, I am not sure this was the exact order but these were the elements: The United States has a high regard for this very respected political leader. He is welcome to visit the United States and we hope that his release will be imminent. In any case, we deplore acts of terrorism, including kidnaping.

Now I am not certain, and others aren't as well, as concerns the element of time. He was kidnaped on August 8 and he was taken to Osaka. In Osaka he was held overnight, I believe, and by the 9th or 10th he was on a small boat in the straits off Japan where apparently he remained for a couple of days.

Now there are any number of press reports that will say that he was there while the Koreans were trying to decide what to do with him. I believe there is information that he was tied, bound, and there are all kinds of indications they were about to throw him in the drink. So far as I am concerned, I have always assumed that the intention was to assassinate him or to do away with him completely. But the outrage that started from here, plus that which continued with the Japanese plus the representations that were made were such that subsequently he was brought back and released in Korea. The best view in the press at the time, I would say it is my own, is that the strength of the public statements that we made at that time saved Kim and the representations that were made in Seoul and in Japan had much to do with keeping him alive.

Mr. FRASER. There was an incident of kidnaping out of West Germany or Berlin.

Mr. RANARD. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Could you just fill us in on that?

Mr. RANARD. Well, that happened some 3 years before I became officer in charge of Korean affairs but I am sufficiently familiar with the essential elements of it. As I recall it, in 1967, I believe it was, the South Korean Government determined to bring home from Germany several of their students and others who may well have been in some contact with North Korea. I am not certain about some of these facts and I am not certain who some of them were.

There seems to have been some belief that the North Koreans had made some approach to them. That is not to say that these people were Communists, the South Koreans, but rather that the North Koreans had made some kind of approach to them and may even have tried to help some of them with their collegiate studies. In any case, I believe, this excited the interest of the South Korean Government and they kidnaped or drugged or in some way or another took out of West Germany without their permission something like 18 of these people. They brought them back to Seoul.

It became a huge diplomatic problem between Germany and Korea, and Germany threatened to break off diplomatic relations because in their view even if there had been some reason to want them back there was a way to do it. I believe several of them were returned to Germany. In fact, as I say, they almost did break diplomatic relations at that time. I think also one or two were executed. I am not sure they were students but others. Much was made of it as a huge Communist plot and so forth.

The person involved in this, the one who was generally considered to be the bag man, was a Korean CIA station head by the name of Yang Duwon who subsequently turned up in the United States accredited as Lee Sang-ho using a false name. He passed himself off here in the United States for some 3 or 4 years as that while serving as the KCIA station chief in Washington until he was exposed by the New York Times.

He was also the person that I warned on several occasions regarding his activities here. He was subsequently sent home at the end of 1973 where today he is a higher official in the KCIA. It was his presence and his involvement in the early case in Germany plus his presence here at the time of the kidnaping of Kim Dae-jung and the fact that he had left his post here in Washington shortly before Kim Dae-jung was kidnaped that led to many Koreans and others believing that there was some connection between him and the kidnaping. In any case, his presence here had a very disquieting effect on the whole Korean community.

Mr. FRASER. In general, in looking at the practice of assigning intelligence personnel as a part of the country mission in other countries, how would you differentiate the role that the Korean CIA plays in the United States in contrast to, say, the role of the American CIA in embassies abroad?

Mr. RANARD. Well, I might say this, Mr. Chairman, that if the Korean CIA played the typical role, I would not be here testifying today. That is to say, if the mission of the Korean CIA was by and large the conduct of intelligence liaison with our people, or even the collection of intelligence material about what is going on in the United States, I think probably I would regard that as being within acceptable bounds.

It is the fact that the greater part of their effort, in fact I would think at least 85 percent of their effort, their staff, their resources in the United States are directed toward the intimidation of Koreans resident in the United States. I think it is that which I find reprehensible and abhorrent to what I consider to be the guarantees under our Constitution.

I say that I would find the first acceptable because at least it could hardly be put in the category with the Soviet or the Eastern European intelligence mechanisms. Those intelligence agencies are interested in the United States, in learning what weapons we are developing, what our disposition of forces may be, what our intentions are and so forth. The Koreans are not really interested in trying to probe into our munitions factories to find out what new weapons we are developing for the simple reason that they are beyond their own capacities. The Soviets are a pernicious element in that sense but our FBI is on top of the NKVD or KGB, if you will, where so far as the Koreans are concerned they are not.

There seems to be taken for granted the fact that because this is an intelligence agency of an ally that it is unimportant what they do. I think it is very important, and I thought I had mentioned some part of it the other day because it is not alone the fact that they are involved in violating on a daily basis American law or intimidating people beyond our constitutional guarantees, it is the fact that for anybody attached to constitutionalism, for anybody attached to the

American values in foreign policy or anybody concerned about the right of this great country of ours, to moral leadership, I don't think we can be speaking or acting in a sense with a divided tongue.

I don't think on the one hand we can tolerate their activities in the United States and then try to play any sort of constructive role abroad. I think that beyond that, that for Koreans today who are struggling in whatever fashion they can develop, writing March 1 statements which are about as far to the left as the Declaration of Independence, for people who are struggling to find their way to democratic rule, I think the United States should be something of an inspiration and I think they look to us in that light. And for them to see that our country does not pay much attention to the activities here of the KCIA and is not really interested, to the extent that Kim Woon-ha can't even publish a small weekly newspaper on the west coast, I consider to be deplorable.

I don't think that anybody attached to a government as I am to mine, and I represented it for 30 years abroad with some distinction—I don't think that people of my experience should stand still and accept it. I think we have a responsibility to report it and that is what my presence is all about. I think in that I have answered why I am here, and I think I have also answered what I think are the distinctions in terms of intelligence gathering on the part of the Koreans as against the Soviets, and also the significance of what I think these hearings are about.

Mr. FRASER. Tom, do you have any questions?

Mr. SMEETON. The last one was very anticipatory of what I was going to ask. I think you asked it quite well.

Thank you for the opportunity.

Mr. RANARD. I would add to that one item, Mr. Chairman, which I think should be on the record which has not been asked and it frequently is when we speak publicly on this issue. My attention is frequently called to the fact that affairs and conditions in North Korea are pretty bad in that there are no human rights. Well, this is true. This happens to be one of the unfortunate characteristics of a Communist system and it is also one of the characteristics that this government of ours spends millions trying to avoid, but the fact of the matter is that it didn't cost Uncle Sam \$185 billion to do something about human rights in North Korea.

We don't have the leverage there, we don't have the influence there, but we have spent this amount of money, if you take the cost of the Korean war, on South Korea. We do station forces, we do provide military assistance to South Korea and we have an influence. And it is because we have an influence that I think we should use it.

I do not find it difficult to comment on the question of denial of human rights in the Soviet Union or North Korea or in Eastern Europe or other places. I find that deplorable. Our influence is limited but it is not limited in South Korea. I think it is incumbent upon the United States to speak with conviction on this. I think probably that is a further addition to the question. That is a further amendment to my answer to the question that you probably had in mind.

Mr. FRASER. If the opposition in South Korea continues to be silenced or rendered wholly ineffective, can you predict whether that would have any effect between KCIA operations inside the United

States which would tend to be the kind that we have been discussing this afternoon?

Mr. RANARD. Well, first I would like to say one thing about the premise and then I will try to answer the second part of it. So far as if the opposition is rendered harmless in Korea, it is harmless as it is now. It will not be the government's intention to eliminate it. As a matter of fact, it will be its intention to finance it, to a limited extent, so as to provide the facade of democratic rule in Korea.

Of some 70-odd people who sit in the Korean Assembly representing the opposition, probably no more than two-thirds are true opposition members. The rest are opposition members who are in the pay, of the Korean Government and they are kept in that status so as to present for the rest of the world the image of Korea as a democratic government with an opposition. Even if that opposition were completely eliminated, I think my understanding of Korean experience in history would tell me that they will not silence the voices and the feelings of Koreans resident in the United States.

The fact of the matter is most Koreans are resident in the United States because they came here to this great land of liberty because they wanted to get away from repression, and I don't think that is going to change their views as concerns what is going on in Korea.

So I think you can expect that the Korean residents in the United States will continue to speak out on this issue, will continue to try to develop their own newspapers and will continue to try to maintain an independent position. Against that will be the continued activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency attempting to dominate them, and manipulate and quiet them and buy them off as best they can.

Mr. FRASER. Was the KCIA as active in the United States before the adoption of the Yushin Constitution?

Mr. RANARD. The Yushin Constitution was adopted in December of 1972 and they were active beginning somewhere around late 1970, 1971, and from that period through 1972 they were very active. I suspect they were more active beginning with Kim Dae-jung's residence here in the United States and through today. As more editorials appear in the press, as more hearings are held, as more people speak on this, as more people struggle in Korea or elsewhere, I would think you will find the KCIA's efforts increasing here as well, either above board or below surface.

Mr. FRASER. Well, we are deeply indebted to you for your appearance and your testimony this afternoon. It has been enormously helpful to the subcommittee to learn more about the problem of the Korean CIA.

Thank you very much.

Mr. RANARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

APPENDIX 1

LETTER FROM HON. THOMAS E. MORGAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AUTHORIZING HON. DONALD M. FRASER, CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, TO ADMINISTER OATHS TO WITNESSES PURSUANT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S INQUIRY

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., March 17, 1976.

HON. DONALD M. FRASER,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I hereby designate you as Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations to administer oaths to any witnesses that may appear before your Subcommittee whenever, in the opinion of the Members of your Subcommittee, the administration of such oaths is proper and necessary.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

THOMAS E. MORGAN, *Chairman.*

APPENDIX 2

PRESS CLIPPINGS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

[From the New York Times, Aug. 17, 1973]

THREAT TO KOREANS IN U.S. BY SEOUL STIRS CONCERN¹

(By David Binder)

WASHINGTON, Aug. 16.—South Korean intelligence agents stationed in the United States have been increasingly engaging in a program of harassment and serious intimidation against Koreans living in this country.

Most of the reports of harassment come from Korean residents opposed to the Government of President Park Chung Hee, but United States officials have also expressed concern over the increasingly bold moves by the Korean agency.

According to the State Department, three oral representations were made at the South Korean Embassy in April and May. On June 8 the deputy chief of the South Korean Embassy was told again in the State Department that the United States Government was concerned about reports that Korean diplomats were harassing South Koreans in this country. These objections were repeated late in July by a State Department official to Korean diplomats.

In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local police agencies have reportedly been asked to investigate the operations of Korean agents in this country.

Among the recent incidents reported by Koreans opposed to the present Seoul Government are the following:

In St. Louis, a Korean C.I.A. representative called from Seoul to speak to the Master of Ceremonies at an assembly of Korean Christian scholars on April and warned him against anti-Park statements.

In New York, the Korean consul, Gin Duk Son, described as a Korean C.I.A. operative, followed demonstrators on April 29 protesting against the Park military regime and had them photographed.

In San Francisco on May 14, the Korean consul from Los Angeles, Young Sik Bai, also described as a Korean C.I.A. man, appeared at a rally for the opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, who was abducted in Tokyo last week, accompanied by several toughs carrying bags of eggs and ketchup. Apprehended, one of the toughs, Min Hi Lee, a karate expert, began abusing Mr. Kim and tussled with Kim supporters until removed by a police detachment. Mr. Bai protested unsuccessfully.

In Washington, Jai Hyon Lee, former diplomat, received a letter from a close friend in Seoul advising him to "stay out" of politics. Mr. Lee said that it was obviously dictated by the Korean C.I.A. A day later in Washington, Young Chee Kang, a journalist, received a letter from his ailing mother in Seoul, accusing him of collaborating with Kim Dae Jung and adding that if he continued to do so her life and the lives of his sister and two brothers would be in jeopardy. Mr. Kang said: "It read as if it was dictated to her." Several days later in Washington, Sung Nam Chang, publisher of a Korean-American paper, Free Republic, got a letter from his brother in Seoul also warning him of the consequences of continued political opposition.

"They are becoming emboldened more and more," Mr. Kang said.

He and other South Koreans in this country said they were considering renouncing their South Korean citizenship as a means of protecting relatives from reprisals in their homeland.

One Korean who has already taken this step is Jai Hyon Lee, 47, formerly chief cultural and information attached in the South Korean Embassy, who sought political asylum here June 5. He quit in protest against orders to send back two of his former aides who had also decided against returning.

¹ Copyright, 1973/1975 by the New York Times Co. Reprinted by permission.

Contending that he has no special political persuasion, Mr. Lee has nevertheless joined the current campaign of Korean dissidents to defend the opposition leader, Mr. Kim. In an interview he said: "Koreans living in the United States, whether citizens or not, feel unfree in the streets day and night because of the C.I.A."—referring to the Korean agency.

In the Western intelligence community the Korean C.I.A. "rates good points among those who are good east of Suez," as one operative put it. But its official responsibility for external and internal operations distinguishes it from other intelligence agencies, it was pointed out.

The foreign activities of the Korean intelligence agency were spotlighted last week by charges that it was involved in the kidnapping of Mr. Kim in Tokyo.

Sang Ho Lee, the Korean intelligence chief here, flew to Seoul July 27—12 days before the abduction of Mr. Kim.

He was preceded by two other South Korean embassy members, a Counselor, Hong Tae Choi, and a second secretary, Chung Il Park, who flew to Asia July 9 and 10. This was at the time that Mr. Kim left the United States for Tokyo and a rally of his supporters in Japan. Both Mr. Choi and Mr. Park are described in intelligence circles as South Korean C.I.A. operatives. All three embassy members returned to Washington over the weekend.

Mr. Lee, in a telephone interview, denied any link with the Tokyo abduction. "There is nothing connected with me and the kidnaping," he said: "I have no knowledge of it. I can say I made a trip on official business but I cannot say where."

There is an invisible, traditional line across which other foreign diplomats and agents have trod in the past, an American official said, mentioning the activities of Chinese National diplomats in the American-Chinese community at the time of the Nixon Administration's approaches to Peking in 1971.

There are close to 150,000 South Koreans living in the United States.

[From the New York Times, Aug. 20, 1973]

SEOUL'S VAST INTELLIGENCE AGENCY STIRS WIDE FEAR¹

(By Richard Halloran)

SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA, Aug. 18.—Sometimes the Koreans call it "Central College and sometimes "South Mountain," but whenever they speak its proper name, the Central Intelligence Agency, their voices invariably drop to a whisper.

On the northeast outskirts of Seoul, the headquarters of South Korea's Central Intelligence Agency is in a large modern building surrounded by a well-kept green park that looks like a college campus—hence "Central College"—save for the high wall and the deflectors on the windows to prevent visual or electronic surveillance. Earlier, the headquarters was in a section of the city called Namsan, or "South Mountain."

The whispered references reflect fear of the Central Intelligence Agency, which has come to recent attention in the United States because of its reported role in kidnapping a Korean opposition leader from Tokyo as well as through official American complaints that South Korean agents have been harassing Koreans living in the United States.

In South Korea, the intelligence agency is generally regarded as President Park Chung Hee's main instrument for political repression. Its agents, often visible, are everywhere. No telephone is considered safe from tapping and no office, hotel room or even home free from electronic bugging.

"They watch everything," an informed Korean said of the internal security division of the intelligence agency. "They have men in just about every other government office and the government bureaucrats really must not irk the C.I.A. man there."

Yet, despite its reputation, the Central Intelligence Agency performs duties that any nation would think necessary to protect itself—like the United States C.I.A., with which it keeps liaison, the South Korean intelligence agency collects and analyzes information from abroad, particularly on this country's arch enemy, North Korea.

¹ Copyright 1973-75 the New York Times Co. Reprinted by permission.

POLITICIAN SPIRITED FROM JAPAN

Domestically, the intelligence agency has responsibilities for internal security against espionage and sabotage similar to those of the American Federal Bureau of Investigation. In combating subversion, the C.I.A. works alongside the police, the army security command and the Ministry of Justice.

But the agency is also quite clearly a secret police. It strikes at will, without warning or warrant, and is beyond the law and courts.

Nor is its reach confined to Korea itself. The most recent venture, apparently, was the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung, who was President Park's opponent in the 1971 presidential election, from a hotel in Tokyo on the afternoon of Aug. 8. Mr. Kim was spirited to Seoul and is now under what amounts to house arrest.

The Government here has vigorously denied any connection with the kidnapping. Informed South Korean, Japanese and American sources, however, said that the evidence seen so far all points to the intelligence agency. They said that only that organization had the motive, the trained manpower, the financial resources and the freedom of movement within Korea to carry off such a complex operation.

Moreover, those sources surmised that the abduction had the approval of President Park and the director of the intelligence agency, Lee Hu Bak. In authoritarian South Korea, only they could have authorized the operation.

The Korean Central Intelligence Agency was founded after Mr. Park, then an army general, came to power in the military coup of 1961. The agency's first director was Kim Jong Pil, one of the young colonels who organized the coup. He is now the Premier.

From the beginning, the intelligence agency was immersed in politics. Mr. Kim used it to form the Democratic Republican party, the political organization that got Mr. Park his first election victory in 1963 and has continued a dominant role in South Korean politics.

BUDGET NOT MADE PUBLIC

Since then, the agency has expanded steadily. Neither its budget nor size could be determined, although estimates of its manpower ranged from 100,000 to 300,000. Besides its staff employes and informers, large numbers of active and retired military men are assigned there.

Informed South Koreans said that the agency attracts, among others, two rather distinct types of men. Some are well-educated, intelligent and dedicated, capable of acquiring and analyzing information. At the other extreme are the muscle men who do the rough jobs without question.

The current director, Lee Hu Rak, is among President Park's closest advisers and is widely considered the power behind the scenes in Mr. Park's regime. Mr. Lee, who is 49 years old, was an army intelligence officer early in his career and was the chief of the presidential staff from 1963 to 1969.

Mr. Lee helped push through the constitutional amendment in 1969 that allowed President Park to run for a third term in 1971. That was the beginning of Mr. Park's assumption of nearly absolute power, after serving as ambassador to Japan for a year, Mr. Lee became head of the C.I.A. in late 1970.

Officials at the intelligence agency refused to discuss its mission or organization. But an outline was pieced together from other sources here.

DEPUTY IS AN EX-PROSECUTOR

Immediately below Mr. Lee are the deputy director, Kim Chi Yul, a former prosecutor in the Ministry of Justice, and two assistant directors, one for external and the other for internal affairs.

There are eight operational bureaus and several staff offices. The bureaus are numbered one through nine, there being no fourth bureau because the number four is believed to be most unlucky in Korea.

The first bureau is the general affairs bureau, responsible for recruiting, training, personnel and administrative functions. It also collects information from abroad through newspapers and magazines and passes that to other bureaus for analysis.

The second is the cultural affairs bureau, which is in charge of internal propaganda and anti-Communist indoctrination. It also oversees the press with supervising agents in each newspaper and broadcasting station.

The third bureau is charged with counter-intelligence, the vital task of combating North Korean infiltration, espionage and subversion. It has been rounding up alleged North Korean spy rings at the rate of about one a week recently.

The fifth bureau, responsible for internal security, is the one that South Koreans fear so much. It has agents in many government offices, in banks and businesses, in labor unions, cultural associations. It also has branch offices in each provincial capital and smaller offices in every city.

The network is so extensive that the agency once put a telephone call through from Seoul to a noodle shop in the remote countryside where an American visitor had wandered on a holiday without telling anyone.

The fifth bureau, in addition, has agents in the Foreign Ministry's passport office to give final approval to all South Korean applications for travel abroad. Similarly, it has agents in the Ministry of Justice's immigration office at Kimpo International Airport to check the entry of Koreans and foreigners.

C.I.A. agents watching foreigners in hotel lobbies are usually easy to spot. One was stationed near the door of this correspondent's room for most of a five-day stay and reported comings and goings by phone.

The sixth bureau conducts special missions, usually known in the intelligence trade as dirty tricks, such as sabotage and assassination. The sixth bureau reportedly abducted Kim Dae Jung and brought him to Seoul.

DATA FROM ABROAD COLLECTED

The seventh bureau gathers information from abroad, except from North Korea, and refines it into intelligence for use by political leaders. It has men in each South Korean Embassy, with the senior official usually holding the rank of minister.

The eighth bureau carries on psychological warfare, mostly against North Korea, through radio and loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflet drops and rumor-spreading.

The ninth bureau, considered to be among the best, specializes in North Korean affairs. It was originally part of the seventh bureau but was made a separate division to concentrate its efforts on the North. The ninth bureau also does staff work for the five senior South Korean officials, led by Mr. Lee, who have been engaged in political negotiations with the North Koreans.

[From the San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 24, 1974]

VISITING KOREANS CALL PARK DEMONIC TYRANT (By Ken Wong)

Republic of Korea President Chung Hee Park was painted as a demonic tyrant by two South Koreans at a Glide Memorial Church meeting last night.

The speakers were a Presbyterian minister, the Rev. Chai Choon Kim, and a former mayor of Seoul, Sang Don Kim. The two are touring Canada and the United States speaking out against the Park government.

Both have been arrested for their outspoken condemnation of policies they say have sentenced critics to death and imprisoned some good persons for political beliefs.

Sang Don Kim was mayor of Seoul from 1950 to 1961 when he was imprisoned. He was released two years later, but was under house arrest until three months ago, when he left Korea.

He warned of "Korean CIA agents who have been sent to this country to keep an eye on compatriots."

"Park does not deserve the title of president. He is a tyrant. He worked with the Japanese during the occupation. After the liberation he organized a Communist underground force in the South Korean army.

"When he was arrested and sentenced to death he saved himself by betraying his Communist comrades," he said.

The Rev. Kim said Christians in his country are being imprisoned, tortured, and sentenced to death. They are identified with the poor and the oppressed, he said.

"Should we be content just to hold quiet worship services and do nothing? To speak out is not just a political act, it is an act of Christian conviction," he said.

"One-man dictatorship is not the people's wish. Nor is it God's wish. It is demonic power. People live under police surveillance and enslaved by fear," he said.

Rev. Kim will appear Thursday at the Pacific School of Religion in Berkeley at 7:30 p.m.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Nov. 24, 1975]

THREATENED BY SOUTH KOREA, EDITOR SAYS—PARK REGIME DENIES RETALIATING AGAINST LOS ANGELES MAN¹

The editor and publisher of a Korean language newspaper in Los Angeles says his editorial criticism of the Park Chung Hee regime has made his weekly the object of "subtle but brutal retaliation" by South Korean agents and consular officials.

Kim Woon-Ha claimed he had been threatened personally and his small paper, The New Korea had lost about \$10,000 in revenue in the last six months because of "pressures" on advertisers from consular sources.

South Korean Consul Gen. Park Young Friday denied the charges as "vicious" and untrue.

At a press conference at his paper's offices, Kim and other spokesmen insisted strong-arm tactics have been used on other members of the large Korean community here to "muffle all criticism" of the South Korean government.

"There have been scattered incidents of people battered or beaten in a bar," said Sang Dal Cha, chairman of a group called the Southern California Citizens Congress to Restore Democracy in Korea. "And these people who use violence know they are protected by the consulate."

Kim charged that operatives of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency "have brought pressures" on his advertisers, including Korean Air Lines which he said contracted last July to run 26 weeks of airline advertising in his paper and broke the contract a few weeks later.

Kim said the same tactics were used by the South Korean government "in silencing the last bastion of the free press there . . . the Dong-A Ilbo which has a Los Angeles edition.

An advertising executive at KAL, however, denied any pressures on the airline from consular officials.

"We are not governed by the government," he said: "This is a private, profit-making business and the consul office can't tell us what to do." He said KAL, on reevaluation of advertising effectiveness, decided there was not much value" in the weekly paper and canceled the ads.

The consul general vehemently denied that any pressures were being channeled through his offices to stifle criticism. "We didn't come here to exert pressure or so forth," he said.

[UPI Dispatch, Dec. 24, 1975]

WASHINGTON.—U.S.-Korean news service correspondent in Washington Julie Moon told a State Department news conference today she had received a death threat call from a South Korean CIA agent.

Asking whether the Department had completed investigations into Korean CIA threats to Koreans in the United States, she said that Korean CIA agents were threatening Koreans living in the United States, particularly in Los Angeles.

"I received three calls about 3 a.m. Sunday," she said. "Speaking in Korean the caller asked me, 'Why don't you help President Park (Chung Hee)?"

"I told him it was none of his business and hung up. He called again, and said I had assisted the Washington Post with an editorial article on Korea and added in a violent voice, 'Do you want to live or do you want to die?'"

Miss Moon said the caller then slammed down the receiver.

Department spokesman Robert L. Funseth told her she should report the threat to the Department of Justice which is investigating other threats to Koreans.

Funseth added that as far as the State Department was concerned the only reason for the presence of Korean agents in the United States was to exchange foreign intelligence information and to maintain liaison with U.S. intelligence agencies.

Miss Moon is well known in Washington for her opposition to the Park regime.

Asked why she believed her caller was a Korean CIA agent, Miss Moon told United Press International she was sure of it because other Koreans had received similar calls and threats and she knew Koreans agents were active in this area in the United States.

¹ Copyright, 1975, Los Angeles Times, reprinted by permission.

[From the Washington Post, May 17, 1976]

SOUTH KOREAN ABUSES TOLERATED

(By Don Oberdorfer)

President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger expressed U.S. lack of interest in the destruction of democratic rule and loss of human rights in South Korea in 1973 and 1974, according to a former State Department official concerned with Korean affairs.

Donald L. Ranard, who was State Department country director for Korean affairs from March, 1970, to November, 1974, said actual U.S. policy as transmitted in private by the top American officials was at variance with the public claim of U.S. concern for human rights.

The die was cast, according to Ranard, in a private White House meeting Jan. 5, 1973, less than three months after President Park Chung Hee had seized unlimited power via martial law in Seoul, disbanding the elected parliament, scrapping the country's constitution and placing political opponents under house arrest.

At the time of Park's action the State Department refused to say whether the United States approved or disapproved, saying only that it was not consulted about or associated with the decision. Nevertheless, the Park regime reportedly remained uncertain about Washington's tolerance for one-man rule in Korea, where the U.S. is massively involved militarily, economically and diplomatically.

The January, 1973, meeting was between Nixon and Korean Prime Minister Kim Jon Pil, No. 2 to Park at the time, who had taken the occasion of President Truman's funeral to come to the United States as head of the Korean delegation.

"Unlike other Presidents, it is not my intention to interfere in the internal affairs of your country," Nixon told his Korean visitor, according to Ranard who was not present in the meeting but received this account from authoritative sources. Ranard said that in his view, "The Koreans had to interpret Nixon's remarks as meaning, 'Whatever you do is your business, we're not getting involved.'"

Ranard said it is his assessment that in the context of the times, Nixon's statement was the authoritative U.S. signal Park had been hoping for. Ranard is now director of a Washington-based study group concerned with human rights, the Institute for International Policy.

Nixon's reference to the policy of "other Presidents" is unclear. In 1961, President Kennedy refused to apply strong pressures recommended by the embassy in Seoul to roll back the military coup of Park, who was then a general, against the elected government. Later Kennedy successfully pressured Park to return the country to constitutional rule by standing for election as a civilian.

According to Ranard, he learned that Nixon's assurances were reiterated to Park himself by Gen. Alexander M. Haig, then Army vice chief of staff, on a visit to Seoul later in 1973. Haig reportedly promised the Korean leader that the United States would provide the funds as previously agreed for a \$1.5 billion Korean military modernization program and that the United States would "not interfere" in internal affairs.

In mid-1973 the foreign policy apparatus in Washington began a major review of Korean relations looking toward a new basic policy document, issued in 1974 as National Security Memorandum 154.

Among other topics, the memorandum dealt with U.S. policy toward the Korean domestic scene, where signs of opposition to Park and strong repression were evident.

The controversy accelerated after Park's secret police (KCIA) kidnaped former opposition presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung from self-exile in a daring midday raid on a Tokyo hotel.

Late in January, 1974, Kissinger met with senior officials at the State Department to review the forthcoming policy directive. In Korea, Park had just responded to a "restoration of democracy" campaign of Catholic and Protestant leaders, political critics and students by decreeing 15-year jail sentences for anyone opposing or criticizing his rule. Ambassador Philip C. Habib, who was home temporarily from his post in Seoul, presented the draft recommendation that U.S. policy should be to counsel moderation.

By Ranard's recollection the following exchange summed up Kissinger's attitude, and the U.S. policy :

Kissinger : Why counsel moderation ?

Habib : If you were where I am (in Seoul), you would want to do so.

Kissinger : No, I wouldn't. I don't think we should be involved. So why counsel ?

Despite secret police harassment, arrests and trials by closed courts-martial, Korean students and other critics continued to demand an end to one-man rule. In early April 1974, Park decreed penalties up to death for student demonstrators and their sponsors, and began extensive arrests.

About this time, Kissinger learned that Habib had taken it upon himself to express concern privately in Seoul about the increasing violations of human rights. According to Ranard, Kissinger ordered that a cable go out to Habib to "tell him to get off their [Korean Government] backs."

The U.S. "hands off" policy about Park's rule and its attendant repression was not expressed in public, where officials maintained that "the Korean Government is well aware of our position on the matter of human rights."

As criticism grew among U.S. church groups, and in the news media and Congress following the arrest of the country's only living former President, imprisonment of a Roman Catholic bishop and the death sentence imposed on a popular poet for violating Park's anti-dissent decrees, the State Department on July 30, 1974, issued a "special report" to Congress. That report said for the first time that "we do not approve of Korea's policies on human rights." The statement also said that U.S. support for "an independent, self-reliant" Republic of Korea had greater priority.

Evidently because of Nixon's attitude, the "special report" began, "The issue of human rights in the Republic of Korea is currently a matter of concern to the Congress, the Department of State and the public." No mention was made of the White House.

A former official of the U.S. embassy in Seoul, who served there through the end of the Nixon era, said he and others were told repeatedly that "there will be no change in U.S. policy no matter what you might report, and no matter what happens here." The official did not wish to be quoted by name.

Halib, recently named to be under secretary of state for political affairs, would not comment on the incidents described by Ranard except to invite attention to official government statements during the period concerned. Kissinger did not respond to an opportunity to discuss the matter prior to publication.

Ranard, who retired in November, 1974, after more than 30 years as a career government official, said there is as yet no sign that U.S. policy toward Park's rule in Korea has changed.

The U.S. government has had little to say as previously accepted freedoms have been snuffed out, except to claim that U.S. concerns are being made known in private to the Korean government.

Ranard said he doubts any fundamental change in policy will take place as long as Kissinger is Secretary of State.

[From the Washington Post, May 23, 1976]

SOUTH KOREAN CIA : POWER GROWS, FEAR SPREADS

(By John Saar¹)

SEOUL.—South Korea's secret police agency is steadily extending its covert grasp on national life, and its aura of fear is widening, according to numerous sources in this capital.

Answerable only to President Park Chung Hee, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency conducts control and surveillance measures against the armed forces, Cabinet ministers, civil servants, professors, political and religious opposition figures and ordinary citizens, to guarantee the internal security of the regime.

The KCIA's domestic activities have increased sharply since 1972, when, under martial law, Park instituted a new constitution granting him unlimited powers. Diplomatic observers say that as the instrument chosen to enforce Park's increasingly repressive rule, the KCIA has become more powerful and more feared.

¹ Also contributing to this article were Washington Post Staff Writers John Goshko and Bill Richards.

"They incur the enmity of the people," noted a diplomat from a nation friendly to South Korea, "and if ever there is a day of reckoning—public disorder—there's going to be a great slaughter."

The agency's efficiency and sophistication, conceded even by people who hate it, have discouraged open opposition to the point that no accurate estimate of the government's true popularity is possible. Paradoxically, with the strict, KCIA-enforced censorship of the newspapers, other KCIA officials have to conduct polls and public-opinions sampling for President Park's advisers.

A Korean intellectual, never personally harassed by the agency, calls it the key to the government's survival.

"I doubt that this government could last a month without them," he said through an interpreter. "Their controlling mechanisms are vital."

He and other Korean sources insisted that out-right physical torture continues in some cases and that psychological stress tactics are commonly used. Several people interrogated two months ago regarding an alleged plot by former presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung and 17 others complained they were deprived of sleep and questioned day and night for several days.

A deputy director of the KCIA, who declined to be named, issued a blanket denial to allegations of torture, intimidation and coercion. "So many things in our past reputation are distorted and exaggerate," he said. "It is very unfair and irresponsible to accept these allegations without concrete evidence."

The official said that about 80 per cent of the agency's resources go for intelligence-gathering, counterespionage and psychological warfare, all directed at North Korea.

Domestic activities under the national security and anti-Communist laws are essential to the survival of the nation, he said, since antigovernment actions might prompt North Korea to attack.

"This government's primary objective is survival," he added. "Without survival, who do you cry to for human rights?"

No nongovernment Korean interviewed supported that view.

Those who agreed to talk at all about "that certain agency" believe that most of the KCIA's energies are concentrated internally and go far beyond what is necessary in a country where dread of North Korean communism is almost universal.

The sources insisted on anonymity and refused to discuss even trivial matters over the telephone. Some left a radio playing during the conversation as anti-bugging background noise. One person under 24-hour surveillance slipped a KCIA tail for a meeting and insisted on leaving a public building by a different exit to avoid being seen with the reporter.

The sources agreed that there is a continuing need for intelligence operations against North Korea, "but their main activities are among [South] Koreans," as one source put it. An eminent journalist, who keeps his office blinds drawn, put it: "They control us."

The impression of omniscience, echoed by many others in the highly targeted opinion-making groups, is a tribute to the KCIA's carefully nurtured image of being everywhere, watching everyone.

Neutral observers say that while most ordinary people share a general fear of crossing the agency, they are not bothered unless they attract attention by careless talk against the government.

"I think 60 per cent of the assumptions made about the KCIA are untrue, but they keep the people spooked," a diplomat commented.

Koreans overseas express the belief that the KCIA's operations extend into every country that has a sizable Korean community, adding that in every South Korean embassy ultimate authority rests with the KCIA chief, not the ambassador.

Although it took its title from the American CIA, and has a conventional intelligence-gathering function, the KCIA was also characterized as an internal police force with almost unlimited power of arrest and interrogation. It was formed a month after the military coup that brought Park to power in 1961 to counter "indirect aggression and Communist forces and remove obstacles to the execution of the revolutionary tasks."

Fifteen years later, the "obstacles" are interpreted as anyone opposed to Park's regime.

"The facade of openness here makes it seem ridiculous, but control of protest here is tighter than many Communist countries," said a history professor. "The present Polish level of dissidence is unthinkable here, and Sakharov is able to

operate in the U.S.S.R. in ways impossible here. Under the Hitler regime in the '30s, the German people were able to be more outspoken than we can be in Seoul today."

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency personnel assigned to the embassy in Seoul maintain liaison with the KCIA, but the areas of cooperation are not known.

An embassy spokesman said, "We will not comment, this is an internal matter"; but American diplomats have been privately outraged by some KCIA actions. Kim Dae Jung believes that American intervention saved his life when the KCIA abducted him from a Tokyo hotel room in 1973.

Ironically, the man widely—if unofficially—identified as the mastermind behind Kim Dae Jung's kidnaping, a man who has been known at various times as Kim Jae Kwon and Kim Ki Kwan, is currently living in the Los Angeles area.

Some intelligence sources believe that he is retired, like former KCIA director Kim Hyung Wook, who has been living quietly in New Jersey for years. Many people in the Los Angeles Korean community insist that Kim Ki Kwan is the head of the KCIA's "black team" in the United States—the group of agents allegedly responsible for intimidating Koreans living in America.

Reliable sources said that the U.S. government is aware of Kim Ki Kwan's presence in the country, but inquiries about him to federal agencies seemed to run up against a stone wall. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, for example, said that it has no record in its resident-alien master file of anyone in the Los Angeles area under either of Kim's two names.

Sources on Capitol Hill said that congressional inquiries about Kim Ki Kwan drew only vague replies and "the blandest generalities" from federal agencies. Meanwhile, retired or not, Kim Ki Kwan lives in the Los Angeles area, changing his residence frequently.

In the United States, the Justice Department has begun a quiet investigation of charges that the agency is harassing and intimidating Korean residents. So far, the investigation has failed to turn up any evidence of systematic wrongdoing traceable to KCIA agents, leading to suspicion in Korean-American circles that Washington—concerned about strains in its alliance with Seoul, America's only military ally on the North Asian mainland—has let the investigation bog down.

Korean residents say that the KCIA agents make anonymous threats against anti-Park dissidents, try to win control of Korean communal organizations and bring economic pressure against hostile Korean-language newspapers.

The campaign, they say, is most evident in California, where a third of the 300,000 Korean residents in the United States live.

Typical of what allegedly goes on is the story told by Lee Young Woon, a former admiral in the South Korean navy and outspoken Park opponent who now owns a motor hotel in the Los Angeles area.

Lee said that in March, while he was in Japan delivering an anti-Park speech, four men, including the South Korean consul general in Los Angeles, "barged into the office and shouted at my wife and my son-in-law that they wanted to know where I was. They frightened my wife very much," he added.

Since then, Lee says, he has received several telephone threats: "The phone rings late at night and a voice says, 'Don't go out tomorrow. If you go out, you will be killed.' It has made my wife and me very fearful of leaving the motel."

Those familiar with Korean affairs say that harassment of this sort can have a very devastating effect. As Donald L. Ranard, retired former director of the State Department's Office of Korean Affairs, notes:

"You are dealing for the most part with people who grew up in a police-state atmosphere, who are here as resident aliens rather than U.S. citizens, and who can't quite believe that the police here don't have the same power as in Korea.

"As a result, they feel themselves very vulnerable, and only a little bit of pressure can go a long way in making them think twice about what they say."

For example, sources at the Justice Department say, when the FBI recently sought to question 10 persons in the Los Angeles area who reportedly had information about KCIA activities there, eight of the 10—whether from fear or for other reasons—disclaimed any knowledge about the agency.

"Admittedly," Ranard continues, "this isn't the easiest thing to investigate. A lot of Koreans are scared, and when an FBI man flashes a badge on them, it's going to inhibit their talking freely.

"Also," he adds, "there's a lot of intrigue and rivalries in exile circles, and much of what's said is pure gossip aimed at enemies."

"Still, anybody who's familiar with this subject has good grounds for believing that there's something there," he concludes. It seems to me that a really thorough, professional investigation could turn some of it up."

Sources at the Justice Department point to two additional complications that help keep the KCIA investigation State requested from getting very high priority:

Some alleged KCIA agents are diplomats, and their immunity prevents the FBI from questioning them.

Many of the tactics ascribed to the KCIA, while improper diplomatic conduct, do not seem to violate federal statutes.

Many present and former State Department officials say privately that the tendency within the Department, particularly during the presidency of Richard M. Nixon, was "not to make too much noise" about the KCIA. One put it this way:

"You couldn't call it a coverup or anything like that; I never heard anyone say specifically that this was an area to stay away from. It was more that you sensed a lack of enthusiasm about pursuing complaints. The feeling seemed to be that we were dealing not with the Soviets and the KGB but with an important ally and that, like it or not, we had to avert our gaze a little bit."

One notable exception, the sources say, occurred three years ago when the State Department called in officials of the South Korean embassy for a scolding about KCIA activities. Shortly the station chief in Washington, Sang Ho Lee, was quietly recalled to Seoul.

(The present station chief in Washington is known to be Kim Yung Wahn, a former air force general identified by the embassy only as a diplomat with the rank of minister.)

The KCIA's immense concrete complex in southeastern Seoul, a heavily guarded compound overlooking the city, has become synonymous in many Korean minds with interrogation and torture.

Estimates of the agency's size generally run from 30,000 to 45,000. "I have up to a million," said a KCIA deputy director noncommittally. The agency's budget is not disclosed, but sources insist that much of the cost is defrayed by "donations" solicited or extorted from businesses.

Sources say the KCIA is heavily involved in the stock market, real estate, construction and tourism industries.

The KCIA is organized into eight bureaus, numbered from one through nine and omitting four—pronounced the same as "death," four is an unlucky word in Korean.

Bureau 1 gathers and collates information from foreign periodicals; Bureau 2 controls internal propaganda and censorship, monitoring staff relationships within the media and ordering stories run or spiked.

Bureaus 3, 5 and 6 are the ones that operate against dissenting Koreans at home and abroad: 3 is counterintelligence and counterespionage; 5 is internal security; and 6 is "dirty tricks," associated with the abduction of Kim Dae Jung in 1972 and of alleged spies from West Germany and Britain in 1967 and 1968.

Bureau 7 analyzes intelligence gathered abroad by embassies and consulates; 8 is charged with psychological-warfare against North Korea, and 9 does highly regarded strategic analysis on North Korea.

The KCIA's present director is Shin Jik Soo, a former attorney general hand-picked, like his predecessors, by Park. He attends Cabinet meetings, but sources say his influence as one of the two people closest to Park outranks the premier.

The agency has outstripped such other rivals for power as the Army Security Command, the Korean National Police (once all-powerful under Syngman Rhee) and the Presidential Security Force.

Diplomats observe that the KCIA is the perfect instrument for the president's control, since it can watch for possible coups from any quarter but lacks the armed strength to stage one itself.

Under Shin, the agency has reportedly abandoned heavy emphasis on torture for a variety of more subtle methods. Open and covert infiltration of government agencies, factories, political parties and universities suffices to deter or pre-empt dissent.

Practically every church service is attended by KCIA agents who note names and maintain dossiers on ministers and priests. "You have no private life," said a minister who has sought restoration of human rights. "It's not only your telephone and your mail, they question people you meet in your daily routine. From my colleagues and close friends they know what I am thinking."

Surveillance is conducted on U.S. diplomats, and, frequently the people they visit are later questioned by the KCIA on the topics of conversation. Koreans are reluctant to visit the embassy, for it is believed that all callers are photographed from a 19-story government building across the street. Political officers work behind net curtains designed to prevent high-resolution photography.

The campuses get special attention, since it was student demonstrations that brought down Syngman Rhee in 1960.

Since May last year, approximately 150 students have been charged with Emergency Measure No. 9 violations and about 50 have received prison terms of as much as 10 years for such offenses as demonstrating or passing pamphlets. Hundreds of other students have been taken off the street by the KCIA for a day or two of questioning. "They pick a few key figures, put the fear of God into them, get them worried about their families, give them a strong dose of anticommunism and release them," said the professor.

There is also evidence that agents provocateurs are working on the campuses to set other students up for KCIA arrest.

Broadly drawn laws offer a cloak of legitimacy for moves by the KCIA to extinguish dissent. Of some 400 professors fired under a new tenure system in March, about 300 were reported to be listed by the agency as campus undesirables for political activities.

Through coercion the KCIA is able to control labor unions and threaten judges. An eminent lawyer said, "You can just disregard the law. We lawyers can do nothing . . ."

He and other sources alleged that the KCIA intimidates judges to secure guilty verdicts and long sentences in political cases. "We know," he said: "Just look at the unreasonable decisions and sentences which make no common sense."

Typical of the KCIA's present techniques, sources say, was the interrogation of people arrested and subsequently charged with plotting to overthrow the government after the March 1 incident in which Christian leaders read a democracy statement during a cathedral Mass.

"They sat me on a narrow chair and teams of investigators keep asking the same questions again and again . . . It went on for six days and nights without sleep," one ex-prisoner said.

[From the New York Post, Mar. 19, 1976]

SEOUL'S U.S. OPERATIVES ¹

Even if it were determined to go all the way to the Presidential palace in Seoul, there would be a limit on how far the American government could proceed in trying to protect dissident South Koreans from the police of the Park Chung Hee regime. But there are no comparable restraints on Washington's freedom of movement within the continental limits of the United States.

It has every right, for example, to intervene at once to defend Korean nationals in this country from threats and harassment of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. But to judge from testimony before a House international organizations subcommittee, Washington is remarkably reluctant to act.

According to various witnesses, KCIA agents have done their worst with bribes and threats to intimidate the editor of a Korean paper in Los Angeles that has opposed Park. They have tried to break up public meetings of the Seoul regime's foes. If those are mild measures by the ruthless standards of suppression that now apply in South Korea, they should outrage Americans who take pride in the Bill of Rights.

Indeed, at a time when this nation is awaiting the Bicentennial of its bold declaration of liberty and human rights, it is incredible that Washington could remain indifferent to assaults on both by the KCIA.

¹ Reprinted by permission of New York Post, copyright 1976, New York Post Corp.

APPENDIX 3

CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE KOREAN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 12, 1975.

HON. EDWARD W. LEVI,
*Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: On June 10 the Subcommittee on International Organizations received testimony from Dr. Jai Hyon Lee, Associate Professor of Journalism at Western Illinois University. Until defecting in June 1973, Professor Lee was with the Korean Foreign Service and served from about 1970 to 1973 as Director of the Korean Information Office in Washington, D.C. Professor Lee alleged that the Korean Embassy and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) has been engaged in a number of illegal activities. He alleged that the KCIA harasses Koreans and Korean-Americans who are critical of the present government with threats against their families in Korea. He also alleged that the Korean government covertly funds a number of front organizations within the United States, who are not registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. He also alleges that the Korean Embassy has sought to buy off Members of Congress. Enclosed is a copy of Professor Lee's statement. A copy of the transcript of the hearings may be obtained from Alderson's Reporting Company in Washington, D.C.

I would appreciate knowing what organizations are registered under the above mentioned act. Also, would you kindly investigate all the charges of illegal activities which Professor Lee alleges? In the past, to what extent has the Justice Department monitored the activities of the KCIA and the Korean Embassy?

Your kind attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated. If you have any questions, please call my staff consultant, John Salzberg at 225-9237 or 9404.

With best wishes, I am
Sincerely yours,

DONALD M. FRASER,
*Chairman,
Subcommittee on International Organizations.*

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., August 25, 1975.

MR. CLARENCE M. KELLEY,
*Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. KELLEY: On June 12 I wrote to the Attorney General requesting information concerning the activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency within the United States. This inquiry arose from testimony my subcommittee received from Dr. Jai Hyon Lee, former Information Director of the Korean Embassy in Washington, who alleged a number of illegal activities by the KCIA and the Korean Embassy within the United States.

I have received a reply from John H. Davitt, Chief, Internal Security Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice concerning those organizations which gives the names of the organizations registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act which represent the Republic of South Korea. Mr. Davitt did not respond to my questions concerning the charges made by Dr. Lee and referred us to the F.B.I. A copy of Mr. Davitt's letter is enclosed.

Would you kindly investigate the charges Dr. Lee raised in his testimony. A copy of his statement is enclosed. A copy of the verbatim transcript is available, and may be requested from my consultant, John Salzberg, at 225-5318. In particular, Dr. Lee alleged that the KCIA and the Korean Embassy harasses Koreans and Korean-Americans who are critical of the present government with threats against their families in Korea. He also alleged that the Korean government covertly funds a number of front organizations within the United States, who are not registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. He also alleges that the Korean Embassy has sought to "buy off" Members of Congress.

Enclosed is a letter I received from Mr. Tong Hyon Kim. Would you kindly inform me whether he and/or his organization, the Pan-Asia Press, is performing services for the Korean Government.

You kind attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

DONALD M. FRASER,

Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations.

OCTOBER 21, 1975.

Hon. EDWARD H. LEVI,
*Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: On June 12, 1975 I wrote to you requesting that the Department of Justice investigate charges of illegal activities being conducted by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and the Korean Embassy. It is my understanding that the FBI is undertaking a thorough investigation of this matter and a report will be submitted to me as soon as the investigation is completed.

I would like the investigation to include several additional matters which have been brought to my attention. Enclosed is an article which appeared in the Los Angeles newspaper, The New Korea, which alleges that the KCIA was pressuring Korean-Americans to attend a fund raising dinner for Senator Tunney for which the KCIA provided the funds. I would appreciate any information you might have on this matter which, if proven true would, I presume, be in violation of our election laws.

The Korean Traders Association recently gave the East Asian studies program of Harvard University a one million dollar gift. It has been alleged that this money was provided by the Republic of Korea through the KCIA. I would appreciate it if you would investigate these charges as well as ascertain whether the Korea Traders Association has violated any U.S. laws.

Your kind attention in this matter would be most welcomed.

Sincerely yours,

DONALD H. FRASER,

Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations.

OCTOBER 28, 1975.

Mr. CLARENCE M. KELLEY,
*Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. KELLEY: In reference to my letter of August 25th to you inquiring into the activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency within the United States, I would appreciate replies to the following questions:

1. Who is director of the KCIA office in Washington? My information suggests it is (name and position deleted) in the Korean Embassy. If he is not director, does Minister Kim have any responsibilities regarding KCIA activities within the United States?

2. (Name and title deleted) was previously assigned to the Korean Embassy in Washington. Did he have responsibilities with respect to KCIA activities within the United States?

Your prompt response to these questions would be greatly appreciated.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

DONALD M. FRASER.

NOVEMBER 18, 1975.

HON. EDWARD H. LEVI,
Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: In connection with my letter of October 21, 1975 regarding certain alleged activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), Senator John Tunney has informed me that he did not accept the invitation to attend the fund raising dinner mentioned in my letter nor did he accept any funds which might have been raised from such a dinner. Given these facts, it is clear to me that the alleged KCIA effort was aborted. It would still be of interest to me, however, whether such an effort was attempted by the KCIA.

With best wishes.
 Sincerely,

DONALD M. FRASER.

DECEMBER 17, 1975.

Mr. CLARENCE M. KELLEY,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. KELLEY: In connection with human rights problems in South Korea, the Subcommittee on International Organizations in June 1975 began looking into possible illegal activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in the United States, and on June 12 and August 25 I requested assistance from the Attorney General and yourself regarding charges raised in testimony received before my subcommittee.

It has come to my attention that in 1973 an FBI report on KCIA activities was prepared. Because of the subcommittee's interest and established line of inquiry, I request that the FBI make available a copy of that report, or access to the report, for the subcommittee staff. Included in this request is access to other reports on this subject.

I hope this request will meet with your approval. Please have your staff contact Mr. Richard Mauzy, 225-5318, of the subcommittee staff regarding any questions or necessary arrangements.

Your prompt consideration of this matter will be greatly appreciated.
 Sincerely,

DONALD M. FRASER,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations.

JANUARY 12, 1975.

HON. EDWARD R. LEVI,
Attorney General,
Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: In the course of the Subcommittee on International Organization's investigation of possible illegal activities conducted by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in the United States new information has emerged indicating that the KCIA may be engaged in a massive effort to control the activities of Korean-Americans and Koreans residing in America. In addition to being serious encroachments against persons living under the protection of the U.S. Constitution, many of these activities may be in violation of the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act, as well as other statutes.

Attached is a memorandum prepared by my staff outlining the forms and some details of KCIA intervention in the United States. This information has been verbally presented to the Internal Security Section, Criminal Division, of the Justice Department. Because of the serious nature and scope of these activities, I request that they be added to the investigation I requested on June 12, 1975. I further request that the Department and the FBI jointly prepare and present a briefing on past and present KCIA activities and the progress of the current investigation for the subcommittee staff and myself.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be most appreciated.
 Sincerely yours,

DONALD M. FRASER,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations.

JANUARY 30, 1976.

HON. PHILIP C. HABIB,
*Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
 Department of State, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Subcommittee on International Organizations is looking into possible illegal activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), and is now preparing for hearings on that subject. Information received by the subcommittee indicates that the KCIA may be engaged in a massive effort to control the activities of Korean-Americans or Koreans residing in the United States. In addition to being serious encroachments against those living under the protection of the U.S. Constitution and constituting a grave violation of American sovereignty, many of these activities may be in violation of the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act, as well as other statutes.

Pursuant to the subcommittee's inquiry, I request that the Department provide information on the following questions:

How many KCIA officials are currently in the United States under diplomatic cover? How many KCIA officials are currently in the United States under non-diplomatic cover?

How many KCIA officials, under both diplomatic and non-diplomatic cover, are currently serving within the Embassy of the Republic of Korea? How many KCIA officials, under both diplomatic and non-diplomatic cover, are currently serving within the consulates of the Republic of Korea?

On what basis are KCIA officials admitted to the United States? What duties are they expected to perform?

Is the Department satisfied that KCIA officials in the United States are acting in accordance with any formal or informal agreements that may exist on the exchange and coordination of intelligence activities?

Is the Department satisfied that the activities of the KCIA within the United States are in harmony with American law?

I hope that you will be able to provide prompt and complete answers to these questions.

With best wishes, I am
 Sincerely yours,

DONALD M. FRASER,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations.

FEBRUARY 24, 1976.

HON. PHILIP C. HABIB,
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The International Organizations Subcommittee has received information indicating that at least five officials of the Korean Consulate in Los Angeles are in fact active agents of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). Since State Department spokesman Robert L. Funseth on December 24, 1975 reiterated the Department's position that the only reason for the presence of KCIA agents in the United States was to exchange foreign intelligence information and to maintain liaison with U.S. intelligence agencies, this information should be a cause for concern with the Department, as it is for this subcommittee.

The reputed head of the KCIA in Los Angeles is (name deleted), who has been serving as a "consul" since May 1975. The other officials have been identified as (name deleted) (consul, since May 1975), (name deleted) (consul, since October 1975), (name deleted), and (name deleted). ((Names deleted), however, are not listed as consular officials with the Office of Protocol.)

In addition, there have been reports that several individuals are also working as KCIA agents or operatives under non-diplomatic cover. These individuals have been identified as (name deleted), an apparently wealthy individual—but with no visible means of support—who has organized several Korean associations and who reportedly sends association members on free tours to Korea (name deleted), a former military policeman who allegedly switched to the KCIA, again an active man in Korean community affairs but with no visible means of support; and (name deleted), a former Korean naval officer, active in Korean community affairs, also having no visible means of support. All live in Los Angeles and are natives of Korea (although some may now have acquired the status of permanent residents of the United States).

Pursuant to the subcommittee's investigation of possible illegal activities of the KCIA, I hereby request that the Department seek clarification of the status

of Korean Consulate officials, particularly in Los Angeles, and advise this subcommittee of its findings. I also request that the Department urge the FBI to conduct an investigation into the background and activities of the persons named as possible KCIA agents or operatives working under non-diplomatic cover, and that this subcommittee be informed of the results of such investigations.

I hope you will give this matter your immediate attention.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

DONALD C. FRASER,

Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., March 11, 1976.

HON. DONALD M. FRASER,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letters of January 30 and February 24 to Assistant Secretary Habib regarding the interest of the Subcommittee on International Organizations in possible illegal activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in the United States.

I would first note that foreign government officials assigned to embassies and consulates in the United States are identified to the Department of State only in their diplomatic or consular capacities. Any association which they have, or may have had, with intelligence organizations of their own governments is not, as a matter of standard diplomatic practice, disclosed to the Department of State. Our diplomatic records do not, therefore, provide a basis to answer your questions concerning the numbers of KCIA personnel who may be assigned to diplomatic or consular posts in this country.

We are seriously concerned about any improper or illegal activities in the United States by the intelligence organizations of foreign governments. Within the Executive Branch, this entails an effort to learn of any improper or illegal behavior. Questions of this sort are, however, as I am sure you are aware, of a sensitive nature. They are, moreover, primarily the responsibility of the Department of Justice for internal security matters or the Central Intelligence Agency for information pertaining to relations with foreign intelligence services.

While I am unable, therefore, to answer with any specificity your questions concerning numbers and locations of KCIA personnel who may be assigned to diplomatic or consular positions in the United States, I can assure you that this issue is one of concern to us. I would also note our general view that foreign intelligence officers of friendly foreign governments are assigned to the United States to share the analysis of foreign intelligence materials with the appropriate U.S. Government agencies to which they are identified. We do not consider it appropriate for them to be involved in intimidation or harassment of members of their national communities in the United States. I can assure you that the Korean Government is fully aware of our position on this.

Since, with limited exceptions not pertinent here, we are not an investigative agency and are not responsible for the enforcement of local, state or federal laws, the Department must primarily rely on local, state and federal enforcement agencies to bring instances of alleged illegal activities by foreign officials to our attention. In cases where individuals bring such complaints directly to our attention, we refer their complaints to the Department of Justice, which has direct responsibility for such matters.

All foreign officials admitted to the United States to serve in their country's diplomatic or other official establishments are, of course, expected and obligated to conduct themselves in accordance with U.S. law. Such officials may, however, enjoy certain privileges and immunities from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts by virtue of U.S. law, specific international agreements or customary international law and practice. The privileges and immunities of officials of the Republic of Korea in the U.S. are generally governed by 22 USC 252 and 253, by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (22 UST 3227, TIAS 7502), or by our Bilateral Consular Convention (14 UST 1637, TIAS 5469.)

When an investigation by the appropriate enforcement agency provides evidence that a foreign official has violated the law, the Department advises the enforcement agency what standard of immunity the particular official enjoys. Diplomatic officials generally enjoy absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts;

consular officials enjoy immunity only for their official acts. In the case of the latter, it may be alleged that a particular course of conduct falls outside the scope of the individual's immunity. The appropriate U.S. court then determines whether the official does in fact enjoy immunity for the alleged course of conduct. In the event that it is determined that a foreign official enjoys immunity for acts which would be considered illegal, the Department very carefully considers what diplomatic action it would be appropriate to take, including, as you are undoubtedly aware, requesting his departure from the U.S.

In 1973, various allegations of improper activities by Korean Government officials assigned to the United States were made. At that time a number of Korean residents in this country complained directly to the Department that they had been harassed by the KCIA. An investigation was undertaken by the Department of Justice, and, although it was not possible to determine all of the facts concerning these reports, we were satisfied that there was enough substance to the complaints to warrant an expression of our concern to the Korean Government. We pointed out that we considered such activities to be completely inappropriate and unacceptable, and we believe the Korean Government fully understood our views.

From 1973 until recently, the Department did not receive any major direct complaints from either Koreans residing in the United States or from appropriate U.S. enforcement agencies that such harassment was continuing. However, in recent months, we were made aware of allegations of improper activities through complaints by Professor Lee Jai Hyon of Western Illinois University and Mrs. Julia Moon of the U.S.-Asian News Service.

In both of these cases we brought the complaints to the attention of the Department of Justice for appropriate action; we understand that investigations are now being carried out by the Department. We have also informed the Korean Government of the fact that we have received these complaints and that the Department of Justice is undertaking an investigation. When this investigation is completed, we will consider whatever appropriate action may be necessary.

I have been informed that two members of your staff met with several Department officers on March 3 to discuss your letter of February 24 and Department actions with respect to it.

Should you so desire, we would be glad to discuss this matter further with you or members of your staff.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY,
*Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations.*

APRIL 5, 1976.

HON. PHILIP C. HABIB,
*Assistant Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In the course of the subcommittee's inquiry into the activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in the United States, the activities of several individuals have been called into question. To properly understand these situations, and State Department policy towards them, additional information is required on the following cases:

Row Chin Hwan.—In 1974 Row Chin Hwan, a Korean national assemblyman, offered to contribute money to the campaigns of members of Congress who were friendly to Korea. Such an offer would be in violation of Title 18, Section 613 of the U.S. Criminal Code (prior to 1974 amendments). In this regard, what is the Department's policy toward nondiplomatic foreign officials who engage in such unlawful behavior? Does the Department normally continue to issue visas to such an individual?

Kim Ki-Wan.—According to information received by this subcommittee (and relayed to the Justice Department) Kim Ki-Wan, a Korean diplomat, and reputed KCIA agent who was involved in the Kim Dae-Jung kidnapping, is now living in Los Angeles under the name of Kim Jae-Kwong. His phone number is [deleted]. Considering this man's reported background, under what provisions of U.S. law was he admitted to the United States, and was he admitted under his real name or an alias? Also, to the best of the Department's knowledge, was Mr. Kim admitted as a foreign official or a private individual, or does he currently have any official or semi-official relationship with the ROK Government or the KCIA?

The Korea Herald.—Kwang Heun Hahn, publisher of Hancock Shin-Moon and the Washington Observer, both Washington-based newspapers, is reportedly the

distributor for the Korea Herald, a newspaper that is owned and operated by the Korean Government inside Korea. I would like to know (a) if the Department considers the Korea Herald to contain any foreign propaganda material, and (b) if any U.S.-Korea agreement permits such distribution within the U.S. beyond the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act or other relevant statutes.

I hope you will be able to provide prompt answers to these questions to facilitate the subcommittee's work. I also hope the Department will consider action on these, if the facts so warrant, in order to impress upon the South Korean Government that illegal or improper activities in this country will not be tolerated.

With best wishes, I am
Sincerely yours,

DONALD M. FRASER,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., April 28, 1976.

HON. DONALD M. FRASER,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations,
U.S. House of Representatives.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Assistant Secretary Habib has requested that I respond to your letter of April 5 concerning the subcommittee's inquiry into activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). Your letter requests further information on the following particular cases:

Row Chin Hwan.—In 1974, Mr. John E. Nidecker, then of the White House staff, reported to the Department that Mr. Row had offered to contribute money to the campaigns of members of Congress. Mr. Nidecker reported that he immediately informed Mr. Row that such contributions would probably be illegal under U.S. law and, at the very least, would be extremely improper. We understand that Mr. Row has denied ever making such an offer. In any event, Mr. Row did not, so far as the Department is aware, make any subsequent offers to Mr. Nidecker after being informed of their probable illegality.

Under these circumstances, we do not believe we have a basis for denying Mr. Row a visa upon request. I can assure you, however, that the Department has made the Korean Government fully aware of the illegality of any attempts to contribute money to political campaigns in the United States and the impropriety of Mr. Row's reported comments.

Kim Ki-Wan.—The Department's records do not indicate that anyone by this name is currently accredited or recognized on the diplomatic or consular lists. We presume, therefore, that anyone admitted to the United States under this name was admitted as a private individual.

An informal inquiry of the Los Angeles Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service has also failed to generate information on anyone by this name or by the name of Kim Jae-Kwong. We are forwarding a copy of your letter to the headquarters of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for a thorough check of its records to see if it can answer your question, and for consideration of whether there may be any illegalities associated with this individual's visa.

The Korea Herald.—The Korea Herald is owned and operated by the Korean Government. As such, it must be anticipated that its news and editorials reflect the policies of that government.

There are no agreements between the United States and the Republic of Korea which apply to the distribution of the Korea Herald in the United States or which would affect in any way the applicability of U.S. statutes to that distribution. We are informed by officials of the Department of Justice that they are already investigating the applicability of the Foreign Agents Registration Act to the distribution in the U.S. of the Korea Herald and that they have been made aware of your information on this subject by previous communication directly with you. We also understand that the Department of Justice will be discussing this issue with you in the near future.

We hope this information is of assistance in the subcommittee's work. Let me assure you that the Department will continue to take appropriate action respecting illegal or improper activities when the facts so warrant.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY,
*Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations.*

MARCH 31, 1976.

Hon. PHILIP C. HABIB,
*Assistant Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In my letter of February 24, 1976, I relayed information concerning the alleged relationship between certain South Korean consular officials in Los Angeles and the Korean CIA. An FBI investigation of those individuals was also requested.

The subcommittee has recently received additional information regarding the stationing of KCIA agents in South Korean consulates throughout the United States. Specifically, it is alleged that (name deleted) and (name deleted), of the San Francisco consulate, (name deleted), South Korea's alternate observer at the UN, and (name deleted), a vice-consul with the New York consulate are KCIA agents not engaged in legitimate intelligence liaison.

Pursuant to the subcommittee's continuing investigation of possible illegal or improper activities of the KCIA, I hereby request that the Department seek clarification of the status of these officials and seek an FBI investigation of these individuals. I also request that the Department advise this subcommittee of the results of these inquiries.

With best wishes, I am
Sincerely yours,

DONALD M. FRASER,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., April 22, 1976.

Hon. DONALD M. FRASER,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your March 31 letter to Mr. Habib concerning allegations received by your subcommittee that certain Korean Government officials in San Francisco and New York are connected with the Korean CIA.

The Department's records indicate that (name deleted) and (name deleted) are both recognized as consuls in the Korean Consulate General in San Francisco and (name deleted) is recognized as a consul in the Korean Consulate General in New York. In addition, we understand that (name deleted) is accredited to the United Nations as a member of the Office of the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations with the personal rank of Ambassador.

The Department has forwarded the information contained in your letter to the Department of Justice, which, as you know, is conducting an investigation into allegations of improper and illegal activities by Korean Government officials in the United States. I would recommend that your staff make available directly to the Department of Justice whatever specific information you may have concerning the Korean officials named in your letter. Also, as in the past, Department officers would be happy to meet with your staff.

As I indicated in my letter of March 11 to you on this same subject, the Department will consider whatever appropriate action may be necessary when the present investigation is completed.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY,
*Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations.*

APPENDIX 4

MEMORANDA FROM RAYMOND J. CELADA, SENIOR SPECIALIST IN AMERICAN LAW, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONCERNING STATUTES AFFECTING DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN AGENTS

STATUTES AFFECTING DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN AGENTS, MARCH 12, 1976

Reference is made to your inquiry of March 8, 1976, requesting information on the above matter. Specifically, you ask for reference to and explanation of federal laws regulating the conduct of foreign agents, including registration requirements and political campaign contributions.

There currently exist three statutory schemes designed to identify and control the agents of a foreign power. All are bolstered by penal sanctions.

1. Section 951, title 18, United States Code, makes it a Federal crime for any person, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attaché, to act in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the Secretary of State. Violations of this section may be punished by up to 10 years imprisonment or \$5,000 fine, or both.

The term "agent" is not defined. It has been held that a contractual relationship between a defense plant employee and the Soviet Government was not necessary to make the employee who passed defense information to members Soviet United Nations Mission an "agent" of the Soviet Government within the meaning of section 951. "... a contractual relationship is unnecessary, since the act itself does not define the word 'agent'. The few judicial decisions in the field do not discuss the definition in any detail. *The cases assume that it means one who acts directly or indirectly for the benefit of a foreign government.*" *United States v. Butenko*, 384 F. 2d 554, 565-566 (3rd Cir. 1967), *vacated on other grounds*, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (Emphasis supplied.)

The term "foreign government" is defined at 18 U.S.C.A. 11 to include any government, faction, or body of insurgents within a country with which the United States is at peace, irrespective of recognition by the United States.

The constitutionality of the act has been sustained over objections that the requirement of registration is in violation of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. "... the statutory requirement of registration . . . was not unconstitutional, because the statute concerned *future* acts, and the constitutional protection covered only *past* deeds." *United States v. Melekh*, 193 F. Supp. 586, 591, 592 (N.D. 111, 1961).

The court in that case further found

"... no inconsistency between 18 U.S.C. § 951, making it a criminal offense punishable by not more than \$5,000 and/or ten years, for one to act as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the Secretary of State, and 22 U.S.C.A. § 612(a) which requires every person who becomes an agent of a foreign principal to register with the Attorney General within ten days after becoming such agent, and prescribes a \$10,000 and/or five-year penalty. The one could be for the purpose of clarification of diplomatic ramifications and the other for security measures. The registering officials are different; the times are different. Nor is the difference in prescribed time for registration necessarily incompatible. Furthermore, as is pointed out by the Government, Section 13 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act provided that

'This Act is in addition to and not in substitution for any other existing statute.' 22 U.S.C.A. p. 234.

Finally, because of the later date of enactment of the Criminal Code, Section 951 of Title 18 was in fact enacted later than 22 U.S.C.A. § 612." *Id.*, at 591.

2. Section 219, title 18, United States Code, makes it a criminal offense punishable by not more than \$10,000 and/or two years, for any person who, being an officer or employee of the United States in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the government or in any agency of the United States, including the District of Columbia, is or acts as an agent of a foreign principal required to register under 22 U.S.C. 612.

The terms used in section 219 will be examined later.

There are no reported decisions under this section. The House Report (No. 1470, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.) on the legislation proposing section 219 contains the following relevant comments :

10. Officers and employees of the U.S. Government are prohibited from acting as agents of foreign principals. Contract or part-time employees of the Federal Government may act as agents of foreign principals if the head of the employing agency certifies that such employment is in the national interest and a copy of the certification is placed in the public file of the agent maintained by the Department of Justice.

Section 8(b) would amend chapter 11 of the United States Code, title 18, by adding a new section relating to conflicts of interest involving foreign agents.

The new section would make it a felony for any agent of a foreign principal required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 to act as an officer or employee of the U.S. Government or any agency thereof.

The section would except from its prohibition any agent whose employment was certified as required in the national interest by the head of the employing agency. Any such certificate would be made a part of the public records relating to the agent on file with the Department of Justice. 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 2397, 2411, 2399.

3. The Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C.A. 611-621, imposes severe criminal sanctions on any person who acts as an agent of a foreign principal within the United States unless he files a certified registration statement with the Attorney General. Moreover, "[t]he obligation of an agent of a foreign principal to file a registration statement shall, after the tenth day of his becoming such agent, continue from day to day, and termination of such status shall not relieve such agent from his obligation to file a registration statement for the period during which he was an agent of a foreign principal." 22 U.S.C.A. 612 (Supp.). The registration statement elicits a host of details including particulars concerning the agreement with the foreign principal and any activities under the foreign principal-agent relationship. See 22 U.S.C.A. 612 for the complete list of information required to appear on the registration statement. In particular, the registration statement shall detail :

"money and other things of value spent or disposed of by the registrant during the preceding sixty days in furtherance of or in connection with activities which require his registration hereunder and which have been undertaken by him either as an agent of a foreign principal or for himself or any other person or in connection [sic] with any activities relating to his becoming an agent of such principal, and a detailed statement of any contributions the making of which is prohibited under the terms of section 613 of Title 18) *in connection with an election to any political office or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for any political office.* 22 U.S.C.A. 612(a) (8) (Supp.). (Emphasis added.)

The terms "agent of a foreign principal" and "foreign principal" are defined broadly, viz :

(b) The term "foreign principal" includes—

(1) a government of a foreign country and a foreign political party ;
 (2) a person outside of the United States, unless it is established that such person is an individual and a citizen of and domiciled within the United States, or that such person is not an individual and is organized under or created by the laws of the United States or of any State or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and has its principal place of business within the United States ; and

(3) a partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other combination of persons organized under the laws of or having its principal place of business in a foreign country.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the term "agent of a foreign principal" means—

(1) any person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal or of a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal, and who directly or through any other person—

(i) engages within the United States in political activities for or in the interests of such foreign principal ;

(ii) acts within the United States as a public relations counsel, publicity agent, information-service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such foreign principal ;

(iii) within the United States solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal ; or

(iv) within the United States represents the interests of such foreign principal before any agency or official of the Government of the United States ; and

(2) any person who agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or holds himself out to be, whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an agent of a foreign principal as defined in clause (1) of this subsection.

(d) The term "agent of a foreign principal" does not include any news or press service or association organized under the laws of the United States or of any State or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or any newspaper, magazine, periodical, or other publication for which there is on file with the United States Postal Service information in compliance with section 3611 of title 39, published in the United States, solely by virtue of any bona fide news or journalistic activities, including the solicitation or acceptance or advertisements, subscriptions, or other compensation therefor, so long as it is at least 80 per centum beneficially owned by, and its officers and directors, if any, are citizens of the United States, and such news or press service or association, newspaper, magazine, periodical, or other publication, is not owned, directed, supervised, controlled, subsidized, or financed, and none of its policies are determined by any foreign principal defined in subsection (b) of this section, or by any agent of a foreign principal required to register under this subchapter ; 22 U.S.C.A. 611 (supp.)

Section 613 contains various exemptions from the registration requirement, e.g., a duly accredited diplomatic or consular office of a foreign government, any person engaging or agreeing to engage solely in activities in furtherance of bona fide religious, scholastic, academic or scientific pursuits or of the fine arts, and any person qualified to practice law insofar as he engages or agrees to engage in the legal representation of a disclosed foreign principal before any court or any agency of the United States.

Section 614(a) provides that persons required to register who transmit or cause to be transmitted any political propaganda (see 22 U.S.C. 611(j)) must send, within forty-eight hours, copies of such propaganda to the Attorney General, along with a statement as to the times, places, and extent of such transmittal.

Section 615 requires every registered agent of a foreign principal to keep books of account and written records of his activities. The Attorney General may inspect these books at all reasonable times. It is a crime to willfully conceal, destroy, mutilate, or falsify such books or records or attempt to do so.

Section 617 provides that each officer or director, or person performing the functions of an officer or director, of an agent of a foreign principal which is not an individual is obligated to cause such agent to file a registration statement and to comply with the requirements of Section 614 (political propaganda) and all other requirements of the Act. In the case of the failure of any such agent of a foreign principal to comply, each of its officers and directors is subject to prosecution.

Section 618 authorizes substantial penalties for violation of the Act's requirements.

As described recently, "[t]he purpose of the Act is to protect the interests of the United States by requiring complete public disclosure by persons acting for or in the interests of foreign principals where their activities are political in nature. These disclosures offer the Government and our people the opportunity to be informed and therefore enable them to understand the purposes for which they act." *Attorney General v. Irish Northern Aid Committees*, 346 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (S.D. N.Y. 1972).

The Act "is founded upon the indisputable power of the Government to conduct its foreign relations and to provide for the national defense and so falls within the inherent regulatory power of the Congress. . . . What is more fundamental . . . than the authority to require every person acting as an 'agent' of a foreign principal to file comprehensive information showing his agency activities."

Ibid. 4. 18 U.S.C. 613 makes it a crime for a foreign national to make contributions to any election :

Whoever, being a foreign national, directly or through any other person knowingly makes any contribution of money or other thing of value, or promises expressly or impliedly to make any such contribution, in connection with an election to any political office or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for any political office ; or

Whoever knowingly solicits, accepts, or receives any such contribution from any such foreign national—

Shall be fined not more than \$25,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both.

As used in this section, the term "foreign national" means

(1) a foreign principal, as such term is defined by section 1(b) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(b)), except that the term "foreign national" shall not include any individual who is a citizen of the United States ; or

(2) an individual who is not a citizen of the United States and who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence, as defined by section 101(a) (20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a) (20)).

(P.L. 89-486, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 248, as amended by P.L. 93-443, § 101(d) (1) (3), (4) (A), 88 Stat. 1267.)

RAYMOND J. CELADA,

Senior Specialist in American Public Law.

STATUTES AFFECTING DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN CONTROLLED ORGANIZATIONS, APRIL 12, 1976

Reference is made to your inquiry of April 1, 1976, requesting information on an upcoming hearing involving certain organizations which may be in league with or otherwise promoting the interests of a foreign government.

We have examined the confidential material submitted by Mr. Boettcher. Generally, the statutory authorities cited in our memorandum of March 12, 1976, seem to be the ones having a bearing on the problem described therein, viz: the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 611-621, which imposes severe criminal sanctions on any person who acts as an agent of a foreign principal within the United States unless he files a certified registration statement with the Attorney General; 18 U.S.C. § 951, which makes it a Federal crime for any person, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attaché, to act in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the Secretary of State; 18 U.S.C.A. § 219, which makes it a criminal offense punishable by not more than \$10,000 and or two years, for any person who, being an officer or employee of the United States in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the government or in any agency of the United States, including the District of Columbia, is or acts as an agent of a foreign principal required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act; 18 U.S.C.A. § 613 (Supp.), which makes it a crime for a foreign national to make contributions to any election for public offices.

As explained during earlier conferences on this and related matters, there are other provisions which conceivably could come into play, but which on the basis of known and alleged facts are unlikely at best e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 310, prohibits the grant of an FCC license to aliens or representatives of aliens, foreign governments and their agents, foreign corporations, and any corporations controlled by other corporations owned or substantially controlled by aliens; 50 U.S.C.A. § 851, which requires every person who has knowledge of, or has received instruction or assignment in, the espionage, counter espionage, or sabotage service or tactics of a government of a foreign political party to register with the Attorney General; 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 303, 310, which regulates the grant of licenses to noncitizens for radio stations on aircraft. Even more remote—both in terms of apparent relevancy and desuetude—is the Voorhis Anti-Propaganada Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2386, that, *inter alia*, requires every organization subject to a foreign control which engages in political activity to register with the Attorney General. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 10.0 to 10.9.

The Foreign Agents Registration Act appears to be the paramount relevant legal requirement in the present circumstances. It should be noted, however, that

the Act expressly excludes "(e) any person engaging or agreeing to engage *only* in activities in furtherance of bona fide *religious*, scholastic, academic, or scientific pursuits or of the fine arts." 22 U.S.C.A. § 613. In this regard, although the law does not necessitate a contract to establish an agency, because of the severe penal sanctions it imposes, something more than not speaking ill of foreign leader X or not working at cross purposes with him seems needed. However, if the agency exists, then the law requires the agent to file political propaganda for or the interest of his foreign principal whether in the form of prints or what have you. 22 U.S.C.A. § 614. The term print includes "newspapers and periodicals." 22 U.S.C.A. § 611.

RAYMOND J. CELADA,
Senior Specialist in American Public Law.

RADIO OF FREE ASIA—SUMMARY

By letter dated December 23, 1970, Mr. Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, inquired as to RADIO OF FREE ASIA's (RFA) status under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The Department responded by letter dated April 5, 1971, that RFA was not registered under the Act and that available evidence was insufficient to constitute RFA an agent of a foreign principal.

By letter dated June 8, 1971, the Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, furnished additional information concerning RFA. The Department responded by letter dated July 28, 1971, advising that the information was insufficient to establish RFA as an agent of a foreign principal; however, it did suggest that RFA was acting under the direction and control of the Korean Government. Further, the concurrence of the Department of State was requested in having the Bureau make inquiry into this matter.

The Department of State by letter dated October 11, 1971, expressed its concurrence in a full scale investigation of RFA to determine whether there had been a violation of any Federal statute. With the agreement of the Criminal Division, the Internal Security Division requested the Bureau to conduct an investigation of RFA under the registration statutes and the statutes on fraud and misuse of the United States mails.

The Department of State had attached to its letter of June 8, 1971, a "SECRET" memorandum on RFA which alleged persons associated with RFA were of questionable reputation and were believed to be members of the KCIA.

A review of available information revealed that these allegations could not be confirmed by competent evidence. The Bureau report revealed that the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation, Incorporated (KCOFF) is a charitable organization incorporated in 1964 under the laws of the District of Columbia. RFA is a project of KCOFF. The Internal Revenue Service by letter dated September 17, 1964, granted KCOFF tax exempt status pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and by letter dated September 29, 1971, advised that the activities of the KCOFF had been examined for the years ending June 30, 1967, and June 30, 1968, and that the Federal tax-exempt status of KCOFF was continued for those years.

The investigation revealed the principal activity of RFA was the dissemination of information abroad about the foreign policies of the United States and other countries. KCOFF, in addition to its RFA activities, also sponsored a tour of this country by the national folk ballet of Korea (aka. The Little Angels) and awarded scholarships to Korean students for study in the United States. During an interview with FRI agents, the president of KCOFF and RFA contended that the United States Congress intended to encourage private agencies such as KCOFF to disseminate information abroad about the United States by enacting Public Law 402 of the 80th Congress (The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948). No evidence was developed to indicate that KCOFF and RFA were other than such private organizations.

By letter dated March 16, 1972, the Department of State was advised that, based on the information disclosed in the Bureau report, there was insufficient evidence to constitute RFA an agent of a foreign principal within the meaning of the Foreign Agents Registration Act so as to require registration and that there was insufficient evidence to establish a violation of the statutes on fraud in the mails or of any other Federal law which the Department was charged to enforce.

APPENDIX 5

KOREAN NEWSPAPERS ARTICLES SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY PROF. GREGORY HENDERSON

KOREAN STUDY AT HARVARD TO EXPAND UNDER \$4 MILLION EAST ASIA PROJECT

[From Joong-Ang Ilbo, Mar. 12, 1975]

(By Kim Young-hee, Washington correspondent)

A \$4 million project is being actively promoted to enhance Korean studies at Harvard University. Interestingly enough, the project is greatly complicated by the feud between those Harvard scholars who have been actively interfering with the domestic affairs of Korea and those who disapprove such behavior, and also by their 'intra-mural competition' to gain control of East Asian studies with Harvard.

The project is being promoted by Mr. Thomas Jefferson Coolidge of Back Bay-Orient Enterprise, an investor in Korea, who chairs the International Organizing Committee of the Program for Harvard and East Asia, and is intended to establish two chairs for the study of Korean economy, sociology and culture with \$1 million orally pledged by the Korea Trade Association and \$2.8 million which Mr. Coolidge will raise from American investors in Korea.

Harvard is pondering over whether it should accept the amount pledged by the Korea Trade Association.

In donating so large an amount of money, Korea has two objectives in mind. First, to carry the Fourth Five-Year Economic Plan into practice, she wants to consult American scholars on income redistribution and social development, and in international monetary organizations such as the World Bank, from which the funds for the Plan will have to be borrowed, there are many ex-Harvard professors who have close connection with Harvard economists. The participation of American scholars is desired.

An informed economist said that the kinds of brains necessary for the Five-Year Plan are found in the Harvard circle and that the World Bank's loan award decisions are greatly influenced by those who were at Harvard in the past. As an example, he quoted the participation of Harvard scholars in the development plans of Brazil and Colombia.

The second objective is to promote counter-active efforts against those who spearhead anti-Korean government moves like Reischauer and Cohen, thereby to engender a pro-Korean atmosphere at Harvard and in other American academic circles.

Harvard's East Asian studies are managed by its East Asian Research Center whose executive affairs are in the hands of the Council on East Asian Studies with Prof. Fairbank as its chairman and Prof. Reischauer as vice-chairman. Fairbank is due to retire in 1976. Apparently Reischauer may succeed to the chairmanship. In fact, however, this is not likely to be the case. He is too close to Japan, and this is inviting repercussions from those who study China and Korea as well as from those who pursue pure academic work.

To make matters worse, Reischauer recently suffered a stroke. Though he has recovered for the present, his health is a problem now. This raises the possibility that the chairmanship may be given to one who would not retire within a year. Prof. Jerome A. Cohen, who speaks a lot on Korean problems, belongs to the Law School and is therefore not directly involved in the complicated affairs of the East Asian Research Center at the present time.

Fairbank is known to think it highly disagreeable for scholars to interfere in the domestic affairs of foreign countries, as Reischauer and Cohen do, and is also known to support the efforts of Korean Harvard graduates to promote Korean studies, thereby becoming estranged from Reischauer.

Fairbank is greatly dissatisfied with professors like Reischauer and Cohen for their "over-participation." At a recent meeting with Kissinger together with many university presidents, Fairbank is reported to have complained about Harvard professors' interference in the domestic affairs of foreign countries. Kissinger is also reported to have taken a similar stand.

If Harvard's East Asia project is realized, it is expected that many scholars will be consulted on Korea's Fourth Five-Year Economic Plan. The collection of Korean books at Harvard's Yenching Institute, currently about 30,000 volumes, will be greatly expanded; with \$1.8 million to be available after founding two chairs, research on Korea by foreign doctoral candidates and junior scholars will be supported; and exchange of Korean scholars and students will also be promoted, according to sources.

The 1 million from Korea is pledged on condition that it be used exclusively on Korean studies. Though it is not decided how, and by which organization, the money will be used, it is likely to come under the joint management of the Council on East Asian Studies and the East Asian Research Center.

Mr. Coolidge, the promoter of this project, is a descendant of both Thomas Jefferson and Calvin Coolidge, and became fond of Korea while in military service during the Korean war. He is investing in Korea through Boston-based Back Bay-Orient Enterprise and has Korea Silk Textile, an export industry firm, in Korea.

[From Chosun Ilbo, Mar. 13, 1975]

AMERICAN ACADEMIC CIRCLES' SELF-RESTRAINT ON INTERFERENCE WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES¹

(By Kim Dae-joong, Washington correspondent)

When Prof. Edwin Reischauer of Harvard University and Prof. Gregory Henderson of Tufts University finished testimony condemning repression of human rights by the present Korean government and insisting on reduction of military assistance to Korea at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives last July, Korean spectators who filled most of the seats passionately clapped their hands in violation of regulations.

Though not necessarily subsequent to the above incident, Prof. Jerome Cohen also of Harvard who has published his views criticizing the present Korean government is known to have been visited or encouraged by anti-government Koreans.

Even some Opposition leaders have come to feel their U.S. trip to be more significant through visits to Boston to meet them.

Together with other members of the Ivy League like Yale and Columbia on the East coast, Harvard is known to be one of the academic centers that has considerable influence on the internal and external policies of the United States. The Harvard faculty is therefore known to be deeply involved in the internal and external policy-making process of the United States and to have frequent contacts with the State Dept., Congress and intelligence agencies.

The Korean question is no exception. The Harvard group on the Korean question represented by Edwin Reischauer and Jerome Cohen has been extremely critical of the political affairs of Korea. Especially, Reischauer has insisted on reduction of military assistance and gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. Their views have at times influenced the State Department, Congress and the Pentagon.

Within Harvard, however, there has begun to emerge an opinion that "criticism on political realities and academic work should be differentiated." On that occasion of the proposed founding of a chair to study Korea's economy and sociology at Harvard with a donation of \$1 million from Korea, a group of faculty members in Korean studies headed by Prof. John Fairbanks, chairman of Council on EAS, Mr. T. J. Coolidge, chairman of Harvard's East Asian studies (sic), Edward Wagner, professor of Korean studies, Vincent Brandt, professor of Korean anthropology, Lester Gordon, executive board member of Harvard's Center for International Affairs, David Cole, professor of Korean economy, and Professor Marshall Pihl have voiced self-restraint to the effect that "it is neces-

¹ Author's note of reservation: Any article is open to various interpretations. In my case, however, I want to make a note that I wrote the article in the context that I hoped the Korean Government was establishing a chair at Harvard, not for buying the support of academicians, but for better understanding of the Korean situation, which I think is natural. I think it has nothing to do with the KCIA.

sary to study and understand the culture, society, economy and politics of Korea and the United States rather than to criticize politics excessively."

There seems to be a few factors behind this tendency. First, because of its influence, Harvard's direct involvement in political realities rather than in pure academic work has begun to be generally criticized by those within Harvard who pursue the latter. Second, Harvard has felt the need to expand its East Asian program, a field in which it feels itself to be an authority. According to a source, Harvard's study on China and Japan has gone beyond the basic stage now. It has also been indicated that from a geopolitical standpoint Korea is becoming increasingly important and that this has begun to give impetus to Korean studies. It is thought in these circumstances that the criticism of some scholars on Korea can possibly dampen the chances of enlisting the financial cooperation of the Korean government, which is an essential factor for Korean studies. This probably is an expression of the way of thinking that it will better serve the long-range interests of the United States to widen the basis of East Asian studies in American academic circles by understanding Korea better, rather than simply to criticize its current circumstances so bitterly.

Negotiations to establish an institute for the study of Korean economy and sociology with \$1 million from Korea are at a mature stage. The fund is to be donated by Korea's Industrial-Academic Cooperation headed by Park Chung-hoon. This will be an occasion to criticize excessive criticism. There are also problems arising among Harvard's scholars of Korean studies themselves.

A few scholars of Korean studies who used to find themselves lonely in the splendor of Chinese and Japanese studies appear to resist the attempt of Reischauer and Cohen to expand their sphere into the Korean question on this occasion, and to respond with, "How do you know Korea so well?" It may be for this reason that neither Reischauer nor Cohen appears to be involved in the proposed project.

Minister Yang Yoon-se of the Korean Embassy who visited Harvard at the end of February on this business is known to have openly rejected Reischauer and Cohen by saying that "the money from Korea in its present hardships cannot be used to condemn the Korean government."

In any event, Fairbank's remark that the right to oppose and to criticize within the university is being abused and understood in a counter-productive way" can be reasonably taken for a check within Harvard against excessive criticism of foreign countries. But ultimately the problem boomerangs back to us Koreans. It is important to get rid of the tendency of some Koreans to use Harvard professors as a means through which to criticize (the Korean government), as well as to outgrow the mentality to use acquaintanceship with them as a political background. However, no less important is it to realize that it would be dangerous to have people in the Korean government who tend to hold a monolithic view that a scholar's mouth can be adjusted with money or power.

